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10	SAN FRANCIS	SCO DIVISION
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 	JAMES STEWART, JOEL MILNE and JOSEPH STRAZULLO, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. GOGO INC., Defendant.	<section-header><text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text></section-header>
	DEF'S NOT OF MOT & MOT TO DISMISS SAC; MEMO OF P&A	CASE NO. 12-cv-05164-EMC

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1	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMDULAINT			
	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:			
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3	Please take notice that on January 23, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. or as soon thereafter as this matter			
4	may be heard before the Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge, in the United			
5	States District Court for the Northern District of California, 450 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco,			
6	CA, 94102, Defendant Gogo Inc. will and hereby does move this Court for an order dismissing			
7	with prejudice Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint ("SAC") filed August 30,			
8	2013 (Dkt. No. 59) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which			
9	relief can be granted.			
10	This motion is based on this notice, the accompanying memorandum of points and			
11	authorities, the declaration of Mikael A. Abye ("Abye Decl."), the pleadings and papers on file in			
12	this action, and such other evidence and arguments as may be presented at the hearing on the			
13	motion.			
14				
15	STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED			
16	1. Does the SAC fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the Sherman Act,			
17	the California Cartwright Act, or the California Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200 <i>et seq.</i>)?			
18	2. Should the SAC be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiffs have already amended their alaims twice and the facts incorporated in the SAC make further amondment futile?			
19	claims twice and the facts incorporated in the SAC make further amendment futile?			
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

For the third time, Plaintiffs James Stewart, Joel Milne, and Joseph Strazzullo 3 ("Plaintiffs") have failed to state a cognizable antitrust claim against defendant Gogo Inc. 4 ("Gogo"). The SAC is substantively identical to the amended complaint this Court dismissed in 5 its entirety on April 10, 2013. Once again, Plaintiffs try to bring a market foreclosure case on the 6 legally unsound argument that foreclosure should be determined on the basis of a static sliver of 7 the market actually supplied with Gogo's services, rather than the full range of sale opportunities 8 open to competitors. This Court previously held that Ninth Circuit law barred Plaintiffs' theory. 9 The same analysis and conclusion applies here. 10

When Plaintiffs' complaint was last analyzed by this Court, the Court found that "Plaintiffs 11 12 have failed to allege that, as a result of the exclusive dealing arrangements made by Gogo, there has been substantial foreclosure of competition in the relevant market" because the complaint 13 contained no "allegations as to why airplanes that could be equipped should not be included in the 14 full range of selling opportunities reasonably open to a competitor." The Court described the 15 types of allegations Plaintiffs needed to make -- e.g., substantial technology or financial barriers --16 17 and then concluded that "[i]n the absence of such allegations, the Court agrees with Gogo that Plaintiffs cannot focus solely on planes that are actually equipped with internet access, and, as a 18 result, Plaintiffs' allegation that Gogo dominates the market with respect to North American 19 aircraft that are actually equipped to provide internet connectivity to passengers (85%) shows 20little." Consequently, the Court dismissed the complaint with leave amend. 21

Despite taking written discovery in the interim, Plaintiffs return without having made any of the amendments suggested by the Court. Instead, they have doubled down on their failed foreclosure theory. They continue to focus on the legally irrelevant fact that Gogo once supplied 85% of the actually equipped market and fail to explain yet again why, in an antitrust case involving a new technology and expanding market, the much larger number of unequipped aircraft should be disregarded in the relevant market and foreclosure analysis. Plaintiffs' only new

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allegations are nothing more than excerpts from Gogo's agreements with certain airlines, whichfail to address the pleading defects that doomed the prior complaints.

Plaintiffs' legal theories have stayed the same in each complaint and are not improving
over time. The SAC should be dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts

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The new and competitive business of providing inflight Internet connectivity is producing
compelling consumer benefits. Airline passengers now have access to a new service that did not
exist just a few years ago. The SAC acknowledges Gogo's role in pioneering this innovation for
consumers by alleging that "Gogo was the first inflight Internet connectivity provider to launch
such service in the United States in August 2008." SAC at ¶ 85.

