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11	FOR THE NORTH	IERN DISTRIC	T OF CALIFOI	RNIA		
12	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION					
13	UNITED STATES OF AMERI	CA, Cas	se No. 13-cv-0013	33 WHO		
14	Plaintiff,		PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S POST-TRIAL			
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	PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL PROPOSED FINDINGS OF CASE NO. 13-CV-00133 WHO	FACT i				

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PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

I. BACKGROUND

1. Product ratings and reviews ("PRR") are online "word of mouth" feedback from consumers regarding their experiences with retail products. GX93 (Svatek Dep. 73:7-14). PRR platforms combine software and services to enable manufacturers and retailers to collect, organize, and display consumer-generated PRR online. PRR is displayed on a retailer's or manufacturer's website, allowing other consumers to read feedback from previous buyers before making a purchasing decision. GX986* at 3-6.¹

2. PRR is a valuable asset for retailers and manufacturers to feature on their websites because it tends to increase sales, decrease product returns, improve a website's ranking by Internet search engines, and provide valuable information regarding consumer sentiment. *See* Trial Tr. 97:10-98:4 (Hurt); GX537 at -621, -626; GX486 at -031; GX75 (Moog Dep. 63:6-8, 63:11, 63:13-64:7); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 121:7-13); GX93 (Svatek Dep. 73:7-75:6); GX844 at -381; GX770 at -231; GX574* at -638; GX565 at -206-210; GX577* at -038, -045, -049, -056; GX64 (Gigya Dep. 82:19-83:4); GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 9:15-17, 9:20-10:12); GX81 (Collins Dep. 100:12-101:10) and Trial Tr. 752:1-20 (Collins). While PRR is just one type of user-generated-content ("UGC") that retailers and manufacturers can use on their e-commerce sites, it serves a unique purpose. Other types of UGC do not serve as substitutes for PRR. *See infra* Section II.

A. Merging Parties, Venue and Jurisdiction

3. Bazaarvoice provides the market-leading PRR platform. GX839 at -547; GX81 (Collins Dep. 72:12-15, 72:17-73:12, 200:16-22); Trial Tr. 376:14-377:1 (Luedtke). The vast majority of Bazaarvoice's customers purchase its PRR platform and PRR accounts for the majority of Bazaarvoice's revenue. Trial Tr. 881:11-18 (Collins); Trial Tr. 1424:13-16 (Meredith). Bazaarvoice is a publicly traded Delaware corporation headquartered in Austin,

Protection 1 For Exhibits with Bates numbering, the pinpoint cites refer to the last 3 digits of the Bates number. For Exhibits without Bates numbering, the pinpoint cite refers to any internal pagination or, if there is no internal pagination, to the physical page number. Documents or depositions with an * have an outstanding confidentiality issue.

Texas. GX318 (Def.'s Answer ¶ 11). During its 2012 fiscal year, Bazaarvoice earned 1 approximately \$106.1 million in revenue. GX318 (Def.'s Answer ¶ 11). 2

4. 3 PowerReviews was Bazaarvoice's closest competitor in the provision of PRR platforms to manufacturers and online retailers. See infra Section III.A. The vast majority of 4 5 PowerReviews' customers purchase its PRR platform and PRR accounts for the vast majority of PowerReviews' revenue. Trial Tr. 420:17-23, 442:6-16 (Luedtke). PowerReviews was a 6 privately held Delaware corporation headquartered in San Francisco, California. GX318 (Def.'s 7 Answer ¶ 12). During the 2011 calendar year, the company earned approximately \$11.5 million 8 9 in revenue. GX318 (Def.'s Answer ¶ 12). PowerReviews closed the best quarter in its history just prior to the acquisition. GX643 at -565; GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 181:21-182:5); GX88 10 11 (Hossain Dep. 196:4-6, 196:9-18).

5. The San Francisco Division of the District Court for the Northern District of California is the proper venue for the Plaintiff's lawsuit and the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. GX318 (Def.'s Answer ¶¶ 15-17).

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The Development of the Transaction

(i) PowerReviews Presented a Unique Threat to the Long-Term Value of **Bazaarvoice's Business**

6. Bazaarvoice charges its customers a subscription-based fee for the services it provides. GX89 (Hurt Dep. 86:2-7). These fees can total hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. GX203 at -104-107. Bazaarvoice uses a value-based pricing model. GX89 (Hurt Dep. 111:6-10); Trial Tr. 696:22-697:4 (Osborne).

7. Several years after it launched, PowerReviews changed its business model from 22 one based on free services supported by advertising to a model based on charging subscriptionbased license fees, just like Bazaarvoice. GX89 (Hurt Dep. 85:5-14, 87:1-15) and Trial Tr. 232:5-234:15 (Hurt). PowerReviews experienced rapid growth after switching its business model. See, e.g., GX610* at 3, 5.

27 8. PowerReviews' rapid growth did not go unnoticed by Bazaarvoice. Bazaarvoice recognized that increasing competition from PowerReviews threatened the long-term value of 28

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Bazaarvoice's business. Paul Dodd, Bazaarvoice's Vice President for Retail Sales, prepared an analysis for Bazaarvoice executives concluding that price competition from PowerReviews could result in Bazaarvoice losing significant revenues. GX553 at -439; *see also* GX86 (Dodd Dep. 30:17-23, 33:22-25).

9. Dodd's analysis compared Bazaarvoice's estimated "value-based" price for its PRR platform to the price for PowerReviews' PRR platform that the Bazaarvoice sales force observed in the market. GX86 (Dodd Dep. 61:10-62:13, 63:2-15). For example, for large enterprise customers (or "A3 customers") Bazaarvoice's targeted value-based price was , compared to PowerReviews' price of GX553 at -440; see also GX86 (Dodd Dep. 46:19-47:5, 61:10-20, 63:2-8). Matching PowerReviews' price for large enterprise customers would result in a discount of % off Bazaarvoice's estimated value-based price. GX553 at -440. For medium-sized customers ("A2 customers"), Bazaarvoice's targeted valuebased price was compared to PowerReviews' price of GX553 at -440; see also GX86 (Dodd Dep. 46:19-47:5, 61:10-20, 63:2-4). Matching PowerReviews' price for mediumsized customers would result in a % discount off Bazaarvoice's value-based price. GX553 at -440. Dodd's analysis showed that competitive pressure from PowerReviews could result in Bazaarvoice losing millions of dollars. GX553 at -437, -439; see also GX718 at -092 (Godfrey replies to email thread regarding Dodd's analysis titled "Suffocate PR plan" and notes "we are also seeing substantial pressure from PR on the high end"); Trial Tr. 1114:17-1115:9 (Godfrey).

10. PowerReviews also threatened to breach Bazaarvoice's syndication barrier to
entry. Bazaarvoice's network allows PRR content to be shared, or syndicated, for example,
between brand manufacturers and their retailers. It is a formidable barrier to entry in the market
for PRR platforms. *See infra* Section VI.A.(i). As more manufacturers sign up for
Bazaarvoice's PRR platform, the Bazaarvoice network has become more valuable to retailers
because it allows them to gain access to a greater volume of PRR by publishing "syndicated"
PRR content received from manufacturers onto retailers' websites. Trial Tr. 121:24-122:10,
123:6-16 (Hurt). Similarly, as more retailers purchase Bazaarvoice's PRR platform, the
Bazaarvoice network becomes more valuable for manufacturers because it allows them to

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syndicate content to a greater number of retail outlets. Trial Tr. 121:24-122:10, 123:6-16 (Hurt). The feedback between the manufacturers and retailers creates a network effect that is a significant competitive advantage for Bazaarvoice. Trial Tr. 357:16-358:5, 423:6-25 (Luedtke); 711:4-8 (Osborne); GX1220 at -614; *see also infra* Section VI.A.(i). In 2011, before the transaction, PowerReviews had approximately customers, including marquee retail customers like Toys R Us and Staples. GX610* at 4, 10; GX1110 at -509; *see also* Trial Tr. 164:12-165:2 (Hurt). PowerReviews' large retail customer base posed a unique threat to Bazaarvoice's syndication advantage because a PRR network becomes more valuable to manufacturers if the network can provide access to a large number of retail customers. GX491 (Meredith Dep. 139:1-17, 117:19-25); Trial Tr. 1001:5-1002:3, 1013:15-1014:14, 1018:22-1019:14 (Shapiro); GX983* at 76-77; GX1110 at -508; *see also infra* Section VI.A.(i).

11. In July 2011, PowerReviews announced the Open Social Commerce Network, offering a free one year trial to syndication customers in an attempt to diminish Bazaarvoice's network advantage. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 213:14-214:1, 214:4-17, 216:16-218:14, 218:16-18, 219:3-8); GX412 at -494-96. PowerReviews' "open" syndication offering posed a significant threat to Bazaarvoice because it would facilitate syndication between manufacturers that were not PowerReviews customers (including Bazaarvoice customers) and retailers using the PowerReviews platform. GX916; GX88 (Hossain Dep. 148:6-150:2, 150:5-17); Trial Tr. 482:18-483:1, 484:20-485:19 (Defossé); *see also infra* Sections IV.B & VI.A.(i).

12. Bazaarvoice's Vice President of Product Strategy, Erin Defossé, monitored these
developments and detailed to Bazaarvoice co-founder and then-CEO, Brett Hurt, and others on
Bazaarvoice's Executive Team Bazaarvoice's competitive response to PowerReviews offer of
free syndication. *See* GX89 (Hurt Dep. 281:18-283:11); GX412 at -494-96. Hurt testified that
PowerReviews' free and open syndication network was a "call to action." GX89 (Hurt Dep.
285:2-4, 285:6-10); *see also* Trial Tr. 154:2-155:7 (Hurt). When apprised of the PowerReviews
move and Bazaarvoice's response, Bazaarvoice's then-CFO and current CEO, Stephen Collins,
suggested to Hurt that Bazaarvoice could either compete against PowerReviews and "crush"
them, or "damnit lets just buy them now." GX412 at -495; *see infra* Section IV.B.

13. Finally, the fact that PowerReviews was a potential acquisition target for other companies threatened the value of Bazaarvoice's business. Bazaarvoice was motivated to 2 purchase PowerReviews because it would prevent PowerReviews from being acquired by 3 another company with deeper pockets who could compete even more vigorously with 4 5 Bazaarvoice. Hurt suggested acquiring PowerReviews, because: 6

PowerReviews, while considerably smaller than us today in terms of revenue, still has a relatively significant reach and from this base they could mount a significant challenge especially if acquired by a well capitalized player in the social commerce or social media marketing solutions space. Thus, leaving them out there is a significant risk.

GX1175 at -904; see also GX326 at -200; GX81 (Collins Dep. 328:3-329:23, 368:15-369:11, 372:1-7); GX82 (Barton Dep. 185:23-188:20, 217:12-218:14) and Trial Tr.

650:12-651:4 (Barton); Trial Tr. 755:9-23 (Collins).

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Bazaarvoice Acquired PowerReviews to Eliminate Its Primary (ii) Competitor

14. Bazaarvoice had been pursuing PowerReviews as an acquisition target since early 2011 and the parties engaged in three separate rounds of negotiations leading up to the merger: (1) during April/May 2011, (2) during November/December of 2011, and (3) during April/May 2012. Trial Tr. 174:8-176:11 (Hurt). On each occasion Bazaarvoice carefully examined the business rationale for the acquisition, and in each instance the primary benefit considered was the elimination of Bazaarvoice's primary competitor in order to diminish price competition.

15. On April 21, 2011, Bazaarvoice co-founder and executive Brant Barton sent an email to other Bazaarvoice executives regarding why the company should consider acquiring PowerReviews, saying that "taking out one of your biggest competitors can be game-changing." GX514 at -810²; Trial Tr. 645:21-646:10 (Barton). He listed the "Pros" of the deal, including "[e]limination of our primary competitor" and "relief from the price erosion that Sales experiences in 30-40% of deals . . . of up to 15-30%." GX514 at -810; see also GX82 (Barton Dep. 202:10-203:16) and Trial Tr. 646:11-647:10 (Barton). He also recognized "the market will

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² Another version of this document, GX513, omitting the latest strings of the email, was used at trial; the portions cited herein are substantively identical.

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place a premium on us having such a dominant market position, which is a powerful competitive moat." GX514 at -810. He further anticipated that "we will be able to retain an extremely high percentage of PR's customers due to scarce/low quality alternatives." GX514 at -810. He reported that Hurt, Collins, Chief Revenue Officer Michael Osborne and Chief Strategy Officer Mike Svatek were all "supportive." GX220 at -112; GX219 at -258.

16. Michael Osborne, Bazaarvoice's Chief Revenue Officer, shared this view of the market. He wrote an email to Barton on April 24, 2011, stating, "[i]f we buy them [PowerReviews] it changes everything for our model . . . Because 10-20% price erosion will disappear . . . Because this is competitively HUGE" GX221 at -528; Trial Tr. 718:7-25 (Osborne). Osborne testified that he believed that Bazaarvoice's acquisition of PowerReviews would remove price erosion. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 311:25-312:2, 312:6-7, 312:19-21, 312:24-313:4, 313:8) and Trial Tr. 718:20-25 (Osborne). Although Osborne testified that he had not conducted a quantitative analysis of the impact of PowerReviews on Bazaarvoice's pricing, he testified that, based on his experience, price erosion of 10-20% would disappear. Trial Tr. 725:15-21, 728:11-16 (Osborne).

17. On May 4, 2011, in an email to Bazaarvoice's Board of Directors, Hurt informed the Board of an upcoming meeting between Bazaarvoice executives Hurt, Barton, and Collins and senior PowerReviews executives to explore a potential acquisition of PowerReviews. GX518 at -474-475. He wrote, "[p]otentially taking out our only competitor, who is both suppressing our price points (by as much as 15% according to Osborne) . . . could be a highly strategic move" GX518 at -475 and Trial Tr. 170:20-171:11 (Hurt). In his notes from the meeting, Barton wrote that the transaction would enable the combined company to "avoid margin erosion" caused by "tactical 'knife-fighting' over competitive deals." GX519 at -751; *see also* GX82 (Barton Dep. 239:14-240:20, 240:23-242:14).

18. PowerReviews also believed the merger would allow Bazaarvoice to raise prices.
In May 2011, PowerReviews' then-CEO, Pehr Luedtke, wrote to Bazaarvoice's Hurt that one of
the obvious benefits of a merger between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews was "margin
expansion." GX249 at -940. Luedtke testified that one of the ways margins can expand is

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through the elimination of competitive discounting that occurred due to competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 284:8-285:2, 285:5-16, 285:19-25, 286:12-22, 287:1) and Trial Tr. 329:8-15 (Luedtke). Luedtke recognized that Bazaarvoice would likely be willing to pay a premium to acquire PowerReviews because it would allow Bazaarvoice to eliminate the "knife fighting" between the two companies competing for customers. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 289:10-15, 289:18-24) and Trial Tr. 329:8-15 (Luedtke). He further noted that "[e]liminating competitive risk and an acquisition of PowerReviews by a larger player is worth another . . . \$30-50M." GX253 at -188. At trial, Luedtke testified that he was referring to the Gartner "Hype Cycle," *see* GX1213 at 5, when he said that the transaction could "avoid margin erosion (due to tactical knife fighting)," GX519 at -751 and Trial Tr. 390:19-391:8 (Luedtke). He explained that this meant "we wanted to avoid this period, as Gartner explains it, of intense competition and occasionally price compression" Trial Tr. 404:10-405:2 (Luedtke).

19. On May 20, 2011, Bazaarvoice executives represented to the company's Board of Directors that the acquisition of PowerReviews would "[e]liminate [Bazaarvoice's] primary competitor" and "reduc[e] comparative pricing pressure." GX521 at -088; Trial Tr. 653:19-654:2 (Barton).

20. Bazaarvoice continued to explore its interest in PowerReviews in October 2011, when Collins wrote: "[h]ow much longer does it take us to win deals because [PowerReviews is] out there and how much does the price competition impair our long-term value as a company?" GX522 at -035. Collins expected the combined company to receive a higher valuation as a public company because it would have "[1]iterally, no other competitors," and the combined company's "share of the IR 500 [an annual ranking of the 500 largest Internet retailers in North America] would move close to 50% in absolute terms and higher in retail sales coverage." GX522 at -035 and Trial Tr. 754:10-18 (Collins). He anticipated "[p]ricing accretion due to combination." GX522 at -035.

 21.
 In November 2011, Hurt suggested a "second round" of discussions with

 PowerReviews, because:

Combined, we would be approaching the 50% share point of the IR500. There is no other US competitor with more than 10 clients and 104 [of the IR 500] do not

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have any solution or are using an in-house solution. The cost in time and money to displace PowerReviews from these clients is surely a very big number. . . . Here is a list of other potential benefits from a combination:

1. No meaningful direct competitor. Shortened sales cycles, less pricing dilution.

2. Dramatic increase in reach and overall market share making future competition extremely difficult and will increase switching costs. . . .

7. Help us to focus 100% of our strategy without the whipsaw effect of reacting to a competitor that will only be focused on disrupting our lead position . . .

GX1175 at -904 and Trial Tr. 175:22-176:11 (Hurt). Hurt claims that this message was actually

written by Collins, who has since been promoted to CEO. Trial Tr. 177:9-13, 201:6-8 (Hurt).

However, Hurt agreed with many of these points. Trial Tr. 192:23-193:8, 199:12-200:1, 200:22-

201:1 (Hurt). Further, he sent the email to the Board under his own name, not Mr. Collins', after

making some changes to the email. Trial Tr. 177:9-13, 178:3-7, 217:8-9 (Hurt).

22. On December 9, 2011, Bazaarvoice held a six hour meeting with PowerReviews. Afterwards, Bazaarvoice's Collins wrote a memorandum in which he summarized the benefits of the deal, including the ability to "eliminat[e] feature driven one-upmanship and tactical competition on retail." GX324 at -921. He also noted the acquisition would "[c]reate[] significant competitive barriers to entry and protect[] [Bazaarvoice's] flank." GX324 at -922. As a result of the transaction, he believed the combined company would have "[c]lear market leadership with almost 50% of the IR500 and influence over \$80BB in US online retail sales or nearly half of all U.S. online retail sales." GX324 at -922. Bazaarvoice Director Chris Pacitti passed along these notes to his partners at Bazaarvoice-investor Austin Ventures, adding that "[PowerReviews is] the only other credible player in the space. Buying them removes any cheap entry point for a future competitor It improves our pricing power (they are the low cost alternative) and gives us complete ownership of the category and data asset." GX1181 at -158.

23. During this round of negotiations, Bazaarvoice placed merger discussions on hold in order to conduct its initial public offering ("IPO"). GX954; GX328* at -268; Trial Tr.
1393:12-25 (Meredith). Bazaarvoice filed its final amendment to its S-1 registration statement with the SEC on February 9, 2012, one day before it began a series of IPO roadshow presentations for potential investors. GX964. The S-1 only identified two firms by name in its

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1	discussion of "direct and indirect" competitors: PowerReviews and Revieworld (the parent			
2	company of Reevoo, Bazaarvoice's European competitor). GX964 at 11.			
3	24. PowerReviews executives recognized that Bazaarvoice would likely have a higher			
4	public market valuation if it acquired PowerReviews prior to the IPO, as the merger would			
5	eliminate Bazaarvoice's closest competitor. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 292:22-293:17, 293:20-294:1)			
6	and Trial Tr. 329:22-25 (Luedtke). Bazaarvoice's Board, however, concluded the acquisition			
7	could wait. At the time, Hurt wrote, "I honestly believe that PowerReviews is trying very hard to			
8	disrupt us and provoke us to buy them. And it may make sense to buy PowerReviews after the			
9	IPO." GX417 at -035.			
10	25. In preparing for the IPO roadshow, Bazaarvoice prepared Q&As which were			
11	drafted by senior executives in preparation for presentations to analysts to answer questions			
12	about the company. GX89 (Hurt Dep. 418:3-419:25) and Trial Tr. 126:24-127:3 (Hurt). In the			
13	Q&As, Bazaarvoice was prepared to state that:			
14	 It "currently represent[s] 145 of the top 500 Internet Retailers, which is close to 30% market share in US retail online "; 			
15	• It "believe[s] the barriers to entry are very high in our current market"; and			
16 17	• The "most significant barriers to entry" are "[Bazaarvoice's] network, connecting retailers and brands It would be very difficult, and one could argue almost impossible, for a competitor to replicate our network of both retailers and brands given the lead we have and the value we are providing."			
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19	GX425 at -919, -927, -929, -931. Hurt testified that he did not ever "say anything to investors			
20	that [he] thought was not truthful." Trial Tr. 221:14-16 (Hurt).			
21	26. Bazaarvoice issued its IPO on February 23, 2012, raising \$114 million. GX805 at			
22	-097-98.			
23	27. After the IPO, Bazaarvoice entered its final round of negotiations to acquire			
24	PowerReviews in April 2012. PowerReviews executives prepared a presentation in which they			
25	described the benefits of a merger with Bazaarvoice. Those benefits included:			
26	• "Monopoly in the market";			
27	• "More predictable revenue growth (less competition)";			
28	• "Better monetization w/o pricing pressure";			
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1 2 3	 "Not having us in the hands of a competitor, especially one with deep pockets and existing channels"; "Removing competitor clears up [Bazaarvoice's] story to customers, analysts, employees."
4	GX610* at 27-28.
5	28. By mid-May 2012, Bazaarvoice executives had prepared a due diligence
6	memorandum recommending that the company finally acquire PowerReviews. The
7	memorandum noted in furtherance of Bazaarvoice's goal to "becom[e] the de facto solution for
8	retailers to capture and use digital word-of-mouth across online, mobile, and in-store channels,"
9	the transaction:
10	accelerates this strategy in two ways. First, [PowerReviews'] customer base
11	includes 86 IR500 retailers who have resisted becoming Bazaarvoice customers despite significant attempts to displace [PowerReviews] from these accounts. It is unlikely that we can attract these retailers to our platform in the foreseeable future
12	nor without significant cost. Estimated costs to acquire the [PowerReviews] customer base is \$32-50m with a substantial percentage of that being attributed to
13	displacing them in large accounts Further, by addressing the mid-market, Bazaarvoice blocks market entry by competitors and therefore we "cover our
14 15	flank" to ensure our retail business is protected from direct competition and premature price erosion The addition of major retail hubs such as Staples and Toys R Us strengthens our value proposition to brands and further increases the
16	switching costs, and therefore deepens our protective moat, for brands and retailers alike.
17	GX925 at -941, -943; ³ see also GX93 (Svatek Dep. 252:16-253:9); GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep.
18	22:3-24:24, 25:2-27:7, 28:7-29:3, 29:23-31:6).
19	29. Collins sent an email to various employees asking them to discuss with
20	PowerReviews' Luedtke "ways we can very very quickly market Connections (including
21	BrandVoice) [Bazaarvoice's syndication feature] to PowerReviews clients" GX5. Collins
22	noted that "[m]any of [PowerReviews'] clients may have been hearing a 'syndicate for free'
23	message, so we'll have to navigate that," suggesting Bazaarvoice could charge PowerReviews
24	customers for the syndication feature that they previously obtained for free prior to the merger.
25	GX5.
26	
27	
28	³ Another copy of this document, GX1148, was also used during the trial.
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30. By late May of 2012, Bazaarvoice discussed with its Board a presentation regarding the acquisition of PowerReviews. The presentation emphasized the "[e]nhanced value of network economics" and that "[a] combined entity would command 49% of the Internet Retailer 500 . . . [t]he other remaining IR 500 generally have an internal solution or no solution at all A combined entity would influence 52% of the U.S. online retail sales" GX332 at -287, -289. The presentation also identified as likely benefits arising from the acquisition "Foregone Customer Acquisition Costs" including the "cost premium to achieve competitive steals which if, on average, was 25% to 50% equates to an aggregate cost of \$40 to \$50 million." GX332 at -292.

31. When explaining the PowerReviews acquisition to Bazaarvoice employees, Bazaarvoice executives noted that it would take years and significant resources to continue competing with PowerReviews for enterprise customers. GX838 at -392.

32. Bazaarvoice acquired PowerReviews on June 12, 2012. The purchase price for the transaction, including cash and non-cash consideration, was approximately \$168.2 million. GX318 (Def.'s Answer ¶ 10). Hurt testified that it was a "very rich deal" and a "very high amount to pay." GX89 (Hurt Dep. 449:8-25) and Trial Tr. 250:20-251:2 (Hurt). Bazaarvoice also was concerned about the price and the "message it will send to the Street about BV overpaying, desperation, fearing PR who is 10x smaller." GX1260 at -826; Trial Tr. 1822:19-1823:10 (Comée).

33. Barton testified that "by acquiring PowerReviews we would be acquiring the company that we most often competed with in the U.S. for ratings and reviews." GX82 (Barton Dep. 202:10-203:16) and Trial Tr. 633:10-15 (Barton). As a result of the merger, Bazaarvoice was able to acquire every customer that it had lost to PowerReviews. GX222 at -679.

C. The Defendant's Executive and Former Executive Witnesses Have Significant Personal Interests in the Outcome of this Litigation

34. Stephen Collins, Bazaarvoice's CEO and member of the Board of Directors,
owns 65-75,000 shares of Bazaarvoice stock. GX81 (Collins Dep. 37:1-4). He has also been
sued in his personal capacity in a private lawsuit in Texas state court alleging that he knew that

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the acquisition would lessen competition and create a monopoly, and failed to disclose the anticompetitive nature of the acquisition (the "Texas securities fraud action."). Trial Tr. 749:20-751:4 (Collins); GX1202.