Gogo's service uses a land-based network of cellular towers that are pointed upwards to 12 communicate with aircraft. *Id.* at ¶ 15. This technology is known as air-to-ground or "ATG" 13 technology. Id. Gogo offers its services to consumers by contracting with airline partners, 14 through so-called Connectivity Agreements.¹ The Connectivity Agreements generally have a 10-15 year term and allow airlines to terminate the agreement if (i) another company provides an 16 alternate connectivity service that is a material improvement over Gogo's, such that failing to 17 adopt such service would likely cause competitive harm to the airline, or (ii) the percentage of 18 passengers using Gogo Connectivity on such airline's flights falls below certain negotiated 19 thresholds. Abye Decl., Ex. B at 18.² 20

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Inflight connectivity is provided by arrangements between the service providers such as Row 44, ViaSat, and Gogo, and the airlines that want to offer connectivity within their aircraft fleet. Passengers who want to use the service connect directly with the service provider during flights through laptops, cell phones, and other WiFi-enabled devices. Because this service is new and has only recently been made available to consumers, only about 4.7% of passengers offered Gogo's service in 2010 and 2011 took advantage of it, and the take rate has only improved slightly, to 5.3%, for 2012. See Abye Decl., Ex. B at 11.

²⁴ ² As the Court has already concluded that the Gogo S-1 Registration Statement is "incorporated by reference into the complaint." MTD Order at 5. As such, all statements contained in the Registration Statement are assumed to be true

 ²⁵ complaint. WTD Order at 3. As such, an statements contained in the Registration statement are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion to dismiss. *See Davis v. HSBC Bank*, 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Under the incorporation by reference doctrine in this Circuit, a court may look beyond the pleadings without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment. Specifically, courts may take into account documents whose

 ²⁷ contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the Plaintiff's pleading. <u>A court may treat such a document as part of the complaint, and thus may assume that its</u>

^{28 &}lt;u>contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).</u>") (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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1 Since Gogo launched its service in August 2008, at least three powerful new competitors 2 have entered the business of providing inflight Internet services using different technology. One 3 new entrant is a company called Row 44. SAC at ¶ 16. Row 44 uses a competing technology 4 based on satellites rather than an ATG network. Id. Row 44's satellite system allows it to provide 5 continuous Internet connections across international boundaries and over oceans, while Gogo's 6 ATG network relies on land-based towers. *Id* at ¶ 17. Two other new entrants are LiveTV and 7 Panasonic, which also provide a satellite-based Internet service. Id. at ¶ 19; Abye Decl., Ex. B at 8 135.

9 The new entrants have been successful competitors. Row 44 has already won the business 10 of providing Internet services on all the domestic flights of Southwest Airlines. SAC at ¶ 18. 11 Notwithstanding unsuccessful litigation, Row 44 is taking over service to former Gogo partner 12 AirTran Airways after Southwest Airlines acquired AirTran Airways. See Abye Decl. Ex. B at 64. 13 ViaSat has already won the business of providing Internet service on JetBlue and plans to activate that service in 2013. Id. at ¶ 19. Additionally, three major U.S. airlines-- United Airlines, 14 15 Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways -- have announced arrangements with Gogo competitors 16 to provide connectivity on all or a significant portion of their fleets. Abye Decl. Ex. B at 109.

Gogo's competitors include not only Row 44, Panasonic, and LiveTV, but also Thales and
OnAir, all of whom provide inflight connectivity via satellite rather than an ATG network. *Id.* at
135. The competing technologies offer airlines important distinctions and choices. An ATG
service can be installed on an aircraft overnight, limiting the expense associated with taking planes
out of service, and has a lighter weight for better fuel efficiency. *Id.* at 4-5. Satellite solutions, on
the other hand, provide much wider coverage for flights traveling over oceans and internationally. *Id.* at 109-10.

As the result of strong competition among these many companies and competing technologies, Gogo has been compelled to improve its technology by developing its own satellitebased service and upgrading the ATG network with new cell towers and a next-generation platform known as ATG-4. *Id.* at 2, 116. Gogo has also warned potential investors that competition could subject it to downward pricing pressures and adversely affect growth and

profitability. *Id.* at 22-23. Indeed, the S-1 Registration statement informs investors that Gogo is
 not yet profitable and has sustained operating losses in every quarter since launching in 2008. *Id.* at 6, 38-39.

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II. Allegations and Procedural History

On October 4, 2012 plaintiff James Stewart³ filed a putative class action in this Court (Dkt.
No. 1) alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2), the
California Cartwright Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 16720, *et seq.*), and California's Unfair
Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200, *et seq.*). The gravamen of the
complaint was that Gogo is improperly exercising its purported monopoly power by foreclosing
competition in a significant portion of the market for inflight Internet connectivity in the U.S.
through the use of exclusive dealing provisions in its agreements with airline partners.

On December 10, 2012, Gogo moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.
(Dkt. No. 16). In lieu of opposing Gogo's motion, on December 31, 2012 Plaintiffs filed their
First Amended Class Action Complaint (the "FAC") (Dkt. No. 18) alleging the same causes of
action, but containing some additional allegations. Gogo subsequently moved to dismiss the FAC
on January 30, 2013 (Dkt. No. 25). Gogo argued that, among other things, Plaintiffs failed to
adequately allege monopoly power or market foreclosure.


18 On April 10, 2013, this Court granted Gogo's motion with leave to amend (the "MTD 19 Order" [Dkt. No. 37]). The Court found that Plaintiffs' allegation that Gogo had monopoly power 20 because it had equipped 85% of North American aircraft failed to state a Sherman Act claim in 21 light of the fact that the vast majority of aircraft in the relevant market had not yet been equipped. 22 The Court, quoting Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 23 1997), held that when "defining the relevant market, a court must look at the 'full range of selling 24 opportunities reasonably open to competitors, namely all the product and geographic sales they 25 may readily compete for." MTD Order at 6 (internal punctuation omitted). The Court further 26 found that the Plaintiffs had not made any allegations as to why airplanes that were not yet

²⁸ ³ Plaintiffs Milne and Strazzullo joined the action when the First Amended Complaint was filed. *See* Dkt. No. 18.

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equipped for inflight connectivity but could be equipped should not be included in the full range
of selling opportunities reasonably open to a competitor, and the Court agreed with Gogo that
Plaintiffs could not focus solely on planes that were already equipped with Internet access. *Id.* at
6-7. Thus, the Court concluded that the FAC "failed to allege that, as a result of the exclusive
dealing arrangements made by Gogo, there has been substantial foreclosure of competition in the
relevant market." *Id.* Because Plaintiffs' claims under California state law were predicated on the
same conduct underlying the Sherman Act claims, the Court dismissed them as well. *Id.* at 8.

8 After dismissing the FAC, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery --9 reviewing all of Gogo's connectivity agreements with its airline partners -- and file a Second 10 Amended Complaint ("SAC"), which was done on August 30, 2013. *See* Dkt. No. 61. The SAC 11 contains a number of new allegations derived from the Connectivity Agreements, namely that 12 Gogo's agreements with airline partners cover the following aircraft:



open to a competitor. Nor does the SAC make allegations as to Gogo's market share within a
 relevant market containing the full range of selling opportunities reasonably open to a competitor.

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4∥ **I**.