35. Brett Hurt, Bazaarvoice's co-founder and former CEO and current Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, owns 6,000,000 shares of Bazaarvoice stock worth, at the time of his testimony, in excess of \$59,000,000. Trial Tr. 83:25-84:8 (Hurt). Mr. Hurt has also been sued in his personal capacity in the Texas securities fraud action. Trial Tr. 80:2-82:17 (Hurt); GX1202.

36. Thomas Meredith, Chairman of Bazaarvoice's Board, owns Bazaarvoice stock and has also been sued in his personal capacity in the Texas securities fraud action. Trial Tr. 1402:4-16 (Meredith); GX1202.

37. Brant Barton, Bazaarvoice's co-founder, owns Bazaarvoice stock worth approximately \$500,000 as well as 100,000 Bazaarvoice stock options. Trial Tr. 626:17-21 (Barton).

38. Michael Osborne, Bazaarvoice's former Chief Revenue Officer, owns
approximately 511,000 shares of Bazaarvoice stock. His new company, Handshakez, received
\$3 million in financing from Austin Ventures. As a result of that investment, Austin Ventures
holds two of five seats on the Handshakez Board of Directors. Austin Ventures is one of
Bazaarvoice's largest shareholders. Trial Tr. 691:16-693:4 (Osborne).

39. Kenneth Comée, PowerReviews' former CEO, owns approximately 100,000 shares of Bazaarvoice stock. Trial Tr. 1811:25-1812:2 (Comée).

II.

THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET IS PRR PLATFORMS

A. The Nature of the Products

(i) **Overview of PRR**

40. PRR platforms are generally sold to retailers or manufacturers looking to display ratings and reviews on their websites. PRR platforms enable manufacturers and retailers to collect, organize, and display consumer-generated PRR online. These ratings and reviews are displayed on a retailer's or manufacturer's website, allowing other consumers to read feedback from previous buyers before making a purchasing decision. GX986* at 3-6.

41. The software component of a PRR platform provides the user interface and review form for the collection and display of PRR. Most review forms prompt consumers to rate a product on a five-star scale and offer consumers an option to write an open-ended comment about their experience with the product. Other forms also allow consumers to rate products along several dimensions (*e.g.*, product appearance, ease of assembly, value). *See generally* Trial Tr. 91:3-94:25 (Hurt); GX1113*; GX359 at -699-701; GX815; GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 70:4-73:21). The content collected using PRR platforms combines the structured data (product ratings/attributes) and unstructured data (free-form comments). GX82 (Barton Dep. 62:9-63:1).

42. PRR platforms publish approved submissions in a display interface on a customer's website. GX1134 at -058. The display interface may also allow consumers to filter reviews according to their interests. GX1134 at -059.

43. PRR platforms vary in their level of sophistication, features offered, and other available capabilities that may be bundled with the platform or sold separately. In addition to the basic ratings and reviews components of PRR platforms, sophisticated PRR platforms also allow manufacturers to share, or "syndicate," ratings and reviews with their retail partners. GX537 at -625. Through the syndication network, retailers can display PRR that were originally collected by a product's manufacturer. GX85 (Defossé Dep. 152:21-153:7); GX81 (Collins Dep. 130:2-14); GX166 (OneCall Dep. 25:20-26:13). Syndication is an important selling feature for any PRR platform provider. GX82 (Barton Dep. 44:14-45:20);

; GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 62:4-9); see also GX537 at -625.

44. Manufacturers and retailers both benefit from the ability to display more reviews at the point of sale. Trial Tr. 94:20-95:14 (Hurt); GX181 (Sears Dep. 61:5-62:12) and Trial Tr.

1692:14-22 (Massuda/Sears); GX932 at -779, -781, -784;

GX93 (Svatek Dep. 141:2-142:14).

Syndication helps retailers obtain more content than they could independently. Trial Tr. 117:1421 (Hurt); GX166 (OneCall Dep. 28:15-24; 29:15-22); GX181 (Sears Dep. 61:5-62:12) and Trial
Tr. 1692:14-1694:7 (Massuda/Sears); GX932 at -779, -783; GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 25:1526:3). The increase in PRR content helps retailers sell more products and further reduce returns.

GX92 (Osborne Dep.141:15-142:2) and Trial Tr. 703:10-21 (Osborne); GX932 at -779, -781,
-783; GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 25:15-26:3); GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 45:2046:1, 46:4, 46:6-14, 46:17-18, 46:20-21, 46:24); GX79 (Caine Dep. 28:6-29:22, 30:5-31:20,
41:21-42:23). Because PRR increases conversion rates, manufacturers also see a benefit in the
form of increased sales of their products through retailers. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 138:6-139:16,
140:2-16) and Trial Tr. 703:18-21 (Osborne); GX932 at -782.

45. Sophisticated PRR platform providers also offer moderation services. GX1020; GX484 at -015; GX485 at -130, -132. Moderation refers to the review process that occurs after a consumer submits a review, but before that review is posted on the manufacturer's or retailer's website. GX93 (Svatek Dep. 109:1-110:3). After a consumer submits a review, the PRR platform provider applies software algorithms to scan the submission for inappropriate or fraudulent content. Trial Tr. 103:21-105:1 (Hurt); GX485 at -130; GX62* (Pluck Dep. 37:8-16, 39:1-13, 40:5-41:7); GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 28:24-30:19). After the automated scan, a human moderator examines each submission to ensure it complies with a particular customer's moderation standards. Trial Tr. 105:18-106:17 (Hurt); GX484 at -015; GX485 at -130.

46. Customers of PRR platforms find moderation necessary to ensure that the PRR is credible, not offensive, and otherwise complies with the company's business rules. Trial Tr. 101:23-102:17 (Hurt); GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 32:8-33:12); GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 28:24-30:19).

47. Some PRR platforms also include analytics software that manufacturers and retailers use to analyze information collected from PRR. GX82 (Barton Dep. 56:19-58:4); GX93 (Svatek Dep. 105:3-15); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 42:9-19); GX932 at -793. With these tools, manufacturers and retailers can track and analyze real-time consumer sentiment. GX484 at -016; GX485 at -140. Manufacturers and retailers can use this information to identify product design defects, make product design decisions, or identify consumers for targeted marketing efforts.
GX82 (Barton Dep. 58:5-17); GX662 at -271; GX485 at -140; *see generally* GX782.

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(ii) Bazaarvoice's and PowerReviews' PRR Platforms

48. Before the transaction, both Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews offered sophisticated PRR platforms to large enterprise manufacturers and retailers. The PowerReviews Enterprise PRR platform was a full-featured PRR platform competing directly against Bazaarvoice. GX641 and Trial Tr. 347:17-24 (Luedtke). The target market for PowerReviews' Enterprise PRR platform was companies with over \$5 million in annual online sales. GX88 (Hossain Dep. 24:18-25:2, 25:5-18); *see also* GX454 at -335. Bazaarvoice's Conversations product is a full featured PRR platform similar to the PowerReviews Enterprise PRR platform. GX965 at 5, 7-8. In describing the complexity of its product, PowerReviews explained that reviews are aptly described as "a system, not a feature." GX272 at -218. PowerReviews noted that a comparable PRR service would require (among other features) a front end display compatible with thousands of websites, detailed analytic reporting capability, and integration with third-party applications. GX272 at -218.

49. Both companies' PRR platforms offer syndication of PRR content to retailers and manufacturers. BrandShare, the PowerReviews syndication service, allowed PowerReviews retail customers to receive syndicated reviews from their manufacturing partners. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 57:1-12) and Trial Tr. 355:13-25 (Luedtke). Bazaarvoice also offers the ability to syndicate reviews between retailers and manufacturers. Trial Tr. 787:13-788:10 (Collins); GX965 at 7; GX125 (Clorox Dep. 148:22-23, 148:25-149:2, 149:5-10). Bazaarvoice's syndication volumes have been increasing "30-50% year over year." Trial Tr. 889:25-890:15 (Collins).

50. Both Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews also offer moderation services to their PRR platform customers. Trial Tr. 101:20-102:20 (Hurt); GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 81:21-82:14); GX484 at -015; GX965 at 8.

51. Both the PowerReviews and Bazaarvoice PRR platforms include analytics software. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 39:7-16); GX484 at -016; GX93 (Svatek Dep. 105:3-19); GX965 at 8.

52. In addition to its Enterprise PRR platform, PowerReviews also offered a turn-key PRR solution called PowerReviews Express. PowerReviews Express lacks the features and functionality available in the enterprise PRR platforms offered by Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. PowerReviews Express was marketed as a low cost, self-service solution for small-and-medium-sized Internet retailers who have different needs than larger companies. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 41:8-21, 42:19-44:10, 44:12-45:1, 197:21-24, 198:6-19) and Trial Tr. 346:24-347:16 (Luedtke); GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 175:9-22); GX82 (Barton Dep. 212:15-213:18); GX88 (Hossain Dep. 69:20-70:15). Customers purchased PowerReviews Express directly from the PowerReviews website or their e-commerce platform provider's app store. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 48:24-49:7, 49:12-19). Customers commonly purchased the PowerReviews Express platform using a credit card, and the monthly license fee for PowerReviews Express was never more than several hundred dollars per month. *See generally* GX232 at -767; GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 44:12-45:1).

53. Bazaarvoice stated that PowerReviews Express faced a different set of competitors than more full-featured enterprise solutions offered by PowerReviews and Bazaarvoice, and PowerReviews Express did not compete with either the PowerReviews Enterprise platform or the Bazaarvoice platform. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 53:12-23, 199:20-23, 200:1-7, 112:22-25, 113:6-10, 113:24-114:1, 114:3-7, 114:10-13, 115:4-116:1, 116:22-117:9); GX235; GX16; GX85 (Defossé Dep. 43:13-43:21, 48:13-48:25). PowerReviews Express' competitors offered similar self-service solutions with low-cost, limited functionality. *See* GX235 at -501-502.

(iii) Both Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews Price Each Customer Independently

54. Enterprise-level PRR platforms are sold in a direct sales process that requires a significant amount of time and negotiation. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 146:8-17); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 103:12-22) and Trial Tr. 705:8-22 (Osborne); *see* GX405*.

55. Prices are individually negotiated, and each customer's price is independent of the
prices other customers pay. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 91:24-92:8, 129:10-13, 129:23-130:4) and

Trial Tr. 348:23-349:2, 353:22-25, 355:2-5 (Luedtke); GX840 at -944-945; GX92 (Osborne Dep. 2 105:23-106:1, 111:8-10, 111:12, 115:11-12) and Trial Tr. 704:4-7 (Osborne); GX81 (Collins Dep. 69:11-70:5, 76:17-77:16) and Trial Tr. 800:13-24 (Collins); see also GX305; GX405*. 3 Accordingly, customers commonly receive different prices, even when purchasing similar 4 5 products and services. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 146:19-147:5, 162:12-20) and Trial Tr. 704:4-7 (Osborne); GX361*; GX81 (Collins Dep. 77:24-78:4) and Trial Tr. 800:25-801:4 (Collins). 6

56. PRR platform providers negotiate prices in light of each customer's demand characteristics, taking into account competitive alternatives. Bazaarvoice calls this method of setting prices "value-based" pricing, meaning "[t]he more value the [customer] perceives, the higher [Bazaarvoice's] price point." GX87 (Godfrey Dep. 103:10-16); see also GX203 at -100; GX86 (Dodd Dep. 10:18-12:5); GX185 (Smithsonian Dep. 28:9-20, 29:10-14, 35:19-38:5, 38:16-39:15); GX81 (Collins Dep. 108:4-109:9, 113:24-115:22). To develop a pricing proposal, Bazaarvoice collects detailed information from a customer, including total online sales, number of online transactions, and expected sales growth. GX203 at -104; see also GX92 (Osborne Dep. 162:21-163:14, 163:17-18, 164:13-16, 164:19-21) and Trial Tr. 699:25-704:7 (Osborne).

57. During the sales process, it is typical for a salesperson to ask the prospective customer to divulge detailed information related to its business, which may include information related to (1) annual volume of online sales; (2) product return rates; (3) historic conversion rates; (4) e-commerce vendor relationships; or (5) project budgets. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 118:12-119:8) and Trial Tr. 699:25-704:7 (Osborne); GX361*; GX15* at -275; GX354* at -235; GX233 at -594-595. Bazaarvoice sales representatives will also seek information from customers to determine the customer's best alternative to purchasing a PRR platform from Bazaarvoice. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 288:1-289:8) and Trial Tr. 706:8-16 (Osborne).

58. 25 Both Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews also took into account a customer's average order volume, average product price, and the customer's PRR budget, when developing pricing 26 27 proposals. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 86:2-22, 86:24-87:1, 87:4-5, 87:20-88:1, 89:4-22, 91:14-19,

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98:13-99:5) and Trial Tr. 352:12-353:5 (Luedtke); GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 135:14-24, 163:20-164:7); GX779* at -400-401, -403, -405; GX354* at -235; GX900.

59. After acquiring as much information as possible about the prospect, the PRR platform provider offers a price that aligns closely with its perception of the prospect's willingness to pay for its product. *See, e.g.*, GX836 at -113-114; GX204* at -683-684, 2, 4. This price is derived from a Return on Investment ("ROI") calculator. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 121:22-122:4, 122:7-126:7, 126:13-128:11, 128:14-131:1, 132:21-134:14, 134:17-22) and Trial Tr. 699:25-700:10 (Osborne); GX933; GX81 (Collins Dep. 76:17-77:11); GX89 (Hurt Dep. 115:25-116:20).

60. Both Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews used an ROI calculator to sell their PRR platforms, pricing their products based upon the ROI it projected the customer to achieve using PRR. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 120:18-121:10, 127:22-128:20) and Trial Tr. 349:9-23, 353:6-14 (Luedtke); GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 169:23-170:8); GX203 at -104; GX779* at -400-401, -403, -405. Since Bazaarvoice relies on this value-based pricing method, Bazaarvoice's costs are not "a meaningful consideration in how [Bazaarvoice] price[s]." GX81 (Collins Dep. 119:5-21).

61. Once a value-based price is calculated, "[o]ther factors such as market competition and budgetary constraints may reduce [Bazaarvoice's] pricing range." GX203 at -105. The Bazaarvoice sales force was trained to ask whether a prospective customer is considering other competitive alternatives. The Bazaarvoice sales force frequently learned what prices PowerReviews was offering to customers. *See, e.g.*, GX92 (Osborne Dep. 173:25-174:8) and Trial Tr. 706:12-707:20 (Osborne); GX1119 (Godfrey Dep. 19:11-14); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 54:2-5); Trial Tr. 299:2-12 (Levin/Clorox). In most cases, the presence of competition is relatively transparent. GX494 (Godfrey 30(b)(6) Dep. 69:5-9, 69:11-12).

62. Prospects routinely reveal the identity of competitors during negotiations and may
even reveal the terms of competitive offers to improve their bargaining positions. *See, e.g.*,
GX92 (Osborne Dep. 172:11-21, 172:24-173:6); GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 64:12-16); *see also*Trial Tr. 456:8-457:19 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale). Accordingly, Bazaarvoice and
PowerReviews adjusted their pricing to account for other competitive offers, depending on the

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1	nature of the threat posed by the competition. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 173:25-174:8, 225:21-24,
2	226:3, 252:22-253:4, 253:8-9) and Trial Tr. 709:1-11 (Osborne); GX58 at -691-693; GX193
3	(Walgreens Dep. 52:1-15, 52:25-53:7, 53:21-54:5); GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 65:18-20,
4	65:22-67:4); GX480 at -293, -295; GX279* at -122. See generally GX200 at -156; GX56 at
5	-815; GX900. For example, there were circumstances where Bazaarvoice offered to match the
6	PowerReviews price, offered a lower price, or offered products for free. Trial Tr. 709:1-710:14
7	(Osborne). When aware of a competitive threat, one Bazaarvoice sales person said that
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10	GX405* at -003.
11	When there was not a however, the sales representative
12	GX405* at -002.
13	63. Hurt requested the following example of value-based pricing to share with
14	potential investors: for "the value delivered was in the
15	of lift for [year] 1. This drove an initial pricing of the was discounted down to
16	to win against PowerReviews, at GX203 at -105; see also GX405* at -002-3.
17	64. A PRR platform vendor seeking to unseat an incumbent PRR platform provider at
18	a prospective customer can identify the incumbent by viewing the source code of the company's
19	website, even if the customer did not reveal it during negotiations. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 259:20-
20	260:4); GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 45:1-7, 45:10-12).
21	65. Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews have also been able to use information obtained
22	during the sales process to determine whether an in-house PRR solution is an economically
23	viable alternative for a particular customer. GX781 at -631-645; GX627 at -997; see also,
24	GX365*; GX279* at -120; GX807 at -791.
25	(iv) PRR has Become a Must-Have Feature for Retailers and Manufacturers
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27	66. PRR is considered "critical" to the business of many online retailers and it is
28	unlikely that most online retailers would ever eliminate PRR entirely, as consumers now expect
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ratings and reviews to be a part of their online shopping experience. GX302 at 2; GX81 (Collins Dep. 339:3-8) and Trial Tr. 752:17-20 (Collins); Trial Tr. 1195:7-16 (Friedland/Build.com); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 43:4-6, 43:12-13); GX111 (Bon-Ton Dep. 44:16-45:1); GX141 (Golfsmith Dep. 36:12-21, 58:10-19) and Trial Tr. 1218:16-22 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX160 (Lord & Taylor Dep. 32:18-25, 33:5-7, 33:10-14); GX108* (Black & Decker Dep. 88:22-89:15); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 31:21-24, 32:3-9); GX144 (Hayneedle Dep. 47:5-25); GX105 (Belk Dep. 30:8-18); GX196 (World Kitchen Dep. 76:3-22) and Trial Tr. 1303:11-16 (Bausch/World Kitchen); GX171 (Pacific Sunwear Dep. 48:19-49:7); GX79 (Caine Dep. 25:8-17); Trial Tr. 568:13-20 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond); Trial Tr. 1353:19-1354:11 (Hughes/Astral Brands).

67. As PowerReviews' former CEO, Ken Comée, explained, "[PRR] was table stakes. You had to have it." GX84 (Comée Dep. 41:5-11, 41:14-42:8). An online retailer without PRR is at a competitive disadvantage. GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 35:5-36:4); GX577* at -038; GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 38:11-13, 38:16-22) and Trial Tr. 568:13-20 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond).

68. PRR is a valuable asset for retailers and manufacturers to feature on their websites because it tends to increase sales, decrease product returns, and provide valuable information regarding consumer sentiment. *See* GX537 at -621, -626; GX486 at -031; GX181 (Sears Dep. 59:3, 59:5-8); GX75 (Moog Dep. 63:6-8, 63:11, 63:13-64:7); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 121:7-13); GX93 (Svatek Dep. 73:7-75:6); GX844 at -381; GX770 at -231; GX574* at -638; GX565 at -206-209; GX577* at -038, -045-49, -056; GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 9:15-17, 9:19-10:12); GX81 (Collins Dep. 100:12-101:10); GX170 (Overstock.com Dep. 61:25-62:1, 62:4-22); GX89 (Hurt Dep. 257:22-258:5) and Trial Tr. 97:10-20 (Hurt); Trial Tr. 1353:19-1354:11 (Hughes/Astral Brands).

69. Both Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews believed and marketed that their respective
PRR platforms increase conversion rates, which represent the rate at which website visits
translate to sales to consumers. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 125:3-6, 125:9-13) and Trial Tr. 349:24350:10 (Luedtke); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 119:14-120:4, 120:24-121:4); GX482 at -108, -110;

GX485 at -122, -134. Conversion uplift attributed to PRR can be anywhere from 50-150%. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 80:11-16, 81:12-13); GX846 at -082; *see also*

70. Retailers and manufacturers can conduct tests to confirm the extent to which a
PRR platform increases the conversion rates on their website. GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 29:18-31:3). Online retailers confirm that PRR does in fact increase conversion on their websites. GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 40:14-41:5); GX179 (REI Dep. 48:12-49:8); GX109 (Blinds.com Dep. 38:17-39:3); GX195 (Wine.com 29:15-30:6).

71. PRR provides valuable data about consumer preferences and behavior, which retailers and manufacturers can use to make inventory purchasing or product design decisions.
GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 42:15-17, 42:22-43:3); GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 37:18-38:8, 38:10-12); GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 54:4-15); GX159 (LL Bean Dep. 27:18-30:5, 30:20-33:7); GX89 (Hurt Dep. 259:1-9).

72. PRR can help improve a website's ranking on Internet search engine results, which increases traffic to the website. GX82 (Barton Dep. 21:25-22:21, 22:24-24:1); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 41:6-8, 41:10-12, 41:14-23); GX485 at -135; GX537 at -615, -618, -659; Trial Tr. 97:21-25; 113:13-114:25 (Hurt); 1218:19-22 (Maki/Golfsmith). Internet search engine algorithms generally assign higher rankings to websites with fresh and unique content. PRR is often frequently updated, and this content is highly tailored to the retailer's or manufacturer's product catalog. Accordingly, when PRR is indexed by a search engine, the underlying product pages will likely receive a higher ranking on the search engine's results page. GX484 at -017; GX485 at -124-125. Syndication further helps improve a website's visibility because "authentic content is prioritized" by search engines. Trial Tr. 826:13-827:1 (Collins); *see also* GX1248.

73. Search engine optimization ("SEO") functionality provides the ability for PRR to be indexed by a search engine. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 134:12-18, 135:11-16, 136:20-23, 136:25-137:3, 158:11-15); GX484 at -017; GX485 at -135; Trial Tr. 368:10-13 (Luedtke). PRR has a "very positive" effect on SEO. GX141 (Golfsmith Dep. 36:1-11) and Trial Tr. 1218:19-22 (Maki/Golfsmith); *see also* GX195 (Wine.com 30:7-30:14); GX125 (Clorox Dep. 111:23-

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112:18). Bazaarvoice's and PowerReviews' respective enterprise platforms offer SEO benefits
to their customers. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 55:2-4, 55:7-11) and Trial Tr. 350:20-351:10
(Luedtke); GX1113* at -176, -177; GX484 at -017.

74. Consumers often seek out PRR online even when making in-store purchases, so PRR can have a positive effect on a retailer's in-store sales in addition to its online sales. GX662 at -267-268; GX141 (Golfsmith Dep. 36:22-23, 36:25-37:7, 37:9-11) and Trial Tr. 1218:23-1219:1 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 70:2-4, 70:7-71:6); GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 52:25-53:4, 53:9-12); GX108* (Black & Decker Dep. 86:19-21, 86:23-87:12).

(v) PRR is a Valuable Tool for Consumers

75. Consumers find PRR useful because it provides consumers authentic information regarding another consumer's experience with a particular product. Feedback from other consumers can help a prospective buyer make a more informed purchasing decision. GX81 (Collins Dep. 61:13-62:3); GX838 at -392; ; ;

GX142 (Green Mountain Coffee Dep. 19:15-20:2, 41:22-42:24); GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 15:3-15); GX125 (Clorox Dep. 112:22-25, 113:2-20) and Trial Tr. 284:4-17 (Levin/Clorox).

76. PRR also gives consumers more confidence in making a purchase. GX82 (Barton Dep. 25:7-26:20); GX96* (Acer Dep. 28:13-29:6); GX189 (Tempur-Pedic Dep. 23:9-21); GX141 (Golfsmith Dep. 36:1-11); GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 70:2-4, 70:7-71:6).

77. PRR provides information that is not easily ascertainable when shopping online (*e.g.*, sizing, comfort, weight). GX846 at -080; GX160 (Lord & Taylor Dep. 32:9-25).

78. Consumers are more comfortable purchasing products that have high average ratings and content-filled reviews. GX185 (Smithsonian Dep. 25:19-26:13). Negative reviews also have a positive impact on purchasing decisions because they confirm the authenticity of all PRR. GX82 (Barton Dep. 41:21-43:12); GX928 at -926.

B.

Other "Social Commerce" Products are not Sufficient Substitutes for PRR Platforms

79. Manufacturers and retailers use a number of Internet-based applications to interact with consumers, in addition to PRR. Social commerce refers to applications that allow Internet users to create and exchange user-generated content ("UGC") in a commercial environment online. GX986* at 2, 3. In addition to PRR platforms, social commerce products include forums, question and answer ("Q&A") platforms, blogs, microblogs, and social networks, such as Facebook. GX986* at 3-13.

80. These other social commerce products are not substitutes for PRR platforms. They do not collect the same type of structured, product-level data that is associated with PRR. GX840 at -941. Bazaarvoice Director Chris Pacitti agreed that "[w]ithin the umbrella of social commerce engagement tools there are also companies that are not directly competitive with one another on the basis of the features and functionality that they offer to their clients" including "Bazaarvoice's ratings and review product." GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 81:4-15, 82:10-15).

81. The UGC collected by other social commerce products serves a different purpose than PRR. Trial Tr. 461:5-462:7 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale). These other social commerce products are often focused on brand advertising rather than driving the sale of individual products. GX169 (Orchard Supply Dep. 11:5-22, 22:6-10, 22:12-18, 22:20-24:3). In some cases, other social commerce tools are used to manage customer service inquiries after a product purchase. *See, e.g.*, GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 31:18-34:17). Customers on social sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, are "not in an eCommerce state of mind, so to speak, she's not in the mind to purchase. . . ." GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 33:3-23); *see also* GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 73:24-74:11, 74:14-18, 74:20-22, 74:24-25, 75:2-5, 75:8, 75:10-11, 75:13, 75:15-21, 75:24); GX179 (REI Dep. 54:14-55:5, 55:8-15). Online retailers do not want consumers considering a product to leave the retailer's site in favor of a social site because the consumer may not return to the retail site to finish the transaction. GX986* at 14; GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 31:4-19); GX181 (Sears Dep. 60:5-19).