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<u>ARGUMENT</u>

The Sherman Act Claims Should Be Dismissed for Failure to Allege Market Foreclosure

6 "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 7 accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 8 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff 9 must provide "more than [the] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation." Id. 10 A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than 11 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do. 12 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. 13 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (citations omitted); see also Abbyy USA Software 14 *House, Inc. v. Nuance Commc'n Inc.*, No. C 08-01035 JSW, 2008 WL 4830740 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 15 Nov. 6, 2008) (same and dismissing antitrust claims). Pleading facts showing a plausible claim is 16 particularly important in antitrust cases because, "[a]s the Ninth Circuit has explained, 'discovery 17 in antitrust cases frequently causes substantial expenditures and gives the plaintiff the opportunity 18 to extort large settlements even where he does not have much of a case." MedioStream, Inc. v. 19 Microsoft Corp., No. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Kendall v. Visa 20 U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008)).

In the context of an alleged Sherman Act violation involving exclusive dealing, courts
have acknowledged that "[t]here are well-recognized economic benefits to exclusive dealing
arrangements, including the enhancement of interbrand competition." *Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP*, 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations
omitted); *see also E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd.*, 472 F.3d 23, 30 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting that "exclusive distributorship arrangements are presumptively legal"). Therefore, an
exclusive dealing arrangement potentially raises antitrust concerns only "if its effect is to

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1	'foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.'" Allied, 592 F.3d
2	at 996 (quoting Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)); see also
3	Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) abrogated by Illinois Tool
4	Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 577 U.S. 28 (2006) ("Exclusive dealing is an unreasonable restraint
5	on trade only when a significant fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a market by the
6	exclusive deal.") (O'Connor, J. concurring). Consequently, as this Court has held, to state an
7	antitrust claim based on exclusive dealing arrangements, "Plaintiff must allege more than simply
8	the existence of an exclusive contract." Abbyy, 2008 WL 4830740 at *2; see also Kingray, Inc. v.
9	NBA, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1196-97 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing complaint where plaintiffs
10	made only conclusory allegations that exclusive contracts were intended to harm competition).
11	The SAC, like its dismissed predecessor, fails to meet this standard.
12 13	A. In Contravention of the Court's Guidance, the SAC Fails to Plead Facts Establishing Why Unequipped Aircraft Should Be Excluded from the Relevant Market
14	In dismissing the FAC, this Court rejected Plaintiffs' claim that Gogo controlled 85% of
15	the relevant market on the grounds that Plaintiffs' relevant market theory did not take the full
16	range of selling opportunities into consideration and improperly excluded unequipped aircraft
17	without an adequate explanation. MTD Order at 6. The Court also instructed Plaintiffs as to what
18	types of allegations needed to be added to the complaint to make it viable. <i>Id.</i> at 7. The Court
19	
20	In defining the relevant market, a court must look at the "full range of selling
21	opportunities reasonably open to [competitors], namely all the product and geographic sales they may readily compete for." <i>Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco,</i>
22	<i>Inc.</i> , 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, the selling opportunity is to the airlines, who then "distribute" the
23	service to passengers on the planes. While Plaintiffs claim that the Court should consider only those airplanes that the airlines have actually equipped with internet
24	access, they have not made any allegations as to why airplanes that could be equipped should not be included in the full range of selling opportunities
25	reasonably open to a competitor. Plaintiffs do not allege, for example, that there are substantial technological or design barriers to installing a competitor's internet
26	connectivity services on such planes, nor do they allege that there are substantial financial barriers which prevent competition for these planes. In the absence of
27 28	such allegations, the Court agrees with Gogo that Plaintiffs cannot focus solely on planes that are actually equipped with internet access, and, as a result, Plaintiffs' allegation that Gogo dominates the market with respect to North American aircraft that are actually equipped to provide internet connectivity to passengers (85%)
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shows little. See FAC ¶¶ 11, 20. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that, as a result of the exclusive dealing arrangements made by Gogo, there has been substantial foreclosure of competition in the relevant market, and, accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims.

3 Rather than amend their complaint to comply with the Court's prescription as to the types 4 of facts that needed to be pleaded, Plaintiffs continue to assert their flawed and rejected theory of 5 the relevant market. The SAC maintains that Gogo controls 85-90% percent of the relevant 6 market (SAC ¶¶ 21-22) but, apart from an allegation that some unspecified number of Frontier 7 Airlines aircraft are "unable to accommodate inflight internet service" (SAC at ¶ 50), adds no new 8 *allegations* as to why aircraft that could be equipped should not be included in the full range of 9 selling opportunities reasonably open to a competitor. Plaintiffs' failure to fix this fatal pleading 10 defect dooms the SAC to being dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 11 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal with prejudice where "the district court 12 gave Plaintiffs specific instructions on how to amend the complaint, and Plaintiffs did not 13 comply").

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B. The SAC Fails to Plead That Gogo Controls, Let Alone Foreclosed, the **Required Substantial Portion of the Relevant Market**

16 Similarly, the new allegations that Plaintiffs do include in the SAC -- descriptions of some 17 of the terms of Gogo's Connectivity Agreements and recitals of fleet names covered under these 18 agreements -- do not get Plaintiffs any closer to alleging market foreclosure. This is so because no 19 matter how Plaintiffs' claims are analyzed, they do not show that Gogo controlled, let alone 20 foreclosed, a substantial portion of the full range of selling opportunities reasonably open to 21 competitors, which the Court has already found to include equipped and unequipped aircraft. 22 MTD Order at 7. In other words, Plaintiffs fail to plead that Gogo controlled, and foreclosed, a 23 percentage of the relevant market that is high enough to make Plaintiffs' monopolization claim 24 actionable. See Image Technical Servs, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 25 1997) ("Courts generally require a 65% market share to establish a prima facie case of market 26 power."); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 27 1975) ("while 90% of the market 'is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty 28 or sixty-four per cent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not.") (quoting 9

1 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)); B & H Med., L.L.C. v. 2 ABP Admin., Inc., 526 F.3d 257, 266 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Courts routinely observe that 'foreclosure 3 levels are unlikely to be of concern where they are less than 30 or 40 percent.") (quoting Stop & 4 Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 373 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 2004)); see 5 also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 46-47 (30% foreclosure not actionable because "[p]lainly... 6 the arrangement forecloses only a small fraction of the [relevant] markets"); Omega, 127 F.3d at 7 1162-63 (foreclosure of 38% of market inadequate to support plaintiff's antitrust claim); Colonial 8 Med. Grp., Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare W., No. C-09-2192 MMC, 2010 WL 2108123, at *5 (N.D. 9 Cal. May 25, 2010) aff'd sub nom. Colonial Med. Grp., Inc. v. Catholic Health Care W., 444 F. 10 App'x 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (same).

11 Accordingly, the SAC should be dismissed for failure to allege that Gogo had adequate 12 market share to have made substantial market foreclosure even possible. See, e.g., PNY 13 Technologies, Inc. v. Sandisk Corp., No. C-11-4689 YGR, 2012 WL 1380271, at *9 (N.D. Cal. April 20, 2012) (dismissing Sherman Act claim stating "courts require a 65% market share to 14 15 establish a *prima facie* showing of monopolistic market power . . . PNY's Complaint in its current 16 form at best articulates only a 40% share ... Accordingly, PNY has failed to plead sufficient facts 17 supporting an allegation of monopoly power") (citations omitted); POURfect Prods., No. CV-09-2660, 2010 WL 1769413, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2010) (dismissing Sherman Act Section 2 claim 18 19 for, among other things, failure to plead monopoly power by not adequately pleading "facts 20 showing that the defendant owns a dominant share of the market" notwithstanding "conclusory 21 allegation" that defendant "possessed monopoly power in the relevant market").