82. Products that influence consumers immediately prior to making the purchase decision, as PRR does, are fundamentally different than products that attempt to influence consumer behavior at other times. *See* GX82 (Barton Dep. 81:7-82:20, 82:22-83:7); Trial Tr. 284:18-285:23 (Levin/Clorox).

83. Because PRR platforms and other social commerce products serve different purposes, retailers and manufacturers routinely use PRR platforms in combination with one or more other social commerce products. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 33:1-12); GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 94:14-20); GX142 (Green Mountain Coffee Dep. 20:3-21:6, 22:7-23:17). Many online retailers have PRR in addition to a Facebook page and Twitter account. It is competitively necessary for retailers that have a Facebook page and a Twitter account to also have PRR.

Tr. 461:5-24 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale). In other words, other social commerce products are complements to PRR, not substitutes.

84. Other social commerce products do not compete directly with PRR platforms, are not substitutes for PRR platforms, and do not constrain the prices of PRR platforms. Trial Tr.
936:24-939:20 (Shapiro); GX983* at 48-51; *see also infra* Section II.E; GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 155:4-8, 155:11-157:13); GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 88:14-89:9).

(i) Social Networks Like Facebook and Google+ are Not Substitutes for PRR

GX143 (Guess? Dep. 49:8-11, 49:14-15); Trial

85. Facebook is a social network used by retailers and manufacturers to communicate with customers and generate brand awareness. It serves a different purpose than PRR. Trial Tr. 461:516 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale). From a commercial standpoint, Facebook is more conducive to building brand awareness, rather than driving purchasing decisions. GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 25:9-23, 26:1); GX166 (OneCall Dep. 36:2-24); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 70:1-71:12, 71:20-22, 72:2-9, 72:21-22, 72:25, 73:2-11); GX192 (Vitamin Shoppe Dep. 44:5-45:7, 45:9-14); GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 31:5-8, 31:11-18); GX105 (Belk Dep. 25:24-26:22); GX179 (REI Dep. 52:4-55:5, 55:8-56:3); GX110 (Blue Nile Dep. 38:1-39:18, 39:23-40:20); *see also* GX986* at 13-14.

86. Individual product reviews are generally found on a retailer's website rather than on its Facebook page. GX157 (K-Swiss Dep. 21:18-20, 21:22-22:3).

87. Retailers and manufacturers use Facebook as a complement to PRR; they would not substitute PRR with a Facebook page. GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 38:23-39:7, 39:10-23); GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 41:8-13, 41:16); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 73:12-14, 73:16, 73:18-19, 73:22); GX98 (American Eagle Dep. 29:20-23, 30:1-8, 30:13); GX197 (XO Group Dep. 51:25-52:7, 52:9-13, 52:16); GX160 (Lord & Taylor Dep. 36:9-17, 37:1-5, 37:8-9, 37:11-12, 37:16); GX170 (Overstock.com Dep. 66:2-4, 66:6); GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 28:16-18, 29:4-7, 29:10, 29:12-21); GX179 (REI Dep. 58:15-59:2).

88. Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews viewed Facebook as a complement to their PRR
platforms and developed ways for their respective PRR platforms to integrate with Facebook.
GX82 (Barton Dep. 142:18-144:10); GX655 at -916; GX392 at -104; GX530; GX88 (Hossain
Dep. 96:4-5, 96:8-97:3).

89. Bazaarvoice states in its pre-acquisition, ordinary course of business documents
that companies in the business of helping to enhance retailers' and manufacturers' use of
Facebook, like Buddy Media, are not competitive. *See* GX837 at -077-78; GX85 (Defossé
Dep. 114:4-114:13, 114:15-114:20); Trial Tr. 891:20-892:3 (Collins). In a recent Form 10-Q
filed with the SEC, Bazaarvoice states that it does not yet face competition from Facebook and
that Facebook "do[es] not currently focus on [Bazaarvoice's] market." GX969 at 36.
Bazaarvoice's co-founder cannot identify a single potential customer that they have lost because
the customer elected to work exclusively with Facebook. GX82 (Barton Dep. 149:12-150:9) and
Trial Tr. 641:6-9 (Barton). Even today, one of Bazaarvoice's directors testified that Facebook
does not compete "in any market in which Bazaarvoice competes today...." GX492 (Pacitti
Dep. 44:8-13). PowerReviews did not consider Facebook a competitor. GX88 (Hossain Dep.
96:11-97:3).

90. Google+ is another social networking site. Google+ does not offer a competing
PRR platform. GX82 (Barton Dep. 170:1-3, 170:8-171:13). Google+ also does not provide the

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same functionality as PRR and, like Facebook and other social commerce products, online
 retailers and manufacturers would not abandon PRR in favor of Google+. GX181 (Sears Dep.
 62:13-63:11) and Trial Tr. 1695:17-20, 1697:7-10 (Massuda/Sears); GX179 (REI Dep. 57:4-5,
 58:15-59:2). Bazaarvoice has never lost a PRR platform customer to any Google product.
 GX82 (Barton Dep. 173:17-174:15) and Trial Tr. 641:6-11 (Barton); GX1119 (Godfrey Dep.
 34:19-24).

91. PowerReviews did not view Google as a direct competitor. GX88 (Hossain Dep.
97:20-98:5). In its SEC filings, Bazaarvoice stated that it does not yet face competition from
Google and that Google "do[es] not currently focus on [Bazaarvoice's] market." GX969 at 36;
GX970 at 8.

92. Instagram and Pinterest are photo-sharing and social networking sites. Instagram and Pinterest do not provide the same functionality as PRR and, like Facebook and other social commerce products, online retailers would not abandon PRR in favor of Instagram or Pinterest. GX98 (American Eagle Dep. 31:2-4, 31:7-13, 31:14-16, 31:18-21, 31:24); GX195 (Wine.com Dep. 34:25-35:5, 35:7-11); GX111 (Bon-Ton Dep. 45:4-14); GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 30:17-31:3, 31:7-12); GX179 (REI Dep. 57:21-58:17).

93. YouTube is a video-sharing website. Online retailers would not consider
abandoning PRR functionality in favor of YouTube videos. GX181 (Sears Dep. 59:9-12, 64:1519) and Trial Tr. 1696:23-1697:2 (Massuda/Sears); GX98 (American Eagle Dep. 31:25-32:3,
32:5-6, 32:20-22, 33:5).

(ii) Microblogs are Not Substitutes for PRR

94. Twitter is one of the most prominent microblogging sites. Twitter allows users to post short messages called "tweets" that followers of the poster can see on their Twitter feed.
GX986* at 11-12. Businesses use Twitter to engage with their customers and create brand awareness; Twitter serves a different purpose than PRR. GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 26:5-9, 26:12-20); GX192 (Vitamin Shoppe Dep. 45:15-18, 45:20-46:13, 46:15-17); GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 31:5-8, 31:11-18); GX147 (HSN Dep. 49:22-51:1, 51:4-52:21); GX195

1 (Wine.com Dep. 33:4-15, 33:18-25, 55:10-11, 55:14-15); GX179 (REI Dep. 55:10-15, 56:22-2 57:3); GX153 (Jockey Dep. 37:24-38:4, 38:6-7, 38:9-11, 38:14-16).

95. Individual product reviews are generally found on a retailer's website, not on its Twitter feed. GX171 (Pacific Sunwear Dep. 37:25-38:1, 38:3-15, 38:17-39:9); GX109 (Blinds.com Dep. 84:16-86:1, 86:4).

96. PowerReviews did not consider Twitter a competitor. GX88 (Hossain Dep. 97:4-19).

97. Retailers and manufacturers use Twitter as a complement to PRR and would not substitute PRR with Twitter. GX181 (Sears Dep. 59:13-16, 64:2-6, 64:8-14) and Trial Tr.
1696:12-22 (Massuda/Sears); GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 41:17-22, 41:25); GX141 (Golfsmith Dep. 51:17-18, 51:20-52:3, 52:5); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 73:12-14, 73:16); GX98 (American Eagle Dep. 30:14-17, 30:20-23, 31:1); GX178 (Redbox Dep. 62:18-24, 63:1-4, 63:7); GX160 (Lord & Taylor Dep. 37:17-38:1, 38:5-8); GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 30:1-6, 30:10, 30:12-16); GX179 (REI Dep. 58:15-59:2).

(iii) Blogs, Forums, and Q&A are Not Substitutes for PRR

98. Blogs serve a different function than PRR. Blogs are a way to build brand awareness and interact with customers outside of a commercial setting. Retailers and manufacturers use blogs as complements to PRR and would not substitute PRR with a blog.

GX183 (Shoplet Dep. 53:21-54:18);

GX170 (Overstock Dep. 66:12-67:7).

99. Retail blogs allow additional editorial content to be provided to customers and are distinct from the UGC available through PRR. GX195 (Wine.com Dep. 34:3-18, 34:21-24, 55:17-19); GX72* (Lithium Dep. 22:24-23:17, 32:9-15). Indeed, a company's prior adoption of a blog for its online retail site was viewed by Bazaarvoice as a "positive" in trying to identify early customers. GX82 (Barton Dep. 32:6-23) and Trial Tr. 627:14-17 (Barton).

100. Community forums allow users to interact and provide assistance in using a given product in a different manner than the UGC provided in PRR. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 26:2027:3, 28:9-19, 29:7-9, 29:12-30:22). Retailers and manufacturers do not view forums as substitutes for PRR. GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 46:21-24, 47:3-8); Trial Tr. 1623:12-14 (Ahmed/Amazon.com).

101. Q&A tools allow customers to ask questions that may not be answered by the
existing product description provided by the retailer or manufacturer on the product page. Q&A
complements the functionality and content provided by PRR. GX89 (Hurt Dep. 331:17-332:2);
GX81 (Collins Dep. 134:8-13); GX109 (Blinds.com Dep. 46:2-8, 64:2-4, 64:6-25, 65:3-12);
GX192 (Vitamin Shoppe Dep. 40:23-43:25, 44:4, 70:17-71:19, 71:23-72:2, 72:4-9, 72:11);
GX181 (Sears Dep. 57:13-58:18, 58:21-59:2) and Trial Tr. 1694:8-16 (Massuda/Sears); GX146
(Home Depot Dep. 57:11-58:8); GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 10:13-15, 10:23-11:20); GX72* (Lithium Dep. 23:21-24:20, 33:7-22); GX125 (Clorox Dep. 113:25-114:20) and Trial Tr. 286:14-287:1
(Levin/Clorox); GX93 (Svatek Dep. 75:23-77:1, 77:10-78:13).

102.Q&A applications do not serve the same purpose as PRR platforms. GX74*(TurnTo Dep. 116:8-11, 116:16-117:11);

Rather, Q&A fills the gaps left in customers' minds after they read PRR.
GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 107:3-6, 107:9-108:21). Bazaarvoice is not aware of any of its customers that have replaced its PRR platform with a Q&A application. GX1119 (Godfrey Dep. 24:2-6); *see also* Trial Tr. 1623:9-11 (Ahmed/Amazon.com).

103. Other Q&A providers do not consider Q&A a substitute for PRR, and they do not sell their Q&A products as a substitute for PRR platforms. GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 21:14-16, 21:23-22:4, 22:8-24, 23:15-24, 24:3-13, 24:14-26:19, 26:22-24, 27:3-28:13, 28:16-19); GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 9:2-5, 11:21-24, 12:6-20).

C. Bazaarvoice's and PowerReviews' Documents Recognize PRR Platforms as a Distinct Market and Recognize They were Duopolists in the Market

104. In the ordinary course of business, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews recognized that PRR platforms comprise a distinct market. For example, in the materials Bazaarvoice regularly sent to its board members, Bazaarvoice only named other PRR platform providers in the slides titled "Competitive Update." *See* GX1030* at -018; GX1031* at -661; GX1032* at

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-844. Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews' descriptions of market share and market size also reflect the view that they consider PRR platforms to be a distinct market. *See, e.g.*, GX798 at -937; GX1128 at -404; GX524 at -722; Trial Tr. 628:25-630:10 (Barton).

105. Before this litigation commenced, PowerReviews and Reevoo, Bazaarvoice's European competitor, were the only named direct competitors in Bazaarvoice's SEC filings. *See* GX964 at 11; GX965 at 13; GX967 at 25; GX968 at 31. It was only after the United States filed this action that Bazaarvoice identified Pluck, Gigya, and Viewpoints by name as competitors in its public securities filings. *See* GX970 at 8; Trial Tr. 759:12-17 (Collins). Bazaarvoice CEO Collins acknowledged that this lawsuit may have influenced the decision to start naming these companies in Bazaarvoice's SEC filings. GX81 (Collins Dep. 223:2-224:1).

106. Bazaarvoice recognizes that the PRR platform market is highly concentrated. Before the merger, Bazaarvoice's Vice President of Strategy, Erin Defossé, recognized that the number of PRR platform alternatives available to enterprise customers is limited: "My take is that there really isn't a market for them to understand (as it relates R&R), it is us or PowerReviews and in the game of big clients: we win." GX540 at -252.

107. Similarly, Bazaarvoice co-founder Brett Hurt recognized the duopolistic nature of the PRR platform market when remarking that one of the benefits of acquiring PowerReviews would be "[p]otentially taking out our only competitor, who is both suppressing our price points (by as much as 15% according to Osborne)" GX518 at -475. At trial, Hurt testified that prior to the merger he believed that PowerReviews was Bazaarvoice's biggest competitor "for the U.S. market and ratings and reviews." Trial Tr. 130:7-12 (Hurt).

108. PowerReviews executives similarly saw the PRR platform market as a duopoly
between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. As recently as April 2012, shortly before the
transaction, PowerReviews' CEO, Pehr Luedtke, noted "wide recognition" of the "duopoly"
between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. GX254 at 3 and Trial Tr. 340:22-342:8 (Luedtke).
Luedtke repeatedly recognized the absence of other meaningful competitors, calling the PRR
platform market a "duopoly" on several occasions. *See* GX255 at -698; GX955 at -568; GX275
at -093; GX489 at -172; Trial Tr. 345:24-346:14 (Luedtke).

109. PowerReviews' head of marketing, Cathy Halligan, also saw that PowerReviews was in a "duopoly" with Bazaarvoice. GX683 at -339; GX776 at -766. Halligan wrote that it was well-known in the industry that the only viable commercial options for potential customers of PRR platforms were Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. GX683 at -339. Other PowerReviews executives also recognized the duopolistic nature of the market when they described their firm as "the #2 company in a two-horse race (with Bazaar[v]oice, out of Austin, TX)." GX636 at -834.

110. Consistent with its view that the PRR platform market was a duopoly,
PowerReviews noted that a merger of Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews would eliminate
competition by creating a "[m]onopoly in the market" when evaluating the anticipated benefits
of the acquisition. *See, e.g.*, GX612 at 28.

D.

The Industry Recognizes PRR Platforms as a Separate Market

111. Competitors and former competitors in the PRR platform market recognize that it is a distinct market and that after the merger there is now "one dominant player" in the PRR platforms space. GX75 (Moog Dep. 104:15-105:2, 105:5, 106:19-20, 106:23-107:3); *see also* GX952* at -258; GX72* (Lithium Dep. 133:6-21).

112. Industry analysts also recognize that PRR platforms are a distinct market.
Gartner, in its published industry research, noted that "[c]ustomer product reviews are the most important tool that consumers use in determining where to shop. As such, customer product reviews have become a must-have feature for multichannel retailer e-commerce sites PowerReviews is one of the two dominant providers of community review applications for multichannel and pure e-commerce retailers." GX271 at -732, -737, -742; *see also* GX604 at -404; GX1017 at -579-580. Gartner noted that through the merger "Bazaarvoice . . . will acquire its sole rival, PowerReviews . . ." and further noted that PowerReviews legacy clients should "[p]repare for potential migration to Bazaarvoice products and potential price increases to cover the cost of this transaction as well as historically higher-priced Bazaarvoice offerings." GX1214 at -133-134.

27 113. Equity analysts also note the absence of other meaningful competitors in the PRR
28 platform market. For example, following Bazaarvoice's IPO, Credit Suisse described

Bazaarvoice as "the market leader by at least a factor of two in an apparent duopoly for the
 ratings and review space." GX604 at -401; *see also* GX1017 at -579-80; GX687 at -075, -091,
 -105 (Credit Suisse, Piper Jaffray, Deutsche Bank).

E.

Economic Analysis Confirms that PRR Platforms Sold to U.S. Customers are a Relevant Market

114. Professor Carl Shapiro evaluated the likely competitive effects of the acquisition of PowerReviews by Bazaarvoice. Trial Tr. 900:3-6 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro earned his Ph.D. in economics from M.I.T. and specializes in the field of industrial organization generally and antitrust specifically. Trial Tr. 894:11-14, 895:1-4 (Shapiro). Over the past 30 years he has published extensively. Trial Tr. 895:5-11 (Shapiro). He twice served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. Trial Tr. 895:18-22 (Shapiro). He was also a member of President Obama's Council of Economic Advisors. Trial Tr. 897:23-898:10 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro is currently the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at U.C. Berkeley. Trial Tr. 894:19-25 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro has focused his academic and professional work on technology markets, intellectual property issues, and network competition. Trial Tr. 899:8-23 (Shapiro).

115. The economic framework for analyzing mergers is the same for consummated and unconsummated mergers. Trial Tr. 900:13-21 (Shapiro). In order to assess the likely effects of a merger, the *Horizontal Merger Guidelines* jointly promulgated by the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission ("the *Merger Guidelines*") suggest identifying a relevant market, consisting of a relevant product market and relevant geographic market, to determine the areas where a substantial lessening of competition may be observed. GX981 §4; Trial Tr. 900:22-901:19 (Shapiro).

116. Professor Shapiro employed the *Merger Guidelines* to define the relevant product
market. GX983* at 40-41. The *Merger Guidelines* apply the "hypothetical monopolist test,"
which has often been applied by the courts and is the standard methodology employed by
antitrust economists to define the relevant product market. *See, e.g.*, GX984* at 1. The purpose

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of the hypothetical monopolist test is to assess whether there would be significant customer harm
if one firm controlled all of the products in the candidate market relative to pre-merger
competition. Trial Tr. 901:20-902:11 (Shapiro). This test asks whether a profit-maximizing
hypothetical monopolist would impose at least a small but significant non-transitory increase in
price of 5-10% ("SSNIP") on a proposed candidate set of products. GX983* at 40-41; GX981
§4.1; *see also* Trial Tr. 901:20-903:16 (Shapiro).

117. The test boils down to whether enough current users of PRR platforms would drop PRR platforms in response to a SSNIP to make that price increase unprofitable. Trial Tr. 901:20-903:16 (Shapiro); GX983* at 42. As Professor Shapiro notes, "the smaller the number of customers who would shift from products in the candidate market to products outside that market in response to a SSNIP imposed on products in the candidate market, the more likely that market will satisfy the test." GX983* at 42. The hypothetical monopolist will impose a SSNIP on a product if the profit gained from the SSNIP outweighs the total profit lost from customers who will no longer purchase the product at the higher price and will not switch to another product in the market. GX983* at 45.

118. The *Merger Guidelines* describe the appropriate methodologies for defining the relevant geographic market as focusing on the customer location "[w]hen the hypothetical monopolist could discriminate based on customer location." GX981 §4.2.2. As described by Professor Shapiro, in the PRR platform market a hypothetical monopolist can identify and target price increases to a particular group of customers based on geography and those customers cannot engage in arbitrage with customers in another geographic area. The geographic market is defined around those customers to whom a hypothetical monopolist would profitably impose at least a SSNIP. GX983* at 41-42. A supplier in a different area "that has provided or attempted to provide" a relevant product to customers in the geographic market should be included in the market. GX983* at 42; GX984* at 4.

(i)

PRR Platforms Satisfy the Hypothetical Monopolist Test

119. Professor Shapiro identified PRR platforms as the "candidate" relevant product market. Trial Tr. 901:10-19 (Shapiro). In applying the hypothetical monopolist test, he asked

the question "[i]f a single firm controlled all of the ratings-and-reviews software to customers in
the United States, would that be a significant harm to customers?" Trial Tr. 924:22-24 (Shapiro).
The hypothetical monopolist would control Bazaarvoice, PowerReviews, all in-house solutions,
and the fringe suppliers. Trial Tr. 924:25-925:6 (Shapiro). Applying this test, Professor Shapiro
concludes that the relevant market is PRR platforms for U.S. retailers and manufacturers. Trial
Tr. 936:17-23 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro's opinion is supported by both qualitative and
quantitative evidence.

120. Customer substitution patterns support Professor Shapiro's relevant product market. The relevant question is, if the price of PRR platforms went up 5%, would customers drop the product in significant numbers. Trial Tr. 925:18-22 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro concluded the evidence was clear that "no or almost none of them would" drop their PRR platforms if faced with such a price increase. Trial Tr. 926:11-13 (Shapiro). Having a PRR platform is "table stakes" that has become "a necessary part of being a major online retailer." Trial Tr. 926:3-5 (Shapiro); *see also supra* Section II.A.(iv).⁴

121. Over the past five years, an increasing number of online retailers have adopted PRR platforms. In 2009, over 300 firms in the IR 500 did not use PRR platforms. By 2013, only about a little over 100 firms in the IR 500 did not use PRR platforms. Trial Tr. 928:14-18 (Shapiro); GX1038. This trend among top retailers suggests PRR platforms have become a necessary component of an online retail website. *See* Trial Tr. 926:25-927:17 (Shapiro).

122. Another category of qualitative evidence supporting Professor Shapiro's relevant product market is the companies' ROI analysis. Trial Tr. 926:14-24 (Shapiro). As part of their sales process, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews typically prepared ROI analyses for potential customers to convince the potential customer to adopt their PRR platform. GX983* at 43-44; *supra* Section II.A.(iii). Bazaarvoice's ROI estimates of the benefits of PRR to manufacturers and retailers are further evidence that a small but significant nontransitory increase in price "will not cause customers to drop ratings and reviews." Trial Tr. 926:22 (Shapiro).

⁴ Even Defendant's economic expert admits that many customers are "unlikely to consider giving up" PRR. Trial Tr. 1721:14-15 (Shehadeh).

123. The companies' documents, particularly the deal documents, are also directly relevant for product market definition. Trial Tr. 929:11-17 (Shapiro). The documents indicate party executives believed the merger would avoid price erosion and allow the merged firm to profitably raise prices at least 5% above pre-merger levels. Trial Tr. 930:2-8 (Shapiro). Based on Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews' belief that the merged firm could increase prices postmerger, Professor Shapiro concludes that "the hypothetical monopolist who controls not only Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews but also controls all in-house and the fringe players, can raise price even more and profitably." Trial Tr. 930:9-12 (Shapiro).

124. In head-to-head competition, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews often discounted their PRR platform prices in excess of the 5-10% assumed by a SSNIP. The hypothetical monopolist would not face the same pressure to discount its prices and the customer would still purchase PRR platforms, in essence accepting a SSNIP. This is direct evidence that PRR platforms are a proper relevant product market. GX983* at 42-43 and App. C; *infra* Section III.B.

125. Customer testimony that they would not abandon PRR platforms (or even their current PRR platform provider) in the face of a price increase is also consistent with Professor Shapiro's conclusion that PRR platforms are a relevant product market. *See* GX983* at 43-44; GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 43:11-16); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 83:22-23, 84:1-2, 84:4-5, 84:8-12, 84:14-17, 84:20-21, 85:5-14, 85:20-21); GX145 (h.h. gregg Dep. 23:23-24:7); GX111 (Bon-Ton Dep. 37:18-38:7); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 32:20-21, 32:25-33:9, 34:22-35:2, 37:14-16, 37:20-38:10) and Trial Tr. 566:4-11, 567:5-7, 567:25-568:12 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond); GX109 (Blinds.com Dep. 66:7-11, 66:13-16); GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 72:23-73:18); *see also* GX1106* at -617 (customer agreeing to price increase).⁵

126. The quantitative evidence also supports Professor Shapiro's conclusion that PRR platforms satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test. In order for a SSNIP imposed by a hypothetical monopolist to be profitable, the recapture rate, that is, "the percentage of sales lost

⁵ Even Defendant's proffered shopper marketing expert is not aware of anyone ever dropping PRR and replacing with another social commerce tool. Trial Tr. 1568:21-1570:6 (Goldberg).

by one product in the candidate market, when its price alone rises, that is recaptured by other products in the candidate market" must be high enough that the incremental profits from the increased price plus the incremental profits from the recaptured sales that goes to other products in the candidate market exceeds the profits lost to products outside the candidate market. GX983* at 45; GX981 §4.1.3. Professor Shapiro concludes that the minimum recapture rate needed for PRR platforms to form a relevant market would be 17%. Trial Tr. 933:5-19 (Shapiro); GX983* at 46. Professor Shapiro estimated various possible recapture rates and proxies for the recapture rate and concluded that all variations were substantially larger than 17%. Trial Tr. 935:13-936:14 (Shapiro); GX983* at 45-48. Professor Shapiro also estimated the recapture rate based upon data cited by Bazaarvoice's expert and concluded that the recapture rate based on that data is also well above the 17% threshold necessary to show PRR platforms to be a relevant market. GX984* at 3.