22 23

C. Gogo's Agreements Do Not Even Foreclose Competition in Its Legally Insignificant Portion of The Relevant Market

The SAC also fails to plead market foreclosure for the independent reason that record facts establish that Gogo's contracts do not even foreclose competition in the legally insubstantial portion of the market that they govern. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' conclusory allegations, the reality of this new and dynamic market is that it is vibrant with competition.

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1 First, Plaintiffs admit that during the period that Gogo allegedly foreclosed competition, 2 several Gogo competitors entered the market and gained market share. SAC at ¶¶ 16, 19; Abye 3 Decl. Ex. B at 109. These new entrants not only gained market share by executing agreements 4 with airlines with which Gogo does not currently do business (e.g., Southwest Airlines and 5 JetBlue Airways), but also took business that the SAC alleges was locked up by Gogo's exclusive 6 dealing contracts. For example, the SAC alleges that "for the 10-year term of Gogo's contract 7 with Air Tran, all of Air Tran's aircraft were bound to obtain their inflight internet service only 8 from Gogo." SAC ¶ 24. Yet, the Air Tran business has now moved to Row 44. See Abye Decl. 9 Ex. B at 64. Similarly, the SAC alleges that during the term of its agreement with Gogo (which is 10 still in effect (see Abye Ex. B at 109), "no rival internet equipment provider could work with 11 United on any part of United's fleet." SAC ¶ 46. Yet, in reality Gogo provides connectivity on 12 only 13 United planes and United recently entered into an agreement with a Gogo competitor to 13 provide connectivity on all or a significant portion of its fleets. SAC ¶ 13; Abye Decl. Ex. B at 14 109.

15 Second, the SAC fails to address the termination provisions in the in the Connectivity16 Agreements attached to the SAC.

20 . See also Abye Decl., Ex. B at 15 (Gogo's "contracts with airline partners from 21 which we derive a majority of our [commercial airline] segment revenue permit each of these 22 airline partners to terminate its contract with us if another company provides an alternative 23 connectivity service that is a material improvement over Gogo Connectivity"); id. at 19 ("If our 24 airline partners are not satisfied with our equipment or the Gogo service, they may reduce efforts to co-market the Gogo service to their passengers, which could result in lower passenger usage 25 26 and reduced revenue, which could in turn give certain airlines the right to terminate their contracts 27 with us.").

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The termination provision completely undermines Plaintiffs' theory of this case,
which is based on the premise that Gogo's agreements "insulate[] it from price-constraining
competition" and that "[i]f Gogo was not insulated from competition . . . it would face the
prospect that if it attempted to raise or maintain prices for its inflight internet connectivity services
above a competitive level, it would lose business to competing inflight internet connectivity
providers that the airlines would be free to turn to but presently cannot as a result of the Gogo
exclusive contracts that are in effect." SAC ¶¶ 61-62.

11 12 "The main antitrust objection to exclusive dealing is its tendency to foreclose existing 13 competitors or new entrants from competition in the covered portion of the relevant market during 14 the term of the agreement." Omega, 127 F.3d at 1162 (quotations omitted). Therefore, contracts 15 containing exclusive dealing provisions that can be terminated in the face of a materially better 16 offer, , by definition do not foreclose the relevant market to competition. 17 See Allied, 592 F.3d at 997 ("The easy terminability of an exclusive dealing arrangement negates 18 substantially its potential to foreclose competition.") (quotation marks omitted); Omega, 127 F.3d 19 at 1162 (agreement did not foreclose a significant amount of the relevant market because, among 20 other reasons, it allowed for termination should a competing manufacturer offer "a better product 21 or a better deal"); Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F. 3d 793, 799 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating for a terminable 22 exclusive dealing contract that "[s]uch a situation may actually encourage, rather than discourage, 23 competition, because the incumbent and other, competing anesthesiology groups have a strong incentive continually to improve the care and prices they offer in order to secure the exclusive 24 25 positions"). 26 Consequently, the Court should dismiss the SAC's Sherman Act claims for failure to plead market foreclosure. See, e.g., MTD Order at 7 ("Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that, as a 27 28 result of the exclusive dealing arrangements made by Gogo, there has been substantial foreclosure

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of competition in the relevant market, and, accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Sherman
 Act claims.").