127. Dr. Shehadeh, Bazaarvoice's economic expert, contends the relevant product market is too narrow because it does not include Q&A, testimonials, forums and other social commerce tools. *See* Trial Tr. 936:24-937:4 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro criticizes this analysis because Dr. Shehadeh did not perform the hypothetical monopolist test in expanding the relevant product market to include these other social commerce tools. Trial Tr. 937:5-15 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro's analysis confirms that other social commerce tools, including social networking sites, Q&A, and forums, either serve a different purpose than PRR or are insufficient substitutes such that customers would not switch to another social commerce tool in the face of a SSNIP. GX983* at 48-51; *supra* Section II.B.

128. Dr. Shehadeh also contends that the ability of "rapid entrants" to enter the market should be considered at the market definition stage of the analysis. Trial Tr. 940:5-19 (Shapiro). A rapid entrant is a firm that is not currently selling a PRR platform, but could enter the market very quickly and easily without making a substantial investment or incurring risk. Trial Tr. 970:1-13, 972:7-10 (Shapiro); GX981 §5.1.

129. Professor Shapiro testified that considering rapid entrants at this stage of the analysis will lead to "errors." Trial Tr. 940:23-941:5 (Shapiro). Product market definition

focuses on the demand side, "what do the customers need?" Trial Tr. 941:4 (Shapiro). The "standard" merger analysis considers supply-side substitution, including rapid entrants, when calculating markets shares and analyzing entry. Trial Tr. 940:9-941:5 (Shapiro); GX981 §4; *see also* Sections V and VI *infra*.

(ii) The United States is the Relevant Geographic Market

130. The *Merger Guidelines* also apply the hypothetical monopolist test to determine the relevant geographic market. Trial Tr. 905:11-20 (Shapiro); GX981 §§4.2.1 and 4.2.2. The purpose of the test with respect to the geographic market is to identify "the zone where the prices would be profitably elevated in comparison with competition." Trial Tr. 905:19-20 (Shapiro). Where, as here, a hypothetical monopolist could price discriminate, *i.e.* price differently, based on customer location, geographic market is based on the location of the customers, not the suppliers. GX981 §4.2.2. Professor Shapiro concluded that to properly assess the competitive effects of the merger, the relevant market should be defined as the United States, specifically focused on U.S. retailers and manufactures. Trial Tr. 943:7-11 (Shapiro).

131. Although Professor Shapiro concluded the geographic market is the United States,
he includes in the market foreign suppliers that serve U.S. customers. Trial Tr. 941:6-25
(Shapiro). However, in counting foreign suppliers, Professor Shapiro only considered their
success in the United States in order to meaningfully measure their significance to customers
with U.S. facing websites. Trial Tr. 942:1-8 (Shapiro); *infra* Section VI.

132. The evidence supports Professor Shapiro's conclusion that the relevant
geographic market is the United States. PRR platform providers license their products for
specific websites, often limited by geography. Manufacturers and retailers who maintain
separate websites for prospective consumers located in different countries often have different
managers and contracts for the different websites. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. 1167:18-1168:7
(Friedland/Build.com);
GX79 (Caine Dep. 11:2312:4, 63:14-17); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 39:8-16). Because PRR platforms are provided under a
software-as-a-service ("SaaS") or cloud-based model, arbitrage is not available to defeat price
discrimination. In other words, it is not possible to resell the PRR platform to other websites,

including the customer's own websites located in other territories. *See, e.g.*, GX121* at -251, -258; GX437 at -049, -054; GX369* at -611-612, -620; GX338* at -340; GX688* at -319.

133. As Professor Shapiro notes, because "such geographic arbitrage is impossible, we can perform the hypothetical monopolist test looking only at the responses of U.S. customers to the SSNIP." GX983* at 41-42. Because foreign suppliers' PRR platforms cannot be resold to U.S. customers, foreign suppliers who are not selling into the U.S. do not affect the prices charged to U.S. customers and therefore including any such suppliers would not reflect market realities. Professor Shapiro therefore concludes that "the United States is a relevant geographic

market." GX983* at 40-42.

Bazaarvoice's former CEO

agrees, testifying that prior to the merger he believed that PowerReviews was Bazaarvoice's
biggest competitor "for the U.S. market and ratings and reviews." Trial Tr. 130:7-12 (Hurt); *see also* Trial Tr. 131:1, 131:19-20, 193:5-7, 231:14-17 (Hurt); *cf*. Trial Tr. 665:17-666:5, 682:23-25
(Barton) (discussing Reevoo's history as a "European competitor").

134. When announcing the PowerReviews acquisition, Bazaarvoice's then-CEO, Brett Hurt, asserted that "we found in serving large Fortune 500 clients that it's very important to serve them from a local presence. People want to deal with each other from that local presence" GX840 at -943. Retailers and manufacturers agree. *See, e.g.*, GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 67:3-68:4); GX125 (Clorox Dep. 121:25-123:4).

135. Consistent with this understanding of the market, when expanding internationally,
Bazaarvoice prioritized hiring a local salesperson in that new country. GX82 (Barton Dep.
87:25-88:9) and Trial Tr. 630:19-632:6 (Barton); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 26:9-12, 27:17-28:7);
GX81 (Collins Dep. 198:7-23). Bazaarvoice's U.S. sales personnel focus on selling to U.S.facing websites, even while sales personnel in other countries negotiate the sale of Bazaarvoice's
PRR platform for the same company's foreign websites. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 38:9-21, 39:3-16)
and Trial Tr. 704:19-25 (Osborne). Bazaarvoice also faced different competitive dynamics in
different geographies. Trial Tr. 705:5-7 (Osborne). For example, Bazaarvoice did not compete
with PowerReviews in any significant way in Europe. Trial Tr. 735:10-12 (Osborne).

 136.
 Customers often prefer to have U.S.-based, native English speakers perform the

 moderation of their PRR.
 GX248 at -595; GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 279:10-20, 280:9-14, 280:17

 281:2, 281:13-14) and Trial Tr. 371:8-372:2 (Luedtke); GX89 (Hurt Dep. 264:11-17, 264:20-24)

 and Trial Tr. 106:7-17 (Hurt); *cf.* GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 84:21-85:3).

137. Finally, to offer a commercial syndication service in the U.S., a PRR platform provider must have a base of PRR written by U.S. consumers. Few companies attempt to syndicate PRR between the U.S. and other countries due to even slight differences in the products or their product SKUs (stock-keeping units) across geographies that make it difficult to map products across regions. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 84:9-20);

GX96* (Acer Dep. 73:4-14).⁶

III. THE TRANSACTION WILL SUBSTANTIALLY LESSEN COMPETITION AND RESULT IN HIGHER PRICES

A. PowerReviews was Bazaarvoice's Closest and Most Significant Competitor

138. Bazaarvoice executives have repeatedly expressed that PowerReviews was its
most significant, and often only, PRR platform competitor. Bazaarvoice's former CEO, Brett
Hurt, described PowerReviews as Bazaarvoice's "fiercest competitor" (GX417 at -036; GX89
(Hurt Dep. 348:3-7)), "only real competitor" (GX416 at -683), and "biggest competitor" (GX418 at -912; GX89 (Hurt Dep. 367:17-369:11)) and Trial Tr. 130:7-12 (Hurt). Hurt viewed
PowerReviews as Bazaarvoice's number one competitor that was "challenging [Bazaarvoice's]
price points" and winning "key accounts like REI and Staples." GX408 at -667; GX417 at -036.
139. Former Bazaarvoice Chief Revenue Officer Michael Osborne testified that most
of Bazaarvoice's retail deals involved PowerReviews. Trial Tr. 708:11-23 (Osborne); GX223.
Hurt testified that PowerReviews was Bazaarvoice's largest threat for retail customers (GX89
(Hurt Dep. 219:4-7, 219:10-220:8)) as well as manufacturer customers (GX89 (Hurt Dep. 372:18-373:8)). Draft talking points prepared for Hurt to announce the acquisition to

Bazaarvoice employees state that "[s]ix years into our respective journeys, we are both respected

⁶ Even Defendant's economic expert testified that he was not surprised that syndication across geographies was uncommon. Trial Tr. 2013:15-18 (Shehadeh).

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leaders in our space - No. 1 and No. 2." GX838 at -391; *see also* Trial Tr. 509:5-11 (Defossé)
(quoting GX37 at 7, "[PowerReviews] is currently in 80% of our sales pipeline"); Trial Tr. 757:3-16 (Collins); *cf.* GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 151:8-13, 160:20-23, 161:1-3).

140. Bazaarvoice's co-founder Brant Barton wrote in an email to Facebook that "last Thursday we announced the acquisition of PowerReviews, our primary competitor." GX507 at -412. Bazaarvoice's CEO, Stephen Collins, similarly testified that for "ratings and reviews, United States, PowerReviews was, I would say, our – the competitor we looked at as the next best competitor." GX81 (Collins Dep. 143:7-17). At trial, he described PowerReviews as Bazaarvoice's "primary competitor in retail." Trial Tr. 830:19-23 (Collins).

141. Bazaarvoice's sales organization also repeatedly focused its sales efforts on competing with PowerReviews. For example, in July 2011, PowerReviews convinced to reevaluate its relationship with Bazaarvoice. Afterwards, Bazaarvoice's Chief Strategy Officer, Mike Svatek, expressed concern that Bazaarvoice was "seeing new competitive pressure" from PowerReviews through an "aggressive blitz campaign." GX541 at -266; GX914 at -275. Svatek believed Bazaarvoice needed to "eradicate" PowerReviews, and he proposed a counterattack on the PowerReviews base. GX914 at -274. He advocated an "aggressive" approach to "unseat" PowerReviews from three of its largest accounts. GX541 at -265. "Whatever the package, I want to screw PR and out them on their heels by wrecking a few of their big accounts and getting us a couple supernodes. You in? Let's crush these MFs." GX397* at -058.

142. Bazaarvoice launched an extraordinary initiative, which it called "Project Menlogeddon," so named in a nod to PowerReviews' primary financial backer Menlo Ventures (GX1084 at -022), to respond to heightened competition from PowerReviews. GX34. Collins described Project Menlogeddon as "a special project to defeat our only meaningful competitor"
GX334 at -684; GX81 (Collins Dep. 417:24-418:5, 418:14-25); *see also* GX37; GX39.

143. Project Menlogeddon specifically targeted PowerReviews and sought to bring
greater focus in competing against it. GX85 (Defossé Dep. 212:8-19) and Trial Tr. 490:10-491:4
(Defossé); GX93 (Svatek Dep. 201:7-21); GX420 at -846; GX40; GX92 (Osborne Dep. 242:14-

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243:3, 265:18-266:3, 266:6-7) and Trial Tr. 719:9-17 (Osborne); GX34; GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 152:10-13). Under the Project Menlogeddon banner, Bazaarvoice sought to fend off the PowerReviews assault by "building moats" around its most significant customers and enticing large PowerReviews customers to switch to Bazaarvoice's PRR platform. GX33. As Bazaarvoice's Chief Marketing Officer, Erin Nelson, put it: "Important we show that we've got a plan of action that's broad and bold[;] Take their top customers[;] Build moats around our top clients[;] Take their data[;] Shake their confidence[.]" GX33; *see also* GX334 at -684. As part of its plan to "[t]ake it to PowerReviews" (GX40 at -033), Bazaarvoice created pricing guidelines to steal "marquee" PowerReviews customers "at all costs." GX39 at -941; *see also* Trial Tr. 501:18-22 (Defossé).

144. Bazaarvoice's Vice President of Retail Sales, Paul Dodd, reported to his team that he had met with Collins and other members of Bazaarvoice's Executive Leadership Team and Collins wanted to "squeeze PR at every point" including "dropping the price floor" to win certain key accounts. GX558; GX86 (Dodd Dep. 125:12-128:6); *see also* GX81 (Collins Dep. 122:3-6, 122:8-11, 155:8-15). Mr. Defossé recommended that the mascot for Project Menlogeddon be the AC-130 military ground attack aircraft because "[i]t is badass and frankly very intimidating." GX716 at -961. In a "Menlogeddon Update" email, Bazaarvoice Vice President of Product Strategy Erin Defossé wrote "The BV battleship (or AC-130 gunship, rather) and its guns have kicked in and lead rain is starting to drop on PR" The update detailed both defensive and offensive strategies targeting PowerReviews. GX37 at -947; *see also* GX36; GX35; GX755.

145. Project Menlogeddon was a significant undertaking at all levels of the Bazaarvoice corporate hierarchy, and the executive team received regular updates on the progress of the campaign. Trial Tr. 505:15-17 (Defossé); *see also*, *e.g.*, GX35.

146. Bazaarvoice's competitive response to PowerReviews was unique. No other
competitor had the necessary customer base from which to launch a credible attack on the
Bazaarvoice syndication network. *See infra* Section VI.A.(i). Accordingly, Bazaarvoice's
competitive response to PowerReviews was unique. There is no evidence that Bazaarvoice ever

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instituted another competitive initiative targeting Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Gigya, Lithium or 1 2 any other competitor that reached the scale or significance of Project Menlogeddon. GX92 3 (Osborne Dep. 266:22-267:10, 267:25-268:16, 268:24-269:17) and Trial Tr. 719:18-720:12 (Osborne); GX81 (Collins Dep. 159:13-21); GX85 (Defossé Dep. 260:25-261:6, 261:13-18, 4 5 261:21-262:5, 262:8-9) and Trial Tr. 501:18-502:18, 503:17-504:13 (Defossé); GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 152:14-18, 154:6-155:18). 6

147. Bazaarvoice created documents called "battle cards" that showed side-by-side analyses of Bazaarvoice's and its competitors' products. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 262:23-263:12); Trial Tr. 537:13-538:3 (Defossé). In its battle card analyzing PowerReviews, Bazaarvoice said that "PowerReviews appears in many sales cycles in the US and their summary pitch is that they do everything BV does but at a lower price" and that "[f]or enterprise clients and head-to-head capabilities, PR's price is typically between 1/3 and 2/3 of BV's price." GX837 at -098, -101.

148. PowerReviews executives also repeatedly acknowledged that Bazaarvoice was its most significant, and often, only competitor. PowerReviews' former CEO, Ken Comée, testified that Bazaarvoice was PowerReviews' number one competitor. GX84 (Comée Dep. 96:24-97:4, 97:6-9). Similarly, PowerReviews' former Vice President of Marketing, Nadim Hossain, testified that he could only think of one U.S. customer that PowerReviews lost to another competitor besides Bazaarvoice. GX88 (Hossain Dep. 55:13-56:22). He also thought that PowerReviews had the ability to surpass Bazaarvoice to become number one. GX88 (Hossain Dep. 121:25-122:2). PowerReviews also regularly tracked deals where it went head-to-head with Bazaarvoice (GX1019) and held weekly "BV Flip" calls to discuss PowerReviews' attempts to get Bazaarvoice customers to switch to PowerReviews. GX642 at -310.

Would-be competitors likewise viewed Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews as each

23 other's top competitor. 24

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150. Retailers and manufacturers also view Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews as the two most significant providers of PRR platforms. GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 44:1-6, 44:12-14, 44:20-23, 45:1, 49:9-51:8, 51:12-14, 51:17, 66:10-67:3, 67:6); GX192 (Vitamin Shoppe Dep. 40:13-20, 40:22, 61:2-61:9, 61:21-63:18, 63:21-23, 63:25-64:8, 64:10-21, 66:19-21, 66:23-67:8, 67:10-11, 67:16-68:7, 68:9-11, 68:13-69:17, 69:19-70:4, 70:7-11, 70:14-16) and Trial Tr. 1378:1-7 (Beebe/Vitamin Shoppe); GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 84:23-85:19); GX145 (h.h. gregg Dep. 6 13:24-14:25, 15:8); GX142 (Green Mountain Coffee Dep. 31:23-33:6). Customers often looked exclusively at Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews when searching for a PRR platform. GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 66:10-67:3, 67:6); GX125 (Clorox Dep. 126:19-22, 127:1-10, 127:12-15, 130:17-21, 130:23-131:1); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 96:7-17) and Trial Tr. 571:18-25 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond).

151. Bazaarvoice salespeople were generally expected to send a How the Deal Was Done ("HTDWD") email to a specific group email list at the company at the close of each transaction explaining how the transaction was accomplished. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 269:19-270:23, 271:1-272:17, 272:20, 283:7-283:19). These HTDWD emails regularly reported selling Bazaarvoice's PRR platform to customers in direct, and often intense, competition with PowerReviews. These emails sometimes outlined the next steps Bazaarvoice planned to take to sell additional products which would complement, and not replace, the PRR platform. For example:

Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform to in a deal where "PowerReviews was brought in after [Bazaarvoice]" and noting that Bazaarvoice offered discount "because of powerreviews." GX673 at -894; GX422* at -469. a Bazaarvoice competed to win PRR platform business in what was described as a "MASSIVE Power Reviews steel [sic]." GX225 at -253. Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform to in a sale described as a "PR Steal" where Bazaarvoice used "some aggressive pricing to win their business. With PR offering syndication to one of big retailers this was tougher than expected." GX227. PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 42

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1	Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform to in an "Extremely
2	PowerReviews competitive" sale. GX345 at -222.
3	Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform to
4	taking the business away from Power Reviews in what Bazaarvoice described as a
5	"HUGE Power Reviews steal." GX56 at -815.
6	Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform to in a competitive
7	sale against Power Reviews. GX389.
8	Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform, among other things, to in
9	a sale that was described as a "PowerReviews STEAL!" GX261; see also GX228 at -
10	419.
11	Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform and BrandVoice (syndication)
12	to in a "very PR competitive" deal that was "won
13	based on [Bazaarvoice's] network," among other things. GX543.
14	Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform to
15	bragging that "[a]nother IR500 account chooses Bazaarvoice over PR" and that
16	"cancelled a scheduled onsite w/ PowerReviews and signed with us TODAY."
17	GX531 at -973.
18	Bazaarvoice sold its PRR platform, along with Ask & Answer, to
19	in a deal described as "head to head competition with PowerReviews" that
20	required "a reduction in price to bring it home." GX230.
21	B. Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews Competed Aggressively on Price, Resulting in Significant Savings to Customers
22	in Significant Savings to Customers
23	152. PowerReviews positioned itself as a low-price alternative to Bazaarvoice (GX81
24	(Collins Dep. 367:11-13, 367:15-19, 403:18-404:16) and Trial Tr. 774:6-10 (Collins)) and set an
25	internal goal to "[b]e in every deal [Bazaarvoice] is in," and encourage price competition by
26	building a "cost structure to support price compression." GX277 at -870; GX490 at -727; see
27	also GX88 (Hossain Dep. 82:17-85:7, 95:13-16).
28	

153. Bazaarvoice employees viewed PowerReviews as "an ankle-biter that cause[d] price pressure in deals" and acknowledged that many customers brought PowerReviews into negotiations as a "lever to knock [Bazaarvoice] down on price." GX477* at -466. Bazaarvoice acknowledged that competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews resulted in lower prices to its customers, saying it was "common for PowerReviews to provide extremely low pricing to our clients to push them in their favor." GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 149:25-150:18); Trial Tr. 762:3-5 (Collins); *see also* GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 278:2-10) and Trial Tr. 372:21-373:5 (Luedtke); GX82 (Barton Dep. 254:13-256:7).

154. PowerReviews' aggressive approach to pricing frequently forced Bazaarvoice to defend its more expensive prices. Responding to competitive pressure from PowerReviews in July 2011, Bazaarvoice's Vice President of Retail Sales, Paul Dodd, warned that PowerReviews had adopted a "scorched earth approach to pricing," which "force[d] all of [Bazaarvoice's] current prospects and customers to at least understand how and why there is such a delta in price." GX208* at -475.

155. If a prospective customer was unwilling to pay a premium over the
PowerReviews price, Bazaarvoice frequently matched the PowerReviews price or offered a more
favorable price than PowerReviews. GX293 at -118; GX804 at -084; GX1119 (Godfrey Dep.
65:23-67:10); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 205:9-12, 205:15-22, 205:25) and Trial Tr. 709:1-11
(Osborne). For example, Walgreens forwarded PowerReviews' offer to Bazaarvoice and asked
"can you do better . . .?" GX269 at -045-46; *see also* GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 54:11-55:1, 55:756:18, 56:21-23, 56:25-57:2, 57:25-58:3, 58:8-59:19, 59:22, 59:24-60:16, 60:22-61:5).

156. Bazaarvoice offered to meet PowerReviews' price to Vitamin Shoppe and add an
additional 5% discount. GX192 (Vitamin Shoppe Dep. 49:10-50:1, 51:16-52:19, 52:21-53:1,
53:4-18, 53:21-24, 54:2-22, 54:25-55:9, 55:12, 72:17-22, 72:25) and Trial Tr. 1378:8-1379:25
(Beebe/Vitamin Shoppe). Bazaarvoice's Vice President of Sales, Tony Capasso, described this
trend in a 2011 email regarding an apparel manufacturer's consideration of PowerReviews:
"[L]ate adopters see us as the stronger brand but struggle to justify 2X-3X greater costs for a
solution that looks somewhat the same. Even when we do show differences some [prospects]

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don't put enough stock in those differences to justify the price [difference]. We may need to
battle on price in this case" Bazaarvoice ultimately offered to match the price that
PowerReviews had offered the apparel retailer, which represented a substantial discount from its
initial proposal. GX293 at -120.

157. Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews also aggressively pursued each other's installed base of customers. Before the acquisition, a number of manufacturers and retailers switched between the Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews PRR platforms. Many times these switches were spurred by aggressive offers that were intended to displace the incumbent PRR platform provider. *See, e.g.*, GX828 at -564-565; GX480; GX774 at -561; GX423.

158. PowerReviews actively sought opportunities to steal Bazaarvoice customers by offering lower pricing or other incentives to those customers to switch to PowerReviews. In the summer of 2011, PowerReviews was "[a]ggressively going after [Bazaarvoice's] existing customer base" and "[d]isrupting our new client sales efforts" by "[l]owering price floors."
GX212 at 14; *see also* Trial Tr. 1114:10-1115:9 (Godfrey); GX1119 (Godfrey Dep. 45:2-10, 47:10-19, 48:14-49:6); GX85 (Defossé Dep. 229:2-16); GX422*. Bazaarvoice executive Alan Godfrey commented that PowerReviews was convincing key customers like

"to evaluate alternatives, or at least, negotiate us to lower price points." GX915 at -689.

159. In some cases, PowerReviews convinced Bazaarvoice customers to switch platforms. GX753 at -574; GX736; GX737; Trial Tr. 373:16-18 (Luedtke). In other cases, an offer from PowerReviews provided additional leverage for the customer to negotiate more favorable terms from Bazaarvoice. GX956. Even if PowerReviews was unable to win a customer's business, its low prices set the bar for negotiations and compressed Bazaarvoice's margins. *See, e.g.*, GX386* at -414.

160. Bazaarvoice recognized the pricing pressure that PowerReviews imposed and
developed competitive strategies to respond. GX785*; GX497* at -953; GX771. For example,
in response to a PowerReviews campaign targeting Bazaarvoice's manufacturing customers,
Bazaarvoice put into motion a plan to "steal one or more major [PowerReviews] clients . . . by

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offering them something that they can't refuse." GX544 at -797. This strategy was intended to send a signal to PowerReviews that Bazaarvoice was willing "to absorb some pain in return for handing [PowerReviews] major client losses." GX544 at -797. On some occasions, Bazaarvoice persuaded PowerReviews customers to switch. *See, e.g.*, GX471; GX358 at -612.

161. Bazaarvoice now claims that PowerReviews shifted to a "Blue Ocean" strategy in 2012 because it had been unsuccessful targeting Bazaarvoice enterprise clients. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 386:19-387:9, 420:24-421:12 (Luedtke). However, there is no doubt that up to the time of the merger PowerReviews continued to compete with Bazaarvoice. Trial Tr. 424:21-425:2 (Luedtke); Trial Tr. 1804:14-21, 1825:3-4, 1826:22-1827:5, 1828:17-22, 1829:12-1830:13, 1837:10-1838:11 (Comée); Trial Tr. 758:17-20 (Collins). At the time of the merger, PowerReviews executives pitched the merger as one that would result in a "monopoly in the market." Trial Tr. 1819:11-14, 1820:16-1821:1 (Comée). In fact, leading up to the merger, a member of the PowerReviews Board pushed its CEO to "push hard on BV flips with very aggressive pricing." Trial Tr. 1827:9-1828:3(Comée). Bazaarvoice's CEO acknowledged that "prior to the merger, PowerReviews put pricing pressure on Bazaarvoice." Trial Tr. 762:3-5 (Collins). Further, even under the Blue Ocean strategy, PowerReviews contemplated that PRR would remain the foundation of its offering. Trial Tr. 1845:9-12 (Comée). In fact, despite telling Bazaarvoice that his plan was to "pivot the company and focus downmarket," Trial Tr.1833:20-25 (Comée), PowerReviews' CEO issued a press releases to "send a message to Bazaarvoice," Trial Tr. 1834:1-3 (Comée), and "emphasize[] the company's success with large clients," Trial Tr. 1828:21-23 (Comée). After the merger, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews exchanged lists of each company's sales pipeline, and those lists confirm that the companies had been pursuing many of the same customers up to the time of the transaction. See GX817*.

C.

Illustrative Examples of Competition

(i) Bed Bath and Beyond

162. Bed Bath and Beyond ("BBBeyond") operates two online retail websites,
BuyBuyBaby.com and BedBathandBeyond.com selling home goods. BBBeyond had revenues
from online sales of more than half a billion dollars in 2012. GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep.

16:3-18, 16:21-24). In 2009, BBBeyond decided to add PRR to its websites because it was at a 1 competitive disadvantage without PRR and believed PRR would improve conversion. GX76 2 3 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 20:17-24, 21:8-15, 21:18) and Trial Tr. 561:25-562:12 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond). BBBeyond determined that it would not make sense to build its own 4 5 in-house solution and that there were only two PRR platform providers that met its needs: Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 21:19-22:6, 22:10-20, 6 7 22:23-23:19, 23:22-24:7, 24:11-16, 25:16-18, 90:12-14, 90:17-91:3) and Trial Tr. 562:13-564:3, 564:5-8, 564:21-23, 571:2-12 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond). In its negotiations with Bazaarvoice, 8 9 BBBeyond was able to obtain , which represented a cost savings of by threatening to pursue a deal with PowerReviews. GX659 at -477; GX1005; GX548. BBBeyond 10 11 renewed its contract with Bazaarvoice after the transaction closed. After Bazaarvoice attempted 12 /year price increase, BBBeyond agreed to a smaller increase of 11%. to impose a 13 GX1026 at -847; GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 32:3-5, 32:8-16, 32:19-21, 32:25-33:23, 14 34:8-11, 34:14-35:5) and Trial Tr. 565:18-567:9 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond). BBBeyond believes 15 that the presence of a credible competitor "helps out the marketplace" during negotiations and 16 today does not believe there is another alternative to Bazaarvoice that would meet its PRR 17 platform needs. GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 98:2-24, 99:4-13, 106:23-107:23, 108:5-17, 18 109:13-17, 109:21-110:4, 110:12-15, 110:20-111:10) and Trial Tr. 572:1-574:18, 581:9-13 19 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond).

(ii) Big Fish Games

163. Big Fish Games ("BFG") is a computer gaming company. GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 16:2-18). BFG decided to add PRR in order to "harness" their users' opinions on their games. GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 34:6-20). BFG initially considered building its own inhouse PRR platform, since BFG has a large internal programming department, but decided that it would be too costly to service any in-house solution on an on-going basis. GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 49:14-52:5, 53:11-13, 53:16-24). BFG then looked at several possible providers but quickly narrowed its choices down to Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 53:25-54:24, 57:13-18). Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews competed

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vigorously for BFG's business, constantly keeping each other in mind as they prepared proposals and counterproposals. GX376 at -321; GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 58:15-64:11, 64:12-18, 64:21-65:16). BFG believed that it benefited from the competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews as it was able to secure additional price and contract concessions as a result of the competition. GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 65:18-20, 65:22-66:13, 90:4-7, 90:9-18). Ultimately, BFG signed a contract with Bazaarvoice after Bazaarvoice and and

dropped its pricing three times due to competition with PowerReviews. GX488* at -011; GX77
(Heverley/BFG Dep. 66:14-67:4). Internally, Bazaarvoice's sales representative described the BFG engagement as "the most satisfying power reviews competitive (and internal build) win
I've experienced in my career at Bazaarvoice. Being a software developer, there was a lot of internal pressure for BFG to do this themselves . . . at least initially. Once they saw that they'd never be able to keep up with market demand by doing it themselves, they focused on us and power reviews." GX343* at -874.

(iii) BJ's

164. BJ's Wholesale Club ("BJ's"), a warehouse club store, operates the BJs.com
online retail site. BJ's made the decision to add PRR to its website based on its research
indicating that PRR was "a popular and desirable piece of functionality for our members . . .
because customers find feedback from other customers to be of more value, and to be more
reliable and more trustworthy than feedback from other sources." GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's
Wholesale Dep. 15:3-15) and Trial Tr. 450:7-12 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale). BJ's also
believed PRR would improve conversion. GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 16:9-13).
BJ's considered building its own in-house PRR platform but decided against it because "it was
considered not to be an easy project, in light of all of the other technical requirements that we
had on our Website at the time." GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 16:24-17:5, 17:8-24,
18:7-11) and Trial Tr. 450:13-23 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale). During BJ's search for a PRR
platform provider, BJ's only considered three companies, and one was "vetted out of the
process" early, leaving only Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews to compete for BJ's business.
GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 21:14-22:4, 22:7-9) and Trial Tr. 455:10-23

(Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale). BJ's pitted the two firms against each other, telling Bazaarvoice it wanted them "to present to us why Bazaarvoice is a better option over Powerreviews." GX445 2 3 at -142. During its negotiations, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews presented initial and subsequent offers reflecting improved pricing. GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 22:22-4 24, 23:2, 23:4-10, 23:13-24:4, 24:7, 24:9-16, 24:19, 24:21-23) and Trial Tr. 458:13-20, 459:25-460:12 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale); GX440; GX1196. Both Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews met the company's needs. GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 24:24-25:2, 25:5, 25:7-8, 25:11) and Trial Tr. 460:13-20 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale). Ultimately, BJ's chose PowerReviews after seeing the price drop significantly after the competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 25:13-16) and Trial Tr. 460:21-25 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale).

D. Fringe Providers of PRR Platforms Have Not Constrained Bazaarvoice's **Ability to Raise Prices**

165. Bazaarvoice acknowledges that other commercial suppliers of PRR platforms are not sufficiently close substitutes to Bazaarvoice's platform to prevent a significant post-merger price increase. See, e.g., GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 156:6-10, 166:24-167:4, 167:9-12). In April 2011, Bazaarvoice co-founder Brant Barton discussed the absence of competitive alternatives for customers, concluding that Bazaarvoice would "retain an extremely high percentage of [PowerReviews] customers," because available alternatives for disgruntled customers were "scarce" and "low-quality." GX514 at -810; GX82 (Barton Dep. 208:20-212:14) and Trial Tr. 647:19-649:15 (Barton). Bazaarvoice now, post acquisition, faces virtually the same competitive landscape of "scarce" and "low-quality" alternatives that Barton identified in April 2011. GX514 at -810. This fact is borne out in Bazaarvoice's internal churn analyses immediately following the merger that discovered that competitive losses had dropped. Trial Tr. 876:3-878:25 (Collins); GX1216 at 17-18.

166. Customers similarly viewed Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews as the two most significant providers of PRR platforms. See supra Section III.A. Post acquisition, a customer wrote PowerReviews CEO Pehr Luedtke saying "from a retailers stand point I have to say I am a

little concerned that there is now only one option for customer reviews." GX892 at -323. Similarly, as described earlier, BBBeyond came to the conclusion that there were only two options for them in 2009, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews, and came to the same conclusion in 2012. GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 59:21-60:3, 60:6-11, 96:7-17) and Trial Tr. 571:18-25 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond); *see also* GX98 (American Eagle Dep. 21:10-14, 21:17-19).

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Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews Recognized That the Transaction Would Allow Bazaarvoice to Raise Prices

167. When outlining the benefits of the acquisition, Bazaarvoice's Barton noted that acquiring PowerReviews would "[e]liminat[e] [Bazaarvoice's] primary competitor" and provide "relief from . . . price erosion." GX514 at -810; *see also* GX218 at -594; GX82 (Barton Dep. 94:2-24, 129:10-130:9) and Trial Tr. 646:11-647:10 (Barton). He later wrote that the transaction would enable the combined company to "avoid margin erosion" caused by "tactical 'knifefighting' over competitive deals." GX519 at -751; *see also* GX82 (Barton Dep. 239:14-240:20, 240:23-242:14).

168. Bazaarvoice Chief Revenue Officer Michael Osborne wrote, "[i]f we buy [PowerReviews] it changes everything for our model ... [b]ecause 10-20% price erosion will disappear," (GX221 at -528) and admits that he believed that Bazaarvoice's acquisition of PowerReviews would remove price erosion. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 311:25-312:2, 312:6-7, 312:19-21, 312:24-313:4, 313:8) and Trial Tr. 718:20-25 (Osborne).

169. Bazaarvoice's then-CEO, Brett Hurt, saw the acquisition of PowerReviews as an opportunity to "tak[e] out [Bazaarvoice's] only competitor, who . . . suppress[ed] [Bazaarvoice] price points . . . by as much as 15%" GX518 at -475. He later observed that Bazaarvoice would have "[n]o meaningful direct competitor" after acquiring PowerReviews, thereby reducing "pricing dilution." GX899 at -817-818; *see also* GX1181 at -158; Trial Tr. 259:20-260:13 (Hurt).

170. Bazaarvoice CFO Stephen Collins' perspective regarding the potential acquisition was that Bazaarvoice had "[1]iterally, no other competitors," and he expected "[p]ricing accretion due to [the] combination" of the two firms. GX522 at -035. Collins also wrote that the acquisition of PowerReviews would "eliminate the cost in time and money to take

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[PowerReviews'] accounts" and "reduce [Bazaarvoice's] risk of account losses as [PowerReviews] compete[d] for survival." GX324 at -922. The Bazaarvoice "executive team's views of the transaction's ability to improve Bazaarvoice's pricing power" did not change prior to the acquisition of PowerReviews. GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 168:13-18).

171. PowerReviews' CEO, Pehr Luedtke, also believed the benefits of the merger between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews included "margin expansion" (GX249 at -940), the "possibility of reducing the discounting that we had seen in the marketplace," and the fact that it would "[e]liminate[e] competitive risk and an acquisition of PowerReviews by a larger player" GX253; *see also* GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 289:10-15, 289:18-24) and Trial Tr. 329:2-15, 332:7-333:5 (Luedtke).

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Economic Testimony Supports the Conclusion That the Transaction Will Lead to Substantially Higher Prices for Many Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews Customers

13 172. The merger of Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews will result in significant anticompetitive unilateral effects. A "unilateral" effect is one that arises solely through the 14 15 altered behavior of Bazaarvoice without the necessity of coordinated behavior with other PRR 16 platform suppliers. Trial Tr. 911:6-25 (Shapiro); GX983* at 56-57. Economic theory predicts that the merger will result in significant unilateral effects for customers that viewed Bazaarvoice 17 18 and PowerReviews as the most attractive suppliers of PRR platforms and for whom the third-best 19 supplier has a distinctly inferior product, compared to the weaker of the two merged parties. Trial Tr. 916:12-918:1 (Shapiro); GX983* at 57-59. The win/loss data in Bazaarvoice's 2021 Salesforce database and data compiled from HTDWD emails provide direct evidence that, for many customers, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews were the leading two bidders to provide PRR 22 23 platforms and that other PRR platform suppliers were distinctly inferior alternatives. Trial Tr. 24 916:12-918:1, 2062:15-2064:10 (Shapiro). While the data may be incomplete, there was no policy within Bazaarvoice of only recording certain competitors or taking other action which 25 would create a bias in this data. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 204:5-8 (Hurt); Trial Tr. 555:14-25 26(Defossé). 27

173. The win/loss data in Bazaarvoice's Salesforce database tracks instances in which Bazaarvoice won or lost business. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 57:13-59:21); *see also* Trial Tr. 732:18-733:19 (Osborne). Although Mr. Osborne testified that the Salesforce database was not "dependable," he admitted that the data contained in the database was accurate enough to update the management and the Board of Directors about the sales pipeline. Trial Tr. 729:19-23, 733:20-734:5 (Osborne).

174. Professor Shapiro examined 480 PRR platform sales opportunities in North America identified in the Bazaarvoice Salesforce database as being created between August 2005 and July 2012 and that contained information about competitors. GX983* at 61 and Ex. 19; Trial Tr. 984:5-20 (Shapiro); GX1044. Professor Shapiro concluded that PowerReviews was identified as a competitive alternative in 75% of the opportunities. GX983* at 61 and Ex. 19; Trial Tr. 985:3-7 (Shapiro); GX1044. The next closest alternative, internal builds, appears in 18% of the opportunities. GX983* at 61 and Ex. 19; Trial Tr. 985:8-10 (Shapiro); GX1044. No other alternative appears in more than 3% of the opportunities. GX983* at 61 and Ex. 19; *see also* Trial Tr. 985:11-15 (Shapiro); GX1044. The results are similar when the analysis is limited to customers in the Internet Retailer 500 ("IR 500").

175. For the IR 500, as shown by the chart below, Professor Shapiro concludes that
PowerReviews was identified as a competitive alternative solution in 83% of the opportunities.
The next closest alternative, internal builds, appears in 15% of the opportunities. No other
competitive alternative appears in more than 3% of the opportunities. GX983* at 61 and Ex. 20;
GX1045*.

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Frequency of Competitors in Bazaarvoice Win/Loss Opportunities

IR500, Core R&R Products Only

	Opps	Frequency
PowerReviews	121	83%
Internal Build	22	15%
Pluck	4	3%
Viewpoints	4	3%
Reevoo	1	1%
Lithium	0	0%
Expo	0	0%
Jive	0	0%
Zuberance	0	0%
"Other"	2	1%
Total Opportunities	146	
GX1045		

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176. In addition to win/loss data, the Bazaarvoice HTDWD email dataset produces similar results. See supra Section III.A. Although Bazaarvoice had no formal process to ensure the HTDWD emails were complete or accurate, Bazaarvoice did not instruct its employees to skew the reports to overstate engagements involving PowerReviews. Trial Tr. 728:19-729:5, 734:6-16 (Osborne). There was therefore no bias and the fact that it, like most data, is incomplete does not render the analysis unreliable, especially when it is consistent with the other evidence. Trial Tr. 2059:7-2061:4 (Shapiro); cf. Trial Tr. 204:5-8 (Hurt); Trial Tr. 555:14-25 (Defossé).

177. As shown in the chart below, Professor Shapiro examined 143 Bazaarvoice HTDWD emails sent between September 2008 and July 2012 in which a competitor was identified and concluded that PowerReviews accounted for 80% of the references to competitors in these emails. The next closest alternative identified was internal builds, which accounted for 12% of the competitive references. No other competitive alternative appears in more than 3% of the emails. Trial Tr. 986:12-987:1; GX983* at 62, Ex. 26 and Ex. 27; GX1047; GX1048*.

Competitor Counts in Bazaarvoice "How the Deal was Done" Documents

Ratings and Reviews Deals Only

Competitor	Opps	Frequency
PowerReviews	114	80%
In-house	17	12%
Pluck	4	3%
Shopzilla	2	1%
Viewpoints	2	1%
Buzz Metrics	1	1%
Gigya	1	1%
Reevoo	1	1%
Trip Advisor	1	1%
Total Competitor Counts	143	

GX1048

178. Professor Shapiro identified three types of customers "that are most likely to be vulnerable and harmed" by the merger. Trial Tr. 998:18-999:1 (Shapiro). These three groups are Bazaarvoice customers, PowerReviews legacy customers, and customers who place a high value on syndication. Trial Tr. 998:18-999:1 (Shapiro).

179. Professor Shapiro concludes that the unilateral price effects of the Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews merger will be most pronounced for their existing customers when those customers' current contracts come up for renewal. Trial Tr. 999:6-24 (Shapiro); GX983* at 63. These customers have already revealed their preference for a commercial PRR platform, and because of the merger they have lost the ability to play Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews off one another to get a lower price. Trial Tr. 999:15-23 (Shapiro); GX983* at 63; *see also supra* Section III.B. One mechanism Bazaarvoice could employ to unilaterally raise price would be to eliminate the PowerReviews product from a customer's choice set and migrate legacy customers from the PowerReviews enterprise platform to the higher-priced Bazaarvoice product. Trial Tr. 1003:14-1004:11 (Shapiro); GX983* at 64. While the customer may get additional features, these would not be features that the customer would otherwise choose if PowerReviews' lowerpriced alternative were still an option. Trial Tr. 1003:20-1004:4 (Shapiro); GX983* at 65 and fn.307; *see also* GX293 at -118.

180. Bazaarvoice planned to migrate the largest PowerReviews customers to the higher-priced Bazaarvoice platform. In proposing an acquisition of PowerReviews in April 2011, Bazaarvoice's co-founder Brant Barton described this as one "Pro" in favor of the deal: "[w]e could migrate their Tier 1 customers to our platform" GX514 at -810. In addition, a May 2012 Bazaarvoice presentation points out that average revenue from IR 500 customers at PowerReviews in terms of annualized cumulative billings is 83% below Bazaarvoice's, adding: [The merger p]rovides us with the opportunity to increase revenue from [PowerReviews'] existing clients via migration to the Bazaarvoice platform a [sic

[PowerReviews'] existing clients via migration to the Bazaarvoice platform a [sic] higher price points in return for greater features and functionality that [sic] those of [PowerReviews]....

GX332 at -291; Trial Tr. 775:23-776:11 (Collins).

181. As a result of the acquisition, Bazaarvoice gained the ability to unilaterally charge
higher prices for its new customers who do not consider in-house (or fringe competitor solutions)
to be a viable option, as compared to its pre-merger new customers. GX983* at 63; *see also*Trial Tr. 2050:6-2051:19 (Shapiro). In many instances, Bazaarvoice can effectively price
discriminate against such customers because it collects detailed information about a customer's

requirements and budget constraints during the sales process. *See supra* Section II.A.(iii); Trial
Tr. 998:2-17 (Shapiro). The more effectively Bazaarvoice can engage in targeted "price discrimination" based on customer attributes, the greater the unilateral competitive effects.
GX983* at 63; *see also* Trial Tr. 997:18-998:1 (Shapiro).

182. Customers for whom syndication is particularly important, especially brand customers, are also likely to be particularly harmed by the merger. Trial Tr. 998:18-999:1, 1001:5-1002:13 (Shapiro). For brand customers looking for a syndication network with significant retail customers, PowerReviews was the closest and only credible alternative to Bazaarvoice. Trial Tr. 1001:5-1002:13, 2051:20-2052:13 (Shapiro). After the merger, these customers have no alternative PRR platform with a significant syndication network and therefore these customers have lost significant bargaining leverage. Trial Tr. 1001:5-1002:13, 2051:20-2052:13 (Shapiro). This applies both to new customers as well as legacy customers who now have access to a larger syndication network, as "Bazaarvoice will seek to capture that value in the price they charge. The customers' return will depend on what their bargaining leverage is, and that's been weakened." Trial Tr. 1001:5-1002:13 (Shapiro); *see also* Trial Tr. 2051:20-2052:13 (Shapiro).

G. Customers Have Diminished Insight into Potential Competitive Harm

183. Customers are the best source of information on past responses to price increases and the substitutability of different products. Trial Tr. 2043:18-2045:2 (Shapiro). When it comes to determining the potential effects of a merger, however, it is "much harder for customers to do." Trial Tr. 2045:3-2046:10 (Shapiro).

184. Products such as PRR platforms are "relatively inexpensive" and have relatively
long contracts; thus considering competitive alternatives for PRR is not part of customers' dayto-day activities and therefore they do not have as much current information about the
prospective effect of a merger. Trial Tr. 2045:3-2046:10 (Shapiro). In fact, customers have
access to much less information and evidence than expert witnesses and the Court in a merger
trial. Trial Tr. 2073:10-17 (Shapiro). Customers generally do not engage in a specific analysis
of the effects of a merger. Trial Tr. 2077:15-2078:3 (Shapiro); *cf.* GX103 (B&H Foto Dep.

42:20-25). As Dick's Sporting Goods testified in this case, "[i]f I'm not in the market to buy 2 ratings and review services at the moment, I'm not up to speed on that current service, managing 3 hundreds of different vendors. I look at them when they're needed, not continually research everything that's out there all the time." GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 32:18-21, 32:24-4 5 33:5); see also GX170 (Overstock.com Dep. 41:5-10) (when asked whether Overstock had been harmed by the merger, testified "I don't really have enough information to accurately answer 6 that"). 7

185. 8 Many customers testified that they had never considered or given any thought to the merger. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 1268:15-17 (Yudin/Abe's of Maine); GX94 (Abercrombie Dep. 25:10-13); GX132 (Drums on Demand Dep. 25:20-26:7); GX134 (eHobbies Dep. 21:17-19, 38:21-39:1); GX136 (Footlocker Dep. 36:1-5, 47:7-10); GX143 (Guess? Dep. 44:11-14); GX154 (Johnsonville Sausage Dep. 19:20-22); GX157 (K-Swiss Dep. 17:5-8); GX160 (Lord & Taylor 13 Dep. 31:9-15, 31:18); GX164 (New Era Dep. 42:21-24); GX173 (Paypal Dep. 17:5-8); GX174 14 (Perform Better Dep. 19:16-19); GX175 (Petco Dep. 21:9-14); GX183 (Shoplet Dep. 42:23-43:1); GX141 (Golfsmith Dep. 28:16-18, 28:20-23, 62:12-14, 62:16-17); GX138* (Fruit of the 16 Loom Dep. 34:12-16).

186. Many customers were either unaware of alternatives or had conducted a limited review of their alternatives. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 468:7-17 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale); Trial Tr. 1639:11-24, 1640:5-17, 1641:3-9 (Moen/Hayneedle); GX111 (Bon-Ton Dep. 45:15-19, 45:22-46:9, 48:20-49:4); GX113 (The Buckle Dep. 36:10-37:1); GX115 (Cabela's Dep. 21:13-17, 22:15-20); GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 32:18-21, 32:24-33:10); GX136 (Footlocker Dep. 36:1-5); GX169 (Orchard Supply Dep. 28:10-29:1); GX183 (Shoplet Dep. 42:16-22); GX79 (Toys R Us Dep. 58:4-8).

24 187. Still other customers displayed a misunderstanding of the capabilities of other PRR providers. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 1265:10-11 (Yudin/Abe's of Maine) (believing that Reevoo 26 had a U.S. syndication network); GX173 (Paypal Dep. 20:18-19, 20:21-21:1) (believing Zuberance offered PRR platform functionality).

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188. Finally, Defendant cites to other customers who do not currently use a
commercial PRR platform for their opinion on the effects of the merger. *See, e.g.*, GX94
(Abercrombie Dep. 18:16-20); GX110 (Blue Nile Dep. 20:19-23); GX133 (eBags Dep. 49:7-13);
GX147 (HSN Dep. 45:11-20); GX176 (Planet DJ Dep. 27:2-9); GX183 (Shoplet Dep. 22:20-22, 22:24-25, 38:16-19); GX188 (Systemax Dep. 31:8-12, 31:15-23); *cf*. GX169 (Orchard Supply Dep. 27:16-18, 27:21-28:3) (dropped PRR due to a shift in focus away from eCommerce, but if they add it back in the future he would have "some concerns if these were still the only two players that had gone to one in that space.").

H. Since Acquiring PowerReviews, and Despite the Government's Investigation and Lawsuit, Bazaarvoice Has Threatened to Raise, or in Fact Raised, Prices

189. The Department of Justice informed Bazaarvoice that it had opened an investigation just two days after Bazaarvoice acquired PowerReviews. Bazaarvoice was cognizant of the investigation as it made business decisions. In discussing external communications regarding the transaction several months after it occurred, Bazaarvoice's Director of Communications wrote that "[w]hatever we come up with will need to be vetted by legal so we avoid any anti-trust gotchas." GX495 at -301; *see also* GX527; GX1225 at -047; GX352* and Trial Tr. 781:8-782:3 (Collins). Notwithstanding the investigation and this lawsuit, Bazaarvoice raised prices for many customers.

190. Bazaarvoice's economic expert agrees that prices have gone up for a large number of customers since the merger but argues that the post-merger price increases occurred due to the addition of additional features or improved functionality. Customers disagree. For example:

191. **191.** a PowerReviews customer, complained to Bazaarvoice that after the transaction "[s]o we're paying more (at threat of cutting us off during our discussion, which was a total turn-off after years of a great partnership) and getting less. We need to get back to the great service that Power Reviews provided." GX338* at -342. When Bazaarvoice attempted to explain the price increase as not related to the merger, **1910** said that:

> we were paying for four sites and were then told one more site would be another was really treated like dirt and the launch of our was held hostage by a long-term partner, or should I say by the company that bought our long-term partner ... None of this sort of thing

Case3:13-cv-00133-WHO Document235 Filed10/31/13 Page63 of 104 happened when I was with Power Reviews, and this all reinforced my belief that I 1 made the right decision X years ago when I selected PR over BV. 2 GX338* at -340. 3 192. a PowerReviews customer, complained that after the merger: 4 increase for our 5 [o]ur first experience as a BV customer was to receive a renewal in July – not a very good start considering we weren't receiving any meaningful upgrades to our service. My team felt that we had been put over a 6 barrel since we believed that the two premier players in this space had been reduced to one and to make matters worse BV was taking advantage of this 7 situation with heavy handed pricing." 8 GX337* at -523-524. 9 193. eventually complained to PowerReviews CEO, Pehr Luedtke, and got 10 the increase reduced to , which is still significant given that there were, according to the 11 12 customer, no meaningful improvements to service. sent an email to Bazaarvoice 13 referencing the DOJ investigation saying that "your company's actions relative to pricing raised a huge red flag to the DOJ that competition was being diminished." GX337* at -524 14 (emphasis in original). Zach Bolian, a financial analyst at Bazaarvoice acknowledged to Gary 15 16 Skinner, another Bazaarvoice financial analyst, that "there was a price increase with no incremental value "GX337* at -523. Skinner followed up with a directive to "stop this 17 immediately." GX337* at -523. 18 19 reached out to Bazaarvoice expressing its concerns with the transaction 194. renewal negotiations Bazaarvoice attempted to impose a "2x 20after hearing that in 21 increase in the core cost of PR service to with zero added value provided to us." GX257; GX692*. 22 23 195. Dillard's received a price increase of approximately without any corresponding increase in service or functionality. GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 44:5-45:6, 45:9-25, 24 25 46:4-6, 46:13-47:15, 52:15-53:1, 72:23-73:18). 196. Just prior to the merger. was paying Bazaarvoice for 26 27 its PRR platform, limited to 10,000 SKU's, and was in the process of renegotiating its contract. PowerReviews offered its PRR platform for 100,000 SKU's at a price of 28 PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 58

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After the merger, Bazaarvoice learned of PowerReviews' offer, and noted, "it could be tricky for
 us to sell an uptick in fees." GX1149* at -586; *see also* GX120. A salesperson at Bazaarvoice
 then asked, "Can someone communicate back to the PR team that 'we've got this one?"
 GX1149* at -586. ultimately renewed with Bazaarvoice, agreeing to a significant
 price increase. GX821* at -887.

197. While Defendant has identified instances of post-merger price reductions, such price reductions were often accompanied by service reductions. For example, Vitamin Shoppe's PowerReviews price decreased in its most recent contract. The lower price came with significant service reductions, including a downgrade from a standard to basic service package, removal of Facebook Discovery and Community Services, and reductions in moderation and technical response service levels. *Compare* DX1796 *with* GX1221. Similarly, while GameStop was initially cited as an example of a post-merger price reduction because of competition, the evidence showed that the price decrease was actually associated with a reduction in service. Trial Tr. 1140:1-8, 1141:9-1142:21 (Godfrey); GX1231 at 1.

IV. THE TRANSACTION WILL ALSO REDUCE INNOVATION AND PRODUCT VARIETY

198. Prior to the merger, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews spurred one another to enhance and improve their PRR platforms. GX680 at -096; GX81 (Collins Dep. 355:12-16) and Trial Tr. 760:18-761:6 (Collins); GX897 at -118-19. In explaining the acquisition of PowerReviews to Bazaarvoice employees, Bazaarvoice executives wrote that "[1]ike Bazaarvoice, PowerReviews has been an early pioneer in the ratings & reviews space. We know them well, through competing in the marketplace, and over the years, we've pushed each other to innovate in ways that help consumers and retailers." GX838 at -391.

Feature-driven competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews hastened the
pace of innovation and made their PRR platforms an increasingly attractive proposition for
manufacturers and retailers. As PowerReviews and Bazaarvoice grappled to differentiate their
product offerings, they developed new features and improved the functionality offered by their
respective platforms. PowerReviews' former CEO, Pehr Luedtke, described the pattern of

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innovation competition between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews in a 2010 email to a large consumer products retailer: "[T]here are a lot of similarities between BazaarVoice and PowerReviews when it comes to features . . . we have constantly traded places in terms of who leads and who fast follows." GX240; *see also* Trial Tr. 112:15-17, 114:22-25, 115:25-116:14 (Hurt); GX82 (Barton Dep. 96:24-98:5); GX88 (Hossain Dep. 109:3-7, 109:10-110:1, 110:4-111:5, 111:7-11, 111:13-23).

200. PowerReviews made financial investments in its sales, marketing, and product development resources in order to improve its PowerReviews Enterprise product which competed directly with Bazaarvoice. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 201:14-16, 201:18-22, 202:20-203:13, 203:16-204:7, 204:10-206:6). PowerReviews believed it was important to be "at parity or better" and "have competing products in every category [Bazaarvoice is] looking at." GX88 (Hossain Dep. 178:5-179:3).

201. Similarly, Bazaarvoice noted that part of its "strategy for protecting our flanks" was "[c]ontinued investment in R&R – it is the foundation for other elements of our strategy ….." GX411 at -869. Both Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews touted their respective product innovation initiatives to potential customers in efforts to win new customers. *See, e.g.*, GX567* at 7; GX568* at 9; GX77 (Heverley/BFG Dep. 78:8-25); GX485 at -122-23.

202. Bazaarvoice plans to eliminate customers' PRR platform options by sunsetting the PowerReviews Enterprise platform in 2014 while focusing solely on the new Bazaarvoice platform. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 69:9-15); GX784 at -620; GX7. By acquiring PowerReviews, Bazaarvoice recognized that it would be "eliminating feature driven oneupmanship and tactical competition on retail" GX324 at -921. In fact, Bazaarvoice believed that prior to the acquisition, PowerReviews was planning on making a significant increase in its R&D personnel. GX82 (Barton Dep. 238:20-239:9). PowerReviews similarly recognized that the transaction "[e]liminates need for feature wars in core ratings and reviews products." GX254 at 1 and Trial Tr. 339:3-17 (Luedtke).

A. SEO Innovation

203. One example of how Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews competed in product innovation began in 2009 when PowerReviews began offering an "In-Line SEO" solution to its PRR platform customers. GX458 at -737. This was the first PRR platform feature to allow PRR to be indexed by search engines directly from the product webpage, rather than from a separate webpage designed for search engine optimization. GX894; Trial Tr. 367:10-12 (Luedtke). This innovation enabled PowerReviews' PRR platform to drive search traffic directly to the product pages. GX894.

204. PowerReviews used its In-Line SEO feature to differentiate its product from Bazaarvoice's, which relied on the older method of indexing PRR content on separate SEO webpages, instead of on the product pages where a customer can actually purchase a product. GX226; GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 135:11-16, 136:20-23, 136:25-137:3, 141:9-13, 142:2-7, 142:10-14, 154:7-9, 154:12-13, 171:8-17) and Trial Tr. 368:12-15 (Luedtke); GX85 (Defossé Dep. 149:15-19, 149:22-24).

205. In January 2011, Bazaarvoice announced the launch of its "Smart SEO" solution, which, like PowerReviews' In-Line SEO, allowed PRR content to be indexed from the product pages. GX940 at -882; GX941 at -408; GX93 (Svatek Dep. 220:3-21). In fact, Bazaarvoice's Smart SEO "took [PowerReviews'] idea" for at least part of its offering. Trial Tr. 498:4-23 (Defossé). Additionally, PowerReviews's former CEO testified that he viewed the launch of Smart SEO as a response to its launch of In-Line SEO in 2009. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 154:1-9, 154:12-13) and Trial Tr. 368:24-369:14 (Luedtke). Bazaarvoice claimed that this launch made the SEO value between the two solutions equal. GX941 at -408; GX238 at -332. By March 2011, Bazaarvoice decided to "throw Smart SEO in for free" for some customers in an effort to increase adoption of the Smart SEO feature. GX1028 at -924.

Syndication Innovation

B.

206. While PowerReviews was the innovator in SEO technology, Bazaarvoice was the
first company to create a review syndication network that connected manufacturers and retailers.
GX757 at -902-908; GX959. The Bazaarvoice syndication network was limited to

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manufacturers and retailers who used the Bazaarvoice PRR platform and Bazaarvoice typically charged manufacturers to syndicate reviews to other Bazaarvoice customers. GX85 (Defossé 2 Dep. 153:8-154:5) and Trial Tr. 478:4-7 (Defossé); GX89 (Hurt Dep. 283:8-19) and Trial Tr. 149:14-150:13 (Hurt); Trial Tr. 788:5-10 (Collins). PowerReviews responded by creating a similar PRR syndication feature for its customers. GX88 (Hossain Dep. 145:10-147:14); Trial Tr. 362:20-363:11 (Luedtke).

Bazaarvoice's manufacturing customers began to ask Bazaarvoice to syndicate 207. their reviews to retail partners that were on the PowerReviews platform. For example,

a Bazaarvoice customer, wanted to syndicate reviews to а PowerReviews customer. Bazaarvoice's General Counsel Bryan Barksdale signed a contract to allow it to. GX415* at -433. Bazaarvoice CEO, Brett Hurt, learned of the contract and it was "intercepted before it went out," and he scheduled a late night meeting to discuss the issue. GX415* at -433. As Hurt later noted in a conference call with analysts announcing the acquisition, "[Bazaarvoice's] brands have been clamoring to syndicate content through the Bazaarvoice network to [PowerReviews] so that they'll drive more channel sales "GX840 at -940.

208. PowerReviews sought to capitalize on the desire of Bazaarvoice customers to syndicate content by aggressively marketing an "open" content syndication feature that facilitated syndication between manufacturers that were not PowerReviews customers and retailers that were. GX1103 at -467; GX916; GX533; GX412 at -494-96; Trial Tr. 360:16-22 (Luedtke). PowerReviews intended its open syndication network to be an important "point of differentiation" against Bazaarvoice. GX88 (Hossain Dep. 148:6-150:2, 150:5-17).

209. PowerReviews officially announced its open syndication network in July 2011. GX29; GX31 at -735. At this time, PowerReviews invited all Bazaarvoice manufacturing customers to try its syndication service for free for twelve months. GX318 (Defendant's Answer ¶ 52); GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 213:14-214:1, 214:4-17, 216:16-218:14, 218:16-18, 219:3-8) and Trial Tr. 361:17-362:10 (Luedtke). Hurt testified that the PowerReviews press release about its open syndication network was a "call to action." GX89 (Hurt Dep. 285:2-4, 285:6-10, 281:18-

283:11); see also Trial Tr. 487:4-8 (Defossé). Although Bazaarvoice had planned to deploy its
 own open syndication feature in September 2011, the PowerReviews press release alerted
 Bazaarvoice to the "need to immediately start conversations with all BV Manu [manufacturer]
 clients who we believe are strategic to our syndication interests" and "to elevate the urgency"
 with those customers. GX31 at -735; see also Trial Tr. 487:9-25 (Defossé). Several Bazaarvoice
 manufacturer clients signed up for PowerReviews' open syndication platform. Trial Tr. 485:4 14 (Defossé).

210. 8 Bazaarvoice developed a competitive response to fend off PowerReviews' open 9 syndication platform. GX24; GX319; Trial Tr. 481:18-482:15 (Defossé). One tactic 10 Bazaarvoice attempted was to resist syndicating its customers' reviews to PowerReviews 11 customers in an attempt to maintain its "closed" syndication platform. GX912; GX26; GX311 at 12 -014; GX243 at -926-27; GX1215* at -793; Trial Tr. 519:22-520:8 (Defossé) (using legal 13 redlining as a "delay tactic" to resist syndicating to PowerReviews). Internally, Bazaarvoice 14 acknowledged that it was "making a strategic choice not to create a custom (and safe) version of 15 [the content] feed for retailers outside of [the Bazaarvoice] network." GX499* at -763; see also 16 GX85 (Defossé Dep. 202:25-203:15). In communicating this approach to Bazaarvoice's sales 17 leadership team, Michael Osborne, Bazaarvoice's Chief Revenue Officer wrote, "[t]ell all of 18 your teams . . . that we do not support syndication outside of our network – and if we get 19 requests for it, escalate to the top immediately. There's a new competitive battle coming." 20GX714 at -660; Trial Tr. 713:1-19 (Osborne); see also GX210 at -144. Bazaarvoice also 21 considered changing its syndication model to "restrict [PowerReviews'] ability to syndicate 22 without at least paying a toll." GX311 at -014; see also GX1204* at -316; GX125 (Clorox Dep. 23 136:12-15, 136:17-137:7) and Trial Tr. 306:19-307:11 (Levin/Clorox); Trial Tr. 1642:1-5 24 (Moen/Hayneedle).

25 211. Senior PowerReviews executives believed that Bazaarvoice was responding to the
26 PowerReviews open syndication network with "monopolistic behavior," falsely telling potential
27 manufacturer customers that only Bazaarvoice would be able to syndicate to large retailers who

were existing Bazaarvoice customers. GX244 at -979; see also GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 230: 21-231:6, 231:8-232:3).

212. 3 While resisting pressure to syndicate reviews to PowerReviews' retailers, Bazaarvoice was willing to consider doing so for specific retailers like 4

5 in order to potentially switch to Bazaarvoice at a later date. GX773* at -094; GX525 at -625. 6

213. Finally, Bazaarvoice relented to the customer pressure and began developing a new offering to syndicate content to PowerReviews' retailers. GX433 at -599; see also GX28 at -088-089; GX30; GX31; Trial Tr. 481:18-482:15 (Defossé). In an internal announcement, Bazaarvoice's Head of Product Strategy, Erin Defossé, acknowledged that this move to allow open syndication was in response to PowerReviews' open syndication network. GX433 at -598-99; Trial Tr. 496:18-25 (Defossé). The pressure from PowerReviews did not sit well with Bazaarvoice executives. Bazaarvoice's CEO, Brett Hurt, pushed for Bazaarvoice to execute on its plan to "destroy" PowerReviews, urging "[PowerReviews] is not waiting for us" and "I want to aim a big bazooka in their direction." GX913* at -766. Collins offered another suggestion: "lets just buy them \ldots " GX412 at -495.

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Other Innovation

214. PowerReviews and Bazaarvoice also competed in developing analytics software for their PRR platform customers. Bazaarvoice recognized that PowerReviews had some functionality that Bazaarvoice lacked in terms of data structuring and self-service technologies. GX518 at -475. In a training presentation, PowerReviews similarly claimed that it had analytics features to which "[Bazaarvoice] has nothing comparable." GX359 at -764.

23 215. In addition to forcing each other to introduce sophisticated features like syndication and analytics, PowerReviews and Bazaarvoice also monitored and reacted to each 24 25 other's announcements regarding product and platform updates, and integration with Facebook 26 and Twitter. GX640; GX82 (Barton Dep. 257:6-259:25); GX523; GX881 at -607; GX353 at -796; GX761.

216. The presence of PowerReviews as a competitor also prevented Bazaarvoice from taking advantage of its customers. For example, in February 2012, Bazaarvoice proposed changing its licensing agreements to shift ownership of PRR data from the customer to Bazaarvoice. This change was apparently abandoned in part because "in any account where PR is in the picture – they would have a field day with it." GX506 at -777.

V. BAZAARVOICE'S MARKET SHARE AND RESULTING HIGH LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION IN THE PRR PLATFORM MARKET CREATE A PRESUMPTION THAT THE TRANSACTION IS ANTICOMPETITIVE

217. A firm's market share is usually the single best measure of that firm's competitive significance. GX983* at 51. The commanding position occupied by Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews is readily apparent from their combined market share in the IR 500. *See, e.g.,* GX925 at -946. Professor Shapiro analyzed the market shares using several metrics and all measures consistently reveal that the number one and two firms are merging, with in-house an option for some customers, and no other significant commercial providers. Trial Tr. 943:25-944:5 (Shapiro).

218. Professor Shapiro used the IR 500 to calculate market shares. Trial Tr. 944:6-11 (Shapiro). The IR 500 is a list of retailers that self-report their PRR platform providers and captures approximately 98% of all online sales captured by the IR1000; the IR 500 generally captures all online retailers with at least \$15 million in revenues. Trial Tr. 944:12-16; 968:23-969:17 (Shapiro); *see also* GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 32:2-15); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 45:13-22).

219. The IR 500 is the best available data for a list of the largest Internet retailers.
Although Bazaarvoice now questions the reliability of IR 500 data, before the merger
Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews, in the regular course of business, closely tracked their IR 500
market share. Bazaarvoice frequently cited its number of IR 500 customers when promoting
itself to potential customers and investors. GX1168 at -443; GX484 at -022. For example, in
connection with its IPO, Bazaarvoice touted its share of IR 500 customers in prepared responses
to questions that it would likely face from potential investors:

[Question:] What type of market share do you currently have and what do you believe is a realistic share that you can get from a long-term perspective? [Answer:] There are a couple of different ways that we look at market share and market penetration. First, we currently represent 145 of the top 500 Internet

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Retailers, which is close to 30% market share in US retail online but remember that a lot of our retail clients are multichannel and not all are listed in the IR500.

GX425 at -919. Bazaarvoice's former CEO Brett Hurt testified that the list was one that "we would use in terms of measuring ourselves." Trial Tr. 183:9-12 (Hurt). Bazaarvoice also used the list to classify PowerReviews customers that it was targeting. GX39 at -934, -939; Trial Tr. 511:16-513:9 (Defossé). *See also* Trial Tr. 1429:11-15 (Meredith) (referring to the IR 500 in response to a question from the Court).
220. In its due diligence analysis of the PowerReviews acquisition, Bazaarvoice stressed that "[t]he enhanced consumer reach may be illustrated by the fact that a combined

entity would provide solutions to 243, or 49%, of the 500 largest North American retailers by

online sales listed on the 2012 Internet Retailer 500 ("IR 500") and immediately increase the IR

2 500 penetration of Bazaarvoice by 49%." GX925 at -946. Bazaarvoice's CEO, Stephen Collins,

relied on the IR 500 as an indication of Bazaarvoice's market share:

According to the Internet Retailer, PR has 78 IR 500 clients with combined retail sales of \$17BB. We have 136 and \$54BB in retail sales. The combination would produce a truly massive audience for us and would definitively tip the scales in our permanent favor on the network front . . . Our share of the IR500 would move close to 50% in absolute terms and higher in retail sales coverage.

GX522 at -035.

221. Similarly, in the regular course of business prior to the merger, PowerReviews regularly tracked the IR 500 to see what percentage had implemented the PowerReviews PRR platform. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 33:5-9); GX632.


21 222. Further, Bazaarvoice executives testified the company considered the impact that
22 the acquisition of PowerReviews would have on Bazaarvoice's IR 500 market share. GX770 at
23 -218; Trial Tr. 145:11-15 (Hurt); GX82 (Barton Dep. 103:7-17) and Trial Tr. 635:13-636:3
24 (Barton); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 282:21-283:6); GX88 (Hossain Dep. 36:5-37:9); GX492 (Pacitti

25 Dep. 149:7-23, 150:1).

26 223. Customers and industry analysts also look to the information maintained by the IR
27 500 to determine who are the PRR platform vendors in the marketplace and as a useful metric of
28 market share and market leadership. GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 30:17-32:7, 47:1-13,

47:22-48:1); GX108* (Black & Decker Dep. 81:1-20, 82:22-83:14); GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's
 Wholesale Dep. 19:24-20:16); GX1017 at -414, -584-85.


224. Based on IR 500 customer count, Bazaarvoice has a market share of 40%. PowerReviews has a market share of 28%, in-house solutions have a market share of 28%, and all other commercial vendors have a combined market share of 3%. Trial Tr. 947:3-22 (Shapiro). The combined Bazaarvoice-PowerReviews share is 68%. GX985* at Ex.14A; GX1062. Only about 15 customers in the IR 500 use the fringe suppliers. Trial Tr. 947:14-16 (Shapiro). These market shares are presented in a pie chart below:



GX1135

225. The customer count market shares indicate that there are a number of low-quality alternatives. Their small market share indicates that these firms are "unlikely to be as competitively significant as firms with much bigger market share." Trial Tr. 948:8-18 (Shapiro). The standard methodology is to measure market shares to give weight to commercial success. Trial Tr. 950:3-7 (Shapiro). By this measure, "[t]hese [fringe] firms are not very attractive to most customers [because] [t]hey're not winning very much business." Trial Tr. 949:15-24 (Shapiro).

226. Professor Shapiro also used the IR 500 data to measure market shares based on "customer revenues" which reflects the relative volume of online commerce that is handled by 2 the various PRR platforms. Trial Tr. 963:8-20 (Shapiro). As discussed above, customer revenue is a useful metric to measure the significance of PRR platform competitors to both retailers and brands. See Trial Tr. 964:4-15 (Shapiro). Based on customer revenues, Bazaarvoice has a market share of almost 41%. PowerReviews has a market share of 15%, and all other commercial vendors have a combined market share of 2%. In-house solutions have a combined market share of 42%, but one customer – Amazon – accounts for approximately 67% of the inhouse revenues, leading to a 28% overall share for Amazon's in-house and 14% share for all other in-house systems combined. The combined Bazaarvoice-PowerReviews share is 56%. See Trial Tr. 963:8-964:1 (Shapiro); GX985* at Ex. 15A; GX1063. These market shares are presented in a pie chart below:



GX1136

227. Professor Shapiro made certain corrections to his initial market share calculations based on customer revenues. These adjustments resulted in about a 1% adjustment to PowerReviews' market share and about a 2% adjustment to Bazaarvoice's market share. Trial Tr. 965:6-23 (Shapiro); compare GX1077 with GX1063.

228. Customer revenue is an appropriate way to measure market shares for the customers in the relevant market – retailers and manufacturers. Trial Tr. 967:25-968:14 (Shapiro). These are Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews' most important customers. Retailers and brands account for approximately 90% of Bazaarvoice's and PowerReviews' revenues. Trial Tr. 968:15-22 (Shapiro); Trial Tr. 273:20-274:10 (Hurt); Trial Tr. 442:6-12 (Luedtke). Although the IR 500 only tracks retailers, the data is useful to indicate the competitive significance of PRR vendors for brands because, when syndicating, brands care about how much commerce is taking place on the retailer's site. Brands will be more likely to select the PRR provider whose syndication network provides them access to the largest number of retail consumers. Trial Tr. 964:7-15, 966:23-967:12 (Shapiro). Because of this, retailers are very important to Bazaarvoice's brand business. Bazaarvoice's strategy was to build a large base of retailers in order to attract brand customers. Trial Tr. 967:13-24 (Shapiro).

229. Although the IR 500 is the best available data to calculate market shares, Professor Shapiro recognized the data does not provide a "perfect measure" of the PRR market. Trial Tr. 974:12-20 (Shapiro). Therefore, Professor Shapiro performed additional analyses to check the robustness of these results. All checks revealed the same basic market structure. The number one and number two firms are merging, a significant number of customers choose inhouse, and there are some small fringe competitors. Trial Tr. 982:11-19 (Shapiro).

230. First, Professor Shapiro measured shares in the broader group of the IR 1000.
The additional 500 firms are small retailers with sales ranging between about \$15 million and several hundred thousand dollars. Trial Tr. 969:1-7 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro found that no firms, other than the ones identified in the IR 500, served more than ten of these extra 500 retailers. Trial Tr. 976:16-977:1 (Shapiro).

231. Second, Professor Shapiro measured shares using the list of firms in the Fortune 500. The Fortune 500 is informative because it is a standard set of large companies that includes both retailers and brands. Trial Tr. 975:6-18 (Shapiro). Based on the Fortune 500, Bazaarvoice has a market share of 67%, PowerReviews has a market share of 16%, in-house has a market

share of 14%, and all other commercial vendors have a combined market share of about 3%. Trial Tr. 976:1-15 (Shapiro); GX1078.

232. Third, Professor Shapiro analyzed Dr. Shehadeh's sample of 1,000 actual and workable accounts that was drawn from the Bazaarvoice Salesforce.com database. Trial Tr. 979:19-980:5 (Shapiro). Professor Shapiro concluded this was a useful data set because the 1,000 accounts were selected randomly from a pool of 30,000 accounts and included brands as well as large and small retailers. Trial Tr. 980:2-16 (Shapiro). After limiting the data set to U.S. retailers and brands that have a PRR platform, Professor Shapiro found that in-house had a market share of 40%, Bazaarvoice had a market share of 38%, PowerReviews had a market share of 21%, and all others had a share of less than 2%. Trial Tr. 980:9-981:11 (Shapiro); GX1057.

233. Finally, Professor Shapiro compiled data on the total number of customers for each of the commercial PRR vendors identified in Dr. Shehadeh's report. Trial Tr. 978:4-9 (Shapiro). The customer count information generally comes from company depositions as well as Bazaarvoice's due diligence memorandum regarding the merger. GX1064*; Trial Tr. 978:4-17 (Shapiro). The results of Professor Shapiro's analysis are presented in the chart below:

	Founded	PRR Customers	IR500 (2012)	
Company			Customers	Customer Sales (\$B)
Merging Companies				
Bazaarvoice	2005		167.3	69.17
PowerReviews				
Enterprise	2005		119	26.24
Express	2005		119	26.24
Companies Providing PRR				
Gigya	2006			
Lithium	2001			
Pluck	2003			
Rating System	2008			
Reevoo	2005			
Viewpoints	2006			
Other Companies (Non-PRR)				
Jive	2001			
Turnto	2007			
Webcollage	1999			

234. The two columns on the right reflect the vendor's customer count and sales in the IR 500. The middle column, titled "PRR Customers" reflects the vendor's total customer count, including customers in and outside the IR 500. Trial Tr. 978:4-17 (Shapiro). The results are

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similar to what was found in the other checks. The fringe companies have very few customers compared to Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. **Compared to Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews**. **Compared to Bazaarv**

235. These market shares are meaningful because PRR platform vendors with little or no market share are unlikely to provide as strong a competitive check on Bazaarvoice as PowerReviews did before the merger. GX984* at 7.

236. Bazaarvoice's acquisition of PowerReviews significantly increased concentration in the already highly concentrated PRR platform market. The *Merger Guidelines* place significant weight on market concentration in assessing the likely competitive effects of mergers. The *Merger Guidelines* use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market concentration. The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual firms' market shares, and thus gives proportionately greater weight to larger market shares. Trial Tr. 950:14-24 (Shapiro). The *Merger Guidelines* classify markets as highly concentrated if the HHI exceeds 2500. Trial Tr. 950:25-951:14 (Shapiro); GX981 §5.3. The *Merger Guidelines* also look at the increase in the HHI caused by the merger. According to Section 5.3 of the *Merger Guidelines*: "Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power." GX981 §5.3; Trial Tr. 951:3-10 (Shapiro).

237. Based on IR 500 customer revenues, the pre-merger HHI was 2674, and it would rise by 1240 points to 3915 after the merger. GX985* at Ex. 15A; GX1063; Trial Tr. 955:22-956:7 (Shapiro). Based on IR 500 customer count, the pre-merger HHI was 2365, and it would rise by 2226 points to 4590 after the merger. GX985* at Ex. 14A; GX1062; Trial Tr. 950:25-951:11 (Shapiro). By either measure, these figures are significantly above the *Merger*

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Guidelines' thresholds and create the presumption that that the transaction would substantially reduce competition. *See* Trial Tr. 956:5-7 (Shapiro); GX981 §5.3

238. In examining market concentration, Professor Shapiro also considered supply substitution. Supply substitution considers whether there are companies that are not selling PRR platforms who could "very easily and quickly do so." Trial Tr. 970:2-9 (Shapiro); GX981 §5.2. If any such firms exist, such firms are called "rapid entrants." Trial Tr. 970:5-13 (Shapiro). The excess capacity a rapid entrant can divert to the new market must be "measurable." Trial Tr. 972:11-13 (Shapiro); GX981 §5.2. In such an event, the rapid entrant would receive market share in accordance with its divertible capacity. Trial Tr. 2068:1-11 (Shapiro).

239. There are no rapid entrants in this case. First, the concept of divertible capacity does not apply in a software market like the PRR platform market and, as a result, there is no capacity-based market share to assign to a rapid entrant. Trial Tr. 971:18-24, 2068:5-11 (Shapiro). Second, firms outside the PRR platform market cannot easily and quickly enter the market. To enter the PRR platform market and achieve some commercial success requires significant investment and risk. Trial Tr. 972:7-10, 2068:12-22 (Shapiro).

VI. ENTRY OR REPOSITIONING FROM OTHER FIRMS HAS NOT, AND WILL NOT COUNTERACT BAZAARVOICE'S INCREASED MARKET POWER

A. There Are Significant Barriers to Entering the Market for PRR Platforms

240. Even before the acquisition of PowerReviews, Bazaarvoice's competitive position was protected by substantial barriers to entry. GX835 at -825. As a part of its "Key Messages for Initial Public Offering," prepared in February 2012, Bazaarvoice stated that there were "[s]ignificant barriers to entry, [it] would be very difficult for a new company to enter our market organically or through M&A," and that it "[w]ould take a competitor years to build a comparable solution, but then we already have the customers and the network." GX835 at -825.

241. Bazaarvoice recognizes that the acquisition of PowerReviews increases these
barriers to entry, as it noted in the title to a PowerPoint slide, "Scale and Network Effects Create
Sustainable Competitive Advantage." GX770 at -232; Trial Tr. 145:16-25 (Hurt); *see also*GX925 at -941-46; GX409 at -568. In the due diligence memo prepared by company executives

recommending the acquisition to the Bazaarvoice Board, Bazaarvoice executives wrote that by 1 2 virtue of the merger, "Bazaarvoice blocks market entry by competitors and therefore we 'cover our flank' to ensure our retail business is protected from direct competition and premature price 3 erosion." GX925 at -941; see also GX254 at -340. A PowerReviews Board member noted that 4 5 "post this combination, there is a network effect between the brands and the retailers that will be nearly impossible for someone to break." GX746 at -897. A Bazaarvoice Board member 6 7 similarly noted that the acquisition "was a good one given the increased network power it would give [Bazaarvoice] on the retail side." GX949. 8

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(i) The Network Effect that Results from Having an Established Syndication Network is a Significant Barrier to Timely and Sufficient **Entry or Expansion**

242. Bazaarvoice's syndication network is a formidable barrier to entry in the market for PRR platforms. GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 50:23-51:2, 51:5-25). Bazaarvoice touted the size and 13 scope of its syndication network in its efforts to market the company. GX413 at -924; GX750 at 14 15; Trial Tr. 125:10-126:1; 146:19-147:4 (Hurt). Bazaarvoice's syndication volumes have been increasing "30-50% year over year." Trial Tr. 889:25-890:15 (Collins). Economic analysis 15 16 confirms syndication is becoming "significantly more important," Trial Tr. 1014:15-18 (Shapiro), and it would be "very hard" for a new entrant to overcome the syndication barrier to 18 entry, Trial Tr. 1017:18-1020:20 (Shapiro). See also Trial Tr. 1014:19-1015:6 (Shapiro) and GX1052 (growing adoption of syndication); Trial Tr. 1015:7-20 (Shapiro) and GX1053 (same); Trial Tr. 1016:1-1017:16 (Shapiro) and GX1059 (same).⁷ 20

243. As more manufacturers purchase Bazaarvoice's PRR platform, the Bazaarvoice network becomes more valuable to retailers because it will allow them to gain access to a greater volume of PRR. Similarly, as more retailers purchase Bazaarvoice's PRR platform, the Bazaarvoice network becomes more valuable for manufacturers because it will allow them to syndicate content to a greater number of retail outlets. The feedback between manufacturers and

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Even Defendant's economic expert anticipated that there are "trends up" in terms of the percentage of customers choosing syndication and that he expects the number of syndication customers will continue to grow. Trial Tr. 1992:13-1993:10 (Shehadeh).

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retailers creates a network effect that is a significant and durable competitive advantage for Bazaarvoice. GX770 at -219 and Trial Tr. 145:16-25 (Hurt); GX406 at -202 and Trial Tr. 124:15-125:2 (Hurt); GX983* at 73-76; *see also* GX215 at -652; GX1119 (Godfrey Dep. 115:15-116:20); *see also* GX44 at -438; Trial Tr. 296:22-297:6 (Levin/Clorox). In its registration statement and accompanying prospectus for its IPO, Bazaarvoice stated that "[o]ur ability to syndicate content across a wide array of websites attracts brands to our network As a result, we believe we benefit from powerful network effects that differentiate us from our competitors." GX964 at 4, 79.

244. Bazaarvoice acknowledges the importance of its syndication network as a substantial barrier to entry that protects its dominant position. Bazaarvoice's then-CFO Stephen Collins explained that its "[d]ata and network effect should be a buffer against price deflation/commoditization as long as we maintain significant market share and lock competitors out of a meaningful data set." GX1228 at -319. Before its IPO in February 2012, Bazaarvoice prepared a document for an investor roadshow in which it explained the "powerful network economies at play by linking retailers and brands/manufacturers." GX425 at -919. Bazaarvoice identified its "ability to leverage the data" from its customer base as "a key barrier [to] entry." GX425 at -926. During investor roadshows, the company claimed that "any company entering the market would have to start from the beginning by securing all of the retail clients," which would be difficult because most of the largest retailers are already using the Bazaarvoice platform. GX425 at -926 and Trial Tr. 131:9-20 (Hurt). Bazaarvoice boasted to potential investors that "the power of [Bazaarvoice's] network effect and significant advantage on a global scale is starting to crowd out competition " GX425 at -928. Since its IPO, Bazaarvoice's SEC filings have continued to identify "powerful network effects" from syndication as a "competitive strength[] [that] differentiate[s] [Bazaarvoice] from . . . competitors" and "serve[s] as [a] barrier to entry." GX501 at 7; GX964 at 4, 79; see also GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 110:3-10); Trial Tr. 258:22-259:11 (Hurt).

7 245. In explaining Bazaarvoice's network effect, Matt Curtin, Bazaarvoice's Vice
8 President of Brands, stated that having a majority of the companies on the IR 500 list as

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customers makes the Bazaarvoice network more attractive to brands and that the "most important thing to a brand is the ability to take that [PRR] content and syndicate [it]" GX1009 (Curtin 2 3 Dep. 52:15-54:22, 96:21-98:15); see also GX93 (Svatek Dep. 93:4-9). Bazaarvoice's ordinary course business documents also recognized that syndication created a barrier to entry. For 4 5 example, in an email to Mr. Hurt, Mr. Osborne wrote that "[w]e've seen the network effect already in our renewals - customers that are using syndication generally can't leave us, and that's 6 7 a great thing." GX1220 at -614 and Trial Tr. 711:1-712:6 (Osborne).

246. PowerReviews also recognized the significant network effect of Bazaarvoice's large syndication network, and acknowledged losing competitive opportunities because of the strength of that network effect. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 211:9-12, 211:22, 211:25-212:11, 235:7, 235:9-12, 237:18-24, 238:16-239:3, 242:3-12) and Trial Tr. 423:6-25 (Luedtke); see also GX245 at -433-34; GX410 at -482-83; GX89 (Hurt Dep. 232:7-24); GX669 at -630; GX280 at -600. , a Bazaarvoice customer, that "[i]f we could break PowerReviews noted after a call with the syndication barriers we could make significant inroads into existing [Bazaarvoice] US retail accounts." GX607* at -086.

16 247. The acquisition of PowerReviews will extend the reach of Bazaarvoice's network and deprive its remaining competitors of the scale that is necessary to truly compete. See GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 82:15-83:11); GX425 at -919, -923, -926, -933, -935; GX313 at -633; GX899 at -816-17; see also Trial Tr. 128:15-129:18 (Hurt). Bazaarvoice executive Stephen Collins predicted that Bazaarvoice's acquisition of PowerReviews "would definitely tip the scales in [Bazaarvoice's] permanent favor on the network front." GX522 at -035. Similarly, Bazaarvoice executive Brett Hurt wrote, in preparing for a Board meeting prior to the acquisition, that "[o]ur syndication network is a competitive advantage today, but it can become a true competitive moat in the future." GX411 at -871; see also Trial Tr. 262:4-11 (Hurt). 24 Bazaarvoice anticipated that the assimilation of major PowerReviews retailers into the 26 Bazaarvoice network "further increases the switching costs, and therefore deepens [Bazaarvoice's] protective moat, for brands and retailers alike." GX925 at -943.

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1	248. Other PRR platform providers acknowledge that syndication is very important
2	and that Bazaarvoice's syndication network gives it a competitive advantage.
3	GX72* (Lithium Dep. 39:12-40:4, 40:10-11, 45:7-
4	46:16, 46:19-47:9, 47:13-17, 47:20-49:3, 49:11, 49:15-16, 49:18-50:4); GX73* (Reevoo Dep.
5	15:2-7, 15:12-14) (reviewed <i>in camera</i>). Further, Bazaarvoice executive Mike Svatek testified
6	that "the network would be very difficult for any individual company to replicate, any
7	individual customer, a retailer or brand to replicate." GX93 (Svatek Dep. 143:18-144:2).
8	249. Syndication within the same PRR platform requires significant technical work to
9	ensure that the syndicated reviews match the retail customer's format and preferences. GX87
10	(Godfrey CID Dep. 77:12-78:7); GX85 (Defossé Dep. 160:16-161:14).
11	250. Syndication between a manufacturer and a retailer using different PRR platforms
12	is possible, but requires customized integration work to connect the platforms. GX87 (Godfrey
13	CID Dep. 95:20-96:12, 100:10-21); GX92 (Osborne Dep. 237:23-238:12).
14	(ii) There are Significant Costs to Switching PRR Platforms, Giving a
	Compatitive Adventere to Inclimbent Providers of PRR Plettorms
15	Competitive Advantage to Incumbent Providers of PRR Platforms
	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR
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16	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR
16 17	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1
16 17 18	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep.
16 17 18 19 20	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 33:20-34:3); see also GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 61:6-62:21); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 190:3-21
16 17 18 19 20 21	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 33:20-34:3); <i>see also</i> GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 61:6-62:21); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 190:3-21 (reviewed <i>in camera</i>), 226:2-227:5, 227:16-20, 227:22-23); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep.
16 17 18 19	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 33:20-34:3); <i>see also</i> GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 61:6-62:21); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 190:3-21 (reviewed <i>in camera</i>), 226:2-227:5, 227:16-20, 227:22-23); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 35:6-8, 35:11, 35:16-36:8, 81:20-22, 82:4-21) and Trial Tr. 567:10-24, 570:12-571:1
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 33:20-34:3); see also GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 61:6-62:21); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 190:3-21 (reviewed <i>in camera</i>), 226:2-227:5, 227:16-20, 227:22-23); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 35:6-8, 35:11, 35:16-36:8, 81:20-22, 82:4-21) and Trial Tr. 567:10-24, 570:12-571:1 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond); <i>see also</i> Trial Tr. 1012:1-15 (Shapiro). For instance, Dillard's noted
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 22 23 	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 33:20-34:3); <i>see also</i> GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 61:6-62:21); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 190:3-21 (reviewed <i>in camera</i>), 226:2-227:5, 227:16-20, 227:22-23); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 35:6-8, 35:11, 35:16-36:8, 81:20-22, 82:4-21) and Trial Tr. 567:10-24, 570:12-571:1 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond); <i>see also</i> Trial Tr. 1012:1-15 (Shapiro). For instance, Dillard's noted that "there would be significant time" associated with removing one solution to implement
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 33:20-34:3); <i>see also</i> GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 61:6-62:21); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 190:3-21 (reviewed <i>in camera</i>), 226:2-227:5, 227:16-20, 227:22-23); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 35:6-8, 35:11, 35:16-36:8, 81:20-22, 82:4-21) and Trial Tr. 567:10-24, 570:12-571:1 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond); <i>see also</i> Trial Tr. 1012:1-15 (Shapiro). For instance, Dillard's noted that "there would be significant time" associated with removing one solution to implement another. GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 65:14-24).
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	 251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 33:20-34:3); see also GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 61:6-62:21); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 190:3-21 (reviewed <i>in camera</i>), 226:2-227:5, 227:16-20, 227:22-23); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 35:6-8, 35:11, 35:16-36:8, 81:20-22, 82:4-21) and Trial Tr. 567:10-24, 570:12-571:1 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond); see also Trial Tr. 1012:1-15 (Shapiro). For instance, Dillard's noted that "there would be significant time" associated with removing one solution to implement another. GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 65:14-24). 252. Bazaarvoice executive Michael Svatek acknowledges that there are costs, such as
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	 251. Retailers are reluctant to invest the time and money required to switch PRR platforms in the absence of a demonstrable, significant benefit. Trial Tr. 1191:21-1195:1 (Friedland/Build.com); Trial Tr. 1218:1-6 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 33:20-34:3); see also GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 61:6-62:21); GX62* (Pluck Dep. 190:3-21 (reviewed <i>in camera</i>), 226:2-227:5, 227:16-20, 227:22-23); GX76 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond Dep. 35:6-8, 35:11, 35:16-36:8, 81:20-22, 82:4-21) and Trial Tr. 567:10-24, 570:12-571:1 (Waltzinger/BBBeyond); see also Trial Tr. 1012:1-15 (Shapiro). For instance, Dillard's noted that "there would be significant time" associated with removing one solution to implement another. GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 65:14-24). 252. Bazaarvoice executive Michael Svatek acknowledges that there are costs, such as training, labor, and implementation, associated with switching PRR platforms. GX93 (Svatek

switching and inertia. GX92 (Osborne Dep. 316:25-317:10, 317:13-20, 317:23-318:11) and 1 Trial Tr. 710:10-17 (Osborne); GX223 at -634; Trial Tr. 210:12-211:13 (Hurt); Trial Tr. 504:14-2 505:6 (Defossé). 3

> **Developing a Good Reputation through Multiple Successful** (iii) Implementations of PRR Platforms Can Take Years to Develop and is a Significant Barrier to Entry

253. Bazaarvoice's reputation and customer list also creates a barrier to entry. Reputation can be the basis for evaluating whether a PRR platform provider is credible. GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 67:3-68:4, 69:4-15); GX72* (Lithium Dep. 40:20-42:2). For example, when searching for a PRR platform provider, many customers look to the information maintained by the IR 500 to determine which PRR platform providers are being used by companies on the IR 500 list. GX130 (Dick's Sporting Goods Dep. 30:17-32:7, 47:1-13, 47:22-48:1);

; GX78 (Cunningham/BJ's Wholesale Dep. 19:24-20:16).

254. Bazaarvoice executives have testified that "the more clients you have, the more seriously you're taken as a business." GX82 (Barton Dep. 51:18-52:11); see also GX88 (Hossain Dep. 49:23-50:16, 51:1-2, 51:5-12, 51:14-16, 51:19-23). For example, despite Reevoo's presence in Europe, Home Depot felt that Reevoo's lack of a "proven . . . track record with . . . major enterprise customers" was one of the reasons that Home Depot was not interested in Reevoo's PRR platform. GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 67:3-68:4); see also

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Customers generally want a PRR provider with a proven track record in providing PRR and 'when the price of the product is small compared to the risk it if [] things go badly" customers are reluctant to try a new provider. Trial Tr. 1012:16-1013:14 (Shapiro).

255. PowerReviews recognized that the combined reputation of Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews serves as a barrier to entry by creating "[u]nique trust, credibility and scope." GX254 at -340.

(iv) Gaining the Intellectual Property/Know How to Develop and Operate PRR Platforms and Features Can Be Difficult and Resource-Intensive

256. Bazaarvoice recognizes that it "[w]ould take a competitor years to build a comparable solution, but then we already have the customers and the network." GX410 at -483. Beyond the difficulty of creating a syndication network, Bazaarvoice represented to potential investors that its "moderation and analytics capabilities are difficult to duplicate" GX928 at -928; Trial Tr. 888:9-889:4 (Collins). One Bazaarvoice Board member said when asked about Bazaarvoice's moderation capabilities, ". . . that's important. That is a barrier." GX491 (Meredith Dep. 197:23-198:21); *see also* Trial Tr. 1423:11-1424:12 (Meredith).

257. Bazaarvoice's analytics are a "competitive strength" as Bazaarvoice had "developed a – a user experience around [its] analytics capability [that] was extremely modern, very easy to use" and "would allow a business user to quickly get at the heart of whatever their analytics task was." GX93 (Svatek Dep. 105:3-19, 105:24-106:8).

258. Bazaarvoice's moderation capabilities were "unique." GX93 (Svatek Dep.
107:22-24). Bazaarvoice attributed its sophisticated moderation capabilities to investments
Bazaarvoice had made in "tools, meaning IP that [Bazaarvoice] created, as well as processes and,
frankly, human training that were very sophisticated, very customizable and configurable"
GX93 (Svatek Dep. 107:22-108:13). This allowed Bazaarvoice to meet "very demanding
standards for large retailers and very large brands who all had very sophisticated needs." GX93
(Svatek Dep. 107:22-108:13). It would be costly for a competitor to replicate these moderation
capabilities. *Cf.* GX89 (Hurt Dep. 204:8-20) and Trial Tr. 106:18-107:24 (Hurt).

B.

Viewpoints Tried and Failed to Enter the Market for PRR Platforms

259. In 2008-2009, Viewpoints (now Wavetable Labs) built a PRR platform for Sears, which replaced Bazaarvoice's PRR platform on some of Sears' websites. GX75 (Moog Dep. 25:7-19, 31:2-17). After licensing its PRR platform to Sears, Viewpoints decided to offer it to other customers. GX75 (Moog Dep. 31:2-17). Viewpoints made 100 sales calls but signed only three additional customers. GX75 (Moog Dep. 35:20-37:12, 47:5-14). None of those customers

uses Viewpoints' PRR platform today. GX75 (Moog Dep. 48:3-24, 49:3, 49:5-7, 49:11-13, 1 2 49:19-22, 50:2-5).

260. Viewpoints subsequently exited the PRR platform business due to its lack of success, while continuing to serve Sears. GX731 at 1; GX75 (Moog Dep. 47:5-14). Sears abandoned Viewpoints' PRR platform in 2012 due to its cost, limited functionality, and poor performance, leaving Viewpoints' PRR platform with no customers. GX181 (Sears Dep. 49:16-18, 49:20-50:3, 50:10-51:10) and Trial Tr. 1690:16-25; 1691:9-25 (Massuda/Sears); GX75 (Moog Dep. 50:2-5). Viewpoints does not offer a PRR platform today. GX75 (Moog Dep. 67:23-24, 68:3-17, 68:20).⁸

261. Viewpoints believed that competing against Bazaarvoice for PRR customers would have been a "bloodbath" because Bazaarvoice was a "very well funded and aggressive company" with "lots of momentum and success" that "had proven to be very aggressive about defending any opportunity." GX75 (Moog Dep. 47:15-48:2, 69:16-20, 69:24-25, 70:3, 70:7-13).

C. Fringe Providers of PRR Platforms are Unlikely to Expand Sufficiently to Mitigate the Transaction's Anticompetitive Effects

16 262. There are a number of fringe providers of PRR platforms and they are in the relevant market for purposes of calculating market shares. Trial Tr. 1008:3-18 (Shapiro). 18 However, none of these fringe providers has achieved any meaningful level of commercial success in providing PRR platforms to U.S. customers. Trial Tr. 1008:3-18 (Shapiro). 20Moreover, the mere existence of fringe providers is insufficient to mitigate the transaction's anticompetitive effects; "it's really not the number of bidders; it's their quality and attractiveness to customers that matters," Trial Tr. 916:12-917:2 (Shapiro), and "if these products offered by 22 23 these fringe suppliers were almost as good as what PowerReviews is offering, [one] would 24 expect their commercial success to be also close to that of PowerReviews," Trial Tr. 2063:19-2064:1) (Shapiro). There is no evidence that after the merger these fringe players have changed 25 their conduct or plans to replace the competition previously provided by PowerReviews. Trial 26

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⁸ Even Defendant's proffered shopper marketing expert acknowledged that Viewpoints has exited the PRR market. Trial Tr. 1567:5-8 (Goldberg).

Tr. 2064:17-2065:13 (Shapiro). Further, there is no evidence that any player that has entered the market since the merger, such as Reevoo, has achieved any commercial success or gained any meaningful market share. Trial Tr. 2066:18-2067:10 (Shapiro).

(i) Reevoo

263. Reevoo is a London-based PRR platform provider. GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 8:4-6, 20-22) (reviewed *in camera*). Reevoo also sells a Q&A solution. GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 8:23-25) (reviewed *in camera*). Reevoo entered the U.S. PRR platform market in September 2012. GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 8:10-19) (reviewed *in camera*); GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 210:18-23). Just a few months ago, Bazaarvoice's CEO, Stephen Collins, admitted that he was "not sure to what extent, if any, they have entered the U.S. market." GX81 (Collins Dep. 218:7-17).

264. In fact, Reevoo has struggled in the U.S. market.

15	265. Reevoo's U.S. sales force consists of one employee, who is assisted by one
16	subcontractor. GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 13:20-14:4) (reviewed in camera); see also GX947* at -
17	403. Both work out of their homes. GX73* (Reevoo Dep. 7:23-25, 13:20-14:7) (reviewed in
18	<i>camera</i>). Currently, Reevoo has no plans to hire any additional employees in the U.S. GX73*
19	(Reevoo Dep. 14:8-11). Customers have cited Reevoo's relative lack of U.S. resources,
20	customers, and robustness of service as a reason for not selecting its PRR platform. GX73*
21	(Reevoo Dep. 21:25-22:5, 22:8-18, 39:16-40:4) (reviewed <i>in camera</i>); GX125 (Clorox Dep.
22	122:9-18) and Trial Tr. 294:1-16 (Levin/Clorox).

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7	268. Reevoo is also hindered by its lack of reputation in the U.S. market.
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9	Home Depot
10	noted that Reevoo's recent entry into the U.S. market "raised a flag" as Reevoo did not have a
11	"proven track record with what [Home Depot] would classify major enterprise customers."
12	GX146 (Home Depot Dep. 67:13-68:4). At least one U.S. manufacturer believes that Reevoo's
13	PRR platform is inferior to the platforms offered by Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. GX108*
14	(Black & Decker Dep. 49:19-25).
15	(ii) Pluck
16	269. Pluck, a division of Demand Media, sells an array of social applications,
17	including a PRR platform. GX62* (Pluck Dep. 149:22-25) (reviewed <i>in camera</i>). Bazaarvoice's
18	Stephen Collins testified that Pluck is Bazaarvoice's closest remaining competitor. GX81
19	(Collins Dep. 221:7-17) and Trial Tr. 758:21-759:4 (Collins); see also GX492 (Pacitti Dep.
20	141:8-12).
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28	Some of Pluck's customers
	PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 81

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acknowledge that Bazaarvoice's PRR platform is more robust and offers better moderation and 1 customization capabilities than Pluck's PRR platform. GX100 (Autozone Dep. 33:14-34:12, 2 57:11-18, 57:21-58:12, 58:15-59:1) and Trial Tr. 1333:6-11 (Rutherford/Autozone); 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 271. 12 PowerReviews observed that Pluck is "terrible" and Target "made a very bad choice." GX813 at -737. 13 14 15 Target recently discontinued its relationship with Pluck and 16 switched to Bazaarvoice. Trial Tr. 759:5-11 (Collins); Trial Tr. 436:21-24 (Luedtke). (iii) 17 Gigya 18 272. Gigya provides a suite of eCommerce applications, including PRR, for online 19 businesses. GX64 (Gigya Dep. 81:18-82:9). PRR can be bought separately, or as part of the full 20suite. While Gigya has roughly 600 customers, no more than thirty-nine of them use its PRR 21 application. GX461; GX64 (Gigya Dep. 72:12-15, 83:24-84:14) and Trial Tr. 600:5-14 22 (Tarkowski/Gigya). Clorox used Gigya's PRR solution on one of its websites until May or June 23 2013, when it switched to Bazaarvoice. Trial Tr. 308:10-23 (Levin/Clorox). Clorox is no longer 24 a Gigya customer. Trial Tr. 278:10-17 (Levin/Clorox). The inadequacy of Gigya's PRR 25 application is evidenced by the fact that many of Gigya's eCommerce customers, including those 26 that bought Gigya's full suite and therefore have access to Gigya's PRR application, use 27 Bazaarvoice's PRR platform instead. GX64 (Gigya Dep. 105:7-21, 23); GX465 at -632. For 28 example, World Kitchen uses Gigya's social infrastructure tools. Trial Tr. 1301:3-8

(Bausch/World Kitchen). World Kitchen's contract with Gigya allows World Kitchen to use Gigya's PRR application. Trial Tr. 1299:23-25 (Bausch/World Kitchen). However, World 2 3 Kitchen uses Bazaarvoice's PRR, at a cost of nearly \$200,000 per year, because of Bazaarvoice's more robust functionality and syndication. Trial Tr. 1300:5-1301:2 (Bausch/World Kitchen). 4 Because Gigya and Bazaarvoice share customers, Gigya's CEO sees Bazaarvoice "more as a partner" than a competitor. GX465 at -632; Trial Tr. 601:1-603:3 (Tarkowski/Gigya). 6 7 Bazaarvoice shares that view. GX364 at -612; see also GX762 at -070.

273. Gigya's PRR application lacks a network, does not offer syndication, and lacks other functionality, such as moderation, which some customers require. GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 58:11-59:18); GX810 at -442; GX64 (Gigya Dep. 92:24-93:12, 93:14-94:5, 101:4-16) and Trial Tr. 603:4-15 (Tarkowski/Gigya); GX196 (World Kitchen Dep. 62:6-64:3); Trial Tr. 294:22-295:11 (Levin/Clorox). Gigya's PRR application is a more simplistic application that does not even allow consumers to provide ratings on specific product attributes nor does it allow extensive customization. Trial Tr. 1208:15-1209:7 (Katz/Pacific Sunwear). Gigya also does not allow retailers to "white label" its PRR application, *i.e.*, use the application on an ecommerce website without displaying the Gigya name. GX131 (Dillard's Dep. 58:11-59:18).

274. Indeed, Bazaarvoice believes that Gigya targets different customers than Bazaarvoice. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 210:24-211:9). For example, Pacific Sunwear thought Gigya's PRR application was a good fit because the company was seeking a "simplistic" solution with an emphasis on the "social experience" instead of a full-featured PRR solution. GX171 (Pacific Sunwear Dep. 15:3-5, 15:7-20, 33:20-34:15, 42:13-43:4, 45:17-46:3, 46:5-15) and Trial Tr. 1208:15-19 (Katz/Pacific Sunwear).9

> (iv) Lithium

275. Lithium sells a software platform that promotes online interaction between brands and consumers. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 16:12-19, 17:21-25). The company's "strength" is in fostering brand/consumer interactions "after [the] point of purchase." GX72* (Lithium Dep.

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Even Defendant's economic expert could not describe any change in Gigya's PRR offering that would make it more competitive post-merger. Trial Tr. 1946:24-1947:13 (Shehadeh).

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18:1-19:17). Lithium's platform includes a variety of applications, including forums, blogs, and Q&A. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 19:22-20:7). PRR functionality is not included, but is available for purchase by customers who buy Lithium's platform. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 24:21-25:11). Lithium does not sell its PRR application on a standalone basis, *i.e.*, separately from its platform. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 24:24-25:18).

276. Lithium has approximately 300 customers. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 19:18-21). Only one of those customers has deployed Lithium's PRR application. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 42:3-6).

277. There are "critical product gaps" in Lithium's PRR application that the company would have to address before it could compete for customers seeking standalone PRR. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 136:3-16). Lithium has no plans to close those gaps or to further develop its PRR functionality. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 136:23-137:12, 67:22-25, 68:2-10).

278. Bazaarvoice "almost never compete[s]" with Lithium. GX289 at -162; see also GX763; GX668; GX259 at -652; GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 211:15-212:4). Bazaarvoice's Chairman testified earlier this month that Lithium is "probably" not a current competitor to Bazaarvoice. GX491 (Meredith Dep. 200:6-201:5). Lithium has "shied away" from competing with Bazaarvoice for PRR customers because of Bazaarvoice's "dominance" in that area. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 46:5-16, 46:19-47:9, 47:13-17).

279. In fact, Lithium and Bazaarvoice are complementary solutions. GX364 at -609. Many of Lithium's customers use Bazaarvoice's PRR platform. GX72* (Lithium Dep. 47:20-48:5); see also GX668.

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Other Fringe Providers of PRR Platforms are Not Likely to Expand **(v)** Sufficiently to Mitigate the Anticompetitive Effects of the Acquisition

280. **Practical Data:** Practical Data has sold add-on functionality, including PRR, to users of the Yahoo! Store eCommerce platform since 2002. GX65 (Practical Data Dep. 6:2-22). While Practical Data has approximately 110 customers, Practical Data earned revenues of "probably a good bit less" than \$162,000 from its PRR product in 2012. GX65 (Practical Data Dep. 43:4-7, 67:20-68:4, 68:7-16, 68:18). Only of these customers appear to be in the IR

500. GX985* at Ex. 14A; GX1062. Practical Data does not offer moderation or syndication services in connection with PRR. GX65 (Practical Data Dep. 53:8-54:11). Practical Data does not have a research and development program or a roadmap for its PRR product. GX65 (Practical Data Dep. 54:12-17).

281. Rating-System.com: Rating-System has no employees. GX66 (Rating-System Dep. 89:7-11) and Trial Tr. 1325:2-6 (Bruksha/Rating-System). The company's founder, who works full-time at Men's Wearhouse, and several others provide services part-time as needed. GX66 (Rating-System Dep. 13:19-14:3, 89:12-90:1) and Trial Tr. 1316:17-20, 1325:7-21 (Bruksha/Rating-System). Rating-System offers several levels of PRR services, including an "enterprise" plan for larger customers with "bigger traffic sites." GX66 (Rating-system Dep. 45:12-22) and Trial Tr. 1318:23-1319:4 (Bruksha/Rating-System). The company's founder does not know how many PRR customers Rating-System has (Trial Tr. 1318:10-22, 1319:25-1321:7 (Bruksha/Rating-System), but he testified that no one has bought Rating-System's enterprise service plan. GX66 (Rating-System Dep. 45:23-46:2) and Trial Tr. 1319:5-9 (Bruksha/Rating-System). One Rating-System customer, Astral Brands, receives only two or three reviews a day for all of its brands. Trial Tr. 1355:6-11 (Hughes/Astral Brands). Astral Brands employees moderate these reviews and post the reviews to the company's website themselves. Trial Tr. 1348:3-19 (Hughes/Astral Brands). Astral Brands testified that Rating-System's PRR product has "bugs" that "pop up." Trial Tr. 1354:12-24 (Hughes/Astral Brands). Rating-System does not offer syndication, and only one customer uses its moderation services. GX66 (Rating-System Dep. 120:14-121:15) and Trial Tr. 1326:8-10 (Bruksha/Rating-System). Bazaarvoice executive Alan Godfrey described Rating-System as a "very, very small entrant into the market." Trial Tr. 1129:22-1130:1 (Godfrey).¹⁰

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¹⁰ Even Defendant's proffered shopper marketing expert acknowledged that he would not recommend that a large client use Rating-System.com. Trial Tr. 1565:12-1566:7 (Goldberg).

D. In-House Solutions and eCommerce PRR Modules are Not Economically Viable Alternatives for Many Customers and Potential Customers of PRR Platforms and Will Not Constrain Bazaarvoice's Ability to Raise Prices

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(i) In-House PRR Platforms

282. For many retailers and manufacturers, in-house PRR platforms are not sufficiently close substitutes to Bazaarvoice's or PowerReviews' platforms to impede a post-merger price increase by Bazaarvoice. GX365* at -478; GX939 at -551; GX678; Trial Tr. 1188:12-1189:12 (Friedland/Build.com).

283. It would be prohibitively expensive for many customers to develop an in-house PRR platform with functionality comparable to the features offered by Bazaarvoice, and it would be difficult to maintain the same pace of innovation. GX272 at -217; GX625 at -356; GX885 at -572; GX781 at -634; GX778 at -211-212; GX365* at -475-476, -478; GX928 at -929; GX939 at -551; GX160 (Lord & Taylor Dep. 38:9-21) *cf.* Trial Tr. 1690:4-15, 1692:5-13 (Massuda/Sears).

284. One PowerReviews customer, evaluating its options to build its own platform, estimated that it would cost \$120,000 up front and \$12,000 per year in maintenance to replace the PRR platform that it received from PowerReviews. GX168 (Onlineshoes.com Dep. 21:7-22:6). A Bazaarvoice customer estimated it would cost \$30,000-\$40,000 for it to build its own platform and then \$35,000-\$45,000/year in maintenance and moderation costs. GX114 (Build.com Dep. 17:17-19:7, 60:25-61:13); *see also* Trial Tr. 1190:20-1191:20 (Friedland/Build.com). Sears spent eleven months and approximately \$2 million developing an in-house PRR platform that does not have "a lot of the functionality" that Sears would like to have. Trial Tr. 1689:20-1690:15, 1692:5-13 (Massuda/Sears). For many customers, it may be significantly cheaper to use Bazaarvoice than to build their own PRR platform. *See generally* GX565 at -208.

285. The cost of performing moderation also discourages customers from choosing to build an in-house platform and is in fact an "extremely high barrier [to] entry." GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 213:8-13) and Trial Tr. 1143:21-1145:16 (Godfrey); *see also* GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 81:21-82:21); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 46:8-11, 46:14-16, 46:18-49:8); GX364 at -603. 286. It would be very complex and expensive for a customer to perform the same level of moderation as is performed by third party providers. GX272 at -216; GX885 at -572; GX939 at -551; GX89 (Hurt Dep. 204:8-20) and Trial Tr. 106:18-107:24 (Hurt); GX125 (Clorox Dep. 146:22-147:20). In its disclosures to the SEC, Bazaarvoice acknowledged that it benefits from "economies of scale" in supplying moderation of PRR. GX964 at 79.

287. For customers who want syndication, building an in-house solution is generally not a viable option. GX96* (Acer Dep. 71:2-12, 71:15-22); *see also* GX181 (Sears Dep. 51:17-18, 51:20-53:2, 53:4-23) and Trial Tr. 1692:14-1694:4 (Massuda/Sears); GX125 (Clorox Dep. 146:22-147:20). Even if a customer built syndication technology, it would not have access to a syndication network on which it could rely to receive and send PRR content. GX142 (Green Mountain Coffee Dep. 55:11-17, 55:23-56:25).

288. There are companies such as Webcollage that syndicate content from brands to retail websites where the brand's products are sold. Trial Tr. 1229:8-12 (Matthews/Webcollage). However, such syndication companies do not offer PRR functionality. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. 1239:11-17 (Matthews/Webcollage). Webcollage, in fact, syndicates ratings and reviews for only "three or four" customers and each of those customers have syndicated fewer than 50 reviews each. Trial Tr. 1239:23-25, 1240:1-5 (Matthews/Webcollage).

289. Many retailers have limited in-house developer resources, and building PRR functionality, even if technically possible, just doesn't "make a lot of sense" and is not a "good use of development time." GX138* (Fruit of the Loom Dep. 24:24-26:8) and Trial Tr. 1227:9-15 (Krebs/Fruit of the Loom); *see also* GX144 (Hayneedle Dep. 46:6-47:4) and Trial Tr. 1638:5-15 (Moen/Hayneedle); GX141 (Golfsmith Dep. 32:12-14, 32:16-33:7) and Trial Tr. 1218:7-13 (Maki/Golfsmith); GX193 (Walgreens Dep. 46:8-11, 46:14-16, 46:18-49:8); GX159 (LL Bean Dep. 37:6-38:16). Designing and maintaining an in-house solution would have been "too much work" for Astral Brands. Trial Tr. 1352:24-1353:18 (Hughes/Astral Brands). Such an effort would involve "UI (user interface) design, graphic design, database design, building, testing and then maintaining the system." Trial Tr. 1353:1-18 (Hughes/Astral Brands). Even PowerReviews executives acknowledge that developing an in-house PRR platform was generally not a good use of a potential customer's limited internal technical resources. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 76:21-24, 77:3-10).

290. In-house PRR platforms are only a viable option for customers that are not interested in the full feature set offered by Bazaarvoice (including moderation and syndication services), customers that are willing to invest heavily in ongoing platform development to maintain the software and create new features, or customers with specific needs that no vendor meets. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 213:8-23); GX661; GX195 (Wine.com Dep. 40:20-41:12); GX170 (Overstock.com Dep. 30:18-31:10, 32:23-33:10, 34:11-15, 68:3-12, 68:23-69:18, 72:7-9, 72:12-73:25). Customers who elect to build internal PRR platforms are "typically not" larger enterprise customers looking for the type of sophisticated platforms provided by Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 212:23-213:1).

291. For the reasons above, some customers that have invested in building their own PRR platform "ultimately decided to scrap it and use Bazaarvoice." GX885 at -572; *see also* GX88 (Hossain Dep. 138:4-140:15). Generally, the adoption of commercial PRR platforms, such as those offered by Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews, has been increasing over time, while the adoption of in-house PRR platforms has been relatively steady. GX983* at 28-29; GX1038; Trial Tr. 927:18-928:22 (Shapiro); GX1038.

(ii) eCommerce PRR Modules

292. eCommerce platforms are technology that enables a retailer to create an eCommerce site. For example, eCommerce platforms provide the shopping cart functionality on a retailer's website. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 45:21-46:5, 46:8-16).

293. While some commercial eCommerce platforms may offer some native PRR functionality, they generally lack the features necessary to serve as a substitute for the PRR platforms offered by Bazaarvoice or PowerReviews. GX196 (World Kitchen Dep. 19:8-14, 64:17-65:17); GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 116:2-12, 116:15-20) and Trial Tr. 419:6-13 (Luedtke); GX655 at -917, -920. According to Bazaarvoice, "[m]ost e-commerce platforms have R&R widget[s] only" which do not have the features available on the Bazaarvoice or PowerReviews PRR platforms, such as "reporting, robust analytics, content moderation, best practices for

gathering and using content, integrations with other systems, etc." GX885 at -573; see also GX364; GX68 (ShopVisible Dep. 45:23-46:2, 46:5-12, 46:15, 46:19-21, 46:23, 48:20-23, 49:1-2, 52:4-8, 52:10-16, 52:18). Bazaarvoice's "technology is more feature rich and has a lot more bells and whistles" than other eCommerce platforms. GX81 (Collins Dep. 240:8-13) and Trial Tr. 883:7-15 (Collins). Some customers may start by using native PRR functionality in an eCommerce platform, but as they grow they reach the limits of the platform's PRR capabilities. GX189 (Tempur-Pedic Dep. 21:14-22:6); GX141 (Golfsmith Dep. 60:25-61:10, 61:12-17).

To the extent that some PRR "plug-in" modules exist, such modules require 294. significant customization and development time by the retailer and as such are not particularly good substitutes for a robust PRR platform. GX99 (Astral Brands Dep. 127:6-12, 127:15-129:5) and Trial Tr. 1351:20-1352:19 (Hughes).

295. Regardless of whether an eCommerce platform offers its own PRR functionality, many also offer "app stores" that allow customers to purchase add-on PRR functionality from other vendors, such as PowerReviews' Express PRR product. These add-ons improve upon the limited functionality available natively in the eCommerce platform. GX90 (Luedtke Dep. 45:2-20, 46:11-16, 116:2-12, 116:15-20).

296. eCommerce platforms do not often compete head-to-head with Bazaarvoice or PowerReviews to offer PRR platforms. GX68 (ShopVisible Dep. 43:22-24, 44:2-5, 44:7); see, e.g., Trial Tr. 884:13-15 (Collins). Some eCommerce platforms even purchase PRR platforms from Bazaarvoice for their own websites. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 883:16-884:3 (Collins). Switching eCommerce platforms is a very expensive and complicated process and customers generally won't switch eCommerce platforms in order to obtain PRR functionality. See, e.g., DX1418 and Trial Tr. 1226:18-1227:1 (Krebs/Fruit of the Loom); Trial Tr. 1667:3-1668:3, 1669:13-1670:16 (Yukel/Big Dot of Happiness).¹¹

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¹¹ Even Defendant's economic expert admitted that customers won't switch eCommerce platforms in order to obtain PRR functionality. Trial Tr. 1954:13-19 (Shehadeh).

E. Other Social Commerce Companies and Large Software Companies are Unlikely to Enter the Market for PRR Platforms

(i) TurnTo

297. TurnTo provides a social question and answer software system to online retailers. GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 13:6-9). TurnTo is considering whether to develop a PRR solution. GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 39:16-18). TurnTo's CEO believes it would take many years to develop PRR functionality comparable to the Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews platforms. GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 41:25-42:13, 173:16-20, 173:23-174:13). He believes that Bazaarvoice's "strong" network makes it "much harder" for a new entrant to sell PRR. GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 50:19-51:2, 51:5-25).

298. If TurnTo were to try to enter the PRR platform market, the CEO's "fear" is that TurnTo would enter with a less mature and less expensive PRR platform than Bazaarvoice offers. GX74* (TurnTo Dep. 42:25-43:4, 43:7-44:17).

(ii)

Amazon

299. Amazon "do[es] not compete with [Bazaarvoice] as their platform does not allow third-parties to access review data for any reason." GX672 at -846. Further, Alan Godfrey, Bazaarvoice's General Manager of Retail, testified that he cannot recall lowering the price floor for PRR platforms in response to competition from Amazon. GX1119 (Godfrey Dep. 148:7-10); *see also* Trial Tr. 1844:22-1845:5 (Comée) (not aware of an instance of PowerReviews competing directly against an Amazon standalone PRR platform).

300. While Amazon.com has had an in-house PRR platform for its own website for over 18 years, Amazon.com does not currently provide its PRR platform to any website that is not an Amazon subsidiary and has no plans to license its PRR platform to other eCommerce vendors. GX70 (Amazon.com (Ahmed) Dep. 37:11-15, 114:11-24) and Trial Tr. 1625:18-1626:6 (Ahmed/Amazon.com).

301. Amazon is unlikely to enter the market for PRR platforms with a commercial
PRR product because "it would actually be disadvantageous for them to allow brands or retailers
to display the content; Amazon's first goal for the content is to attract consumers to their site and

keep them there for shopping, which relies on their exclusive access to the data." GX672 at
 -846.

302. Where retailers or manufacturers sell products on both their own website and on Amazon.com, Amazon.com does not permit syndication of its PRR between the two sites. GX70 (Amazon.com (Ahmed) Dep. 113:20-114:8) and Trial Tr. 1624:7-19 (Ahmed/Amazon.com).

303. Amazon also sells an eCommerce platform called Amazon Webstore. Although the Amazon Webstore eCommerce platform includes some PRR functionality, Bazaarvoice's Vice President of Product Strategy Erin Defossé dismissed Amazon as a competitor saying, "I have yet to run into a deal where Amazon is a direct competitor to our overall services in a deal where they are not already embedded. So, net net, I would not be concerned with them as a direct competitor" GX19; *see also* Trial Tr. 1150:16-1151:8 (Godfrey). In fact, they cooperate rather than compete: Amazon allows Bazaarvoice to sell the Express product to its Amazon Webstore eCommerce platform customers. GX20 at -649; Trial Tr. 550:22-551:11 (Defossé). *See generally supra* Section VI.D.(ii).

304. The PRR functionality available on Amazon Webstore is not the same as those on Amazon.com, as Amazon.com generally does not make available its features to the Amazon Webstore business unit. GX71 (Amazon Webstore (Sell) Dep. 21:17-20, 29:19-30:1) and Trial Tr. 1706:12-15, 1707:9-16 (Sell/Amazon Webstore). The PRR functionality available through the Amazon Webstore is only a subset of that on Amazon.com. GX71 (Amazon Webstore (Sell) Dep. 21:21-25) and Trial Tr. 1706:16-25 (Sell/Amazon Webstore). Similarly, the analytics features available on Amazon Webstore also do not leverage any of the analytics on Amazon.com and reviews submitted to retailers using the Amazon Webstore eCommerce platform cannot go through Amazon.com's moderation process. GX71 (Amazon Webstore). Amazon has no plans to improve the PRR functionality available via the Amazon Webstore eCommerce platform. GX71 (Amazon Webstore (Sell) Dep. 42:03-42:07) and Trial Tr. 1708:12-16 (Sell/Amazon Webstore).

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305. Amazon does not syndicate reviews between Amazon.com and retailers using the Amazon Webstore eCommerce platform. GX71 (Amazon Webstore (Sell) Dep. 40:21-41:12) and Trial Tr. 1707:20-1708:11 (Sell/Amazon Webstore). Furthermore, Bazaarvoice does not believe that Amazon will start to syndicate PRR to its Amazon Webstore eCommerce platform customers. GX672 at -846. It is also difficult to import or export ratings and reviews to or from a website using Amazon Webstore. A very limited amount of ratings and reviews content can be exported via an API, while importing ratings and reviews would require the manual resubmission of the reviews on the Amazon Webstore-run website. GX71 (Amazon Webstore (Sell) Dep. 41:13-42:1, 45:12-18, 45:21-46:12, 46:14-47:7).

(iii) Facebook

306. Bazaarvoice does not view Facebook as a competitor but rather "more a partner than a potential competitor." GX928 at -928; Trial Tr. 889:5-21 (Collins); *see also* GX655 at -916; GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 44:8-13). According to the Q&As drafted in preparation for Bazaarvoice's IPO roadshow, Bazaarvoice "view[s] Facebook as another channel for us to reach consumers; they are not competitive to our business model, we are actually very different and complementary." GX425 at -927, -928. Facebook told Bazaarvoice executives that it has "no plans to build out Reviews capabilities." GX509 at -869. Bazaarvoice represented to the SEC and potential investors that Facebook "do[es] not currently focus on our market." GX964 at 85; *see also* Trial Tr. 641:6-9 (Barton).

307. No Bazaarvoice brand customers have indicated an interest in abandoning
Bazaarvoice to rely on Facebook services. GX116 (Curtin 30(b)(6) Dep. 12:11-16).
Bazaarvoice's Vice President of Brands, Matt Curtin, also testified that he has not received any
requests from Bazaarvoice sales people for authority to provide a discount to Bazaarvoice
customers due to competition from Facebook. GX116 (Curtin 30(b)(6) Dep. 13:11-15).

308. In its interrogatory response, Bazaarvoice listed Facebook as a partner, *i.e.*, an
"organization[] with which Bazaarvoice is, at this time, strategically aligned and/or share
Bazaarvoice's commitment to pursuing innovative solutions that help businesses better engage
with customers." GX987 (Def.'s Resp. to Pl. Interrogs. 20 & 21 7:22-24, 8:4). More

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specifically, "Bazaarvoice offers a social commerce application for Facebook users that permits
shoppers visiting the product page of a client retailer to automatically send all of their product
reviews and other content to their personal page on Facebook.com." GX987 (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.
Interrogs. 20 & 21 11:12-15).

(iv) Google

309. Google is not a competitive constraint on Bazaarvoice and Bazaarvoice views Google as "more a partner than a potential competitor." GX928 at -928; Trial Tr. 889:5-21 (Collins); *see also* GX1133 at -569; GX511 at -570. Bazaarvoice Director Chris Pacitti testified that Google does "[n]ot today" "compete[] in any market which Bazaarvoice competes." GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 48:17-49:12); *see also* Trial Tr. 641:6-11 (Barton); Trial Tr. 695:18-696:11 (Osborne). According to the Q&As drafted in preparation for Bazaarvoice's IPO roadshow, Google is "not competitive to our business model, we are actually very different and complementary." GX425 at -927. Google does not offer PRR platforms to retailers. GX81 (Collins Dep. 253:22-25). Bazaarvoice represented to the SEC and potential investors that Google "do[es] not currently focus on our market." GX964 at 85. Bazaarvoice has developed a standardized integration with Google Analytics. GX987 (Def.'s Resp. to Pl. Interrogs. 20 & 21 8:24-26).

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(v) IBM, Oracle, and Salesforce.com

310. IBM is a partner of Bazaarvoice and Bazaarvoice does not believe that IBM is "motivated to come to our marketplace." GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 167:9-22). In fact, Bazaarvoice has an out-of-the-box integration/connector for its PRR platform with the IBM WebSphere Commerce eCommerce platform. GX987 (Def.'s Resp. to Pl. Interrogs. 20 & 21 9:2-3, 9:5). Bazaarvoice has also developed a standardized integration with IBM Coremetrics. GX987 (Def.'s Resp. to Pl. Interrogs. 20 & 21 8:24-25, 8:27).

311. Similarly, Oracle and Salesforce.com are partners of Bazaarvoice, not
competitors. Bazaarvoice has an out-of-the-box integration/connector for its PRR platform with
the Oracle Commerce (ATG) eCommerce platform. GX987 (Def.'s Resp. to Pl. Interrogs. 20 &

21 9:2-4). Bazaarvoice also has a solution that integrates with Oracle and Salesforce.com's CRM solutions. GX987 (Def.'s Resp. to Pl. Interrogs. 20 & 21 13:8-11, 13:13-14).

VII. BAZAARVOICE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT MERGER-SPECIFIC EFFICIENCIES WILL OVERCOME THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE MERGER

312. Bazaarvoice has not produced any verifiable evidence that the merger will result
in cognizable, merger-specific efficiencies that will be passed through to customers and will be
sufficient to offset the anticompetitive effects of the transaction. Trial Tr. 923:17-24 (Shapiro).
313. At trial, Bazaarvoice attempted to justify the merger in part as an attempt to better
compete in the online advertising space. Trial Tr. 271:9-12 (Hurt). Bazaarvoice has a
preexisting media product. Trial Tr. 683:9-11 (Barton). Bazaarvoice also made a separate
acquisition to expand in the advertising space. Trial Tr. 271:13-17 (Hurt). Bazaarvoice
executives testified that there was nothing preventing Bazaarvoice from selling advertising
products to PowerReviews clients absent the merger. Trial Tr. 271:18-272:1 (Hurt); Trial Tr.
882:16-19 (Collins); *cf.* Trial