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II. Plaintiffs' Cartwright Act Claim Should Be Dismissed

Just as the Court did with the FAC's Cartwright Act claim, the Court should dismiss the 4 5 SAC's Cartwright Act claim for failure to adequately allege a Sherman Act cause of action. See 6 MTD Order at 8 ("[T]he Court concludes that the Cartwright Act claim, like the Sherman Act 7 claims, must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to make allegations as to why planes that 8 could be equipped with internet access should not be considered part of the full range of selling 9 opportunities reasonably open to competitors. In short, there is no allegation of substantial 10 foreclosure of competition in the relevant market."); see also Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 586 F. 11 Supp. 2d 1190, 1203-04 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("The Cartwright Act was patterned after Section 1 of 12 the Sherman Act, and the pleading requirements under the two statutes are similar."); In re Late Fee & Over-Limit Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 953, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing Cartwright Act 13 14 claims because plaintiff had failed to plead a viable Sherman Act claim) (citing Cnty. of Tuolumne 15 v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001)).

16 The Cartwright Act claim is also defective for the independent reason that the SAC only 17 alleges unilateral conduct, which is not actionable under the Cartwright Act. *See*, *e.g.*,

18 Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986) opinion modified on denial of

19 reh'g, 810 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987) (the Cartwright Act "does not address *unilateral* conduct").

20 Accordingly, the Court should also dismiss the Cartwright Act claim for failure to allege a

21 combination. *See id.* (affirming dismissal of Cartwright Act claim, stating "[t]his claim is not

22 cognizable under the Cartwright Act, for it fails to allege any combination"); *see also, e.g., Garon*

23 v. eBay, Inc., No. C 10-05737 JW, 2011 WL 6329089, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011) ("Because

24 Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendant collaborated with another interest in restraint of trade,

25 they have not alleged a violation of the Cartwright Act."); *Psystar*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04

26 ("[Among other failures] the counterclaim alleges only unilateral anticompetitive conduct. The

- 27 Cartwright Act claim, therefore, must be dismissed.").
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III. Plaintiffs' UCL Claim Should Be Dismissed

2 "Under California law, if the same conduct is alleged to be both an antitrust violation and 3 an unfair business act or practice for the same reason, then the determination that the conduct is 4 not an unreasonable restraint of trade necessarily implies that the conduct is not unfair toward 5 consumers." In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 6 2011) (quotations omitted); *Psystar*, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (same). Accordingly, the Court 7 should dismiss Plaintiffs' claim under the California Unfair Competition Law. See e.g., MTD 8 Order at 8 ("Because the Court is dismissing both the Sherman Act and Cartwright Act claims, 9 Plaintiffs' assertion that Gogo acted unlawfully in violation of § 17200 must also fail.").

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CONCLUSION

11 The Court should dismiss the SAC with prejudice. Plaintiffs have already had three 12 unsuccessful opportunities to state a claim. See Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 13 (9th Cir. 2013) ("A district court's discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where 14 the plaintiff has previously amended.") (quotations omitted). Moreover, the facts in the SAC and 15 documents incorporated therein affirmatively undermine Plaintiffs' claims and demonstrate that 16 Plaintiffs will never be able to allege viable antitrust claims. See Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 17 195 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[I]f a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 18 can be granted, leave to amend may be denied . . . if amendment of the complaint would be futile. 19 If the district court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 20 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency, then the dismissal without leave to amend is 21 proper.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., Applestein v. 22 Medivation, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing complaint with 23 prejudice because, among other reasons, the complaint contained factual "contradictions that 24 cannot be undone by a further amendment"). 25 DATED: November 25, 2013 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP 26 By: /s/ James Donato James Donato 27 Attorneys for Defendant GOGO INC. 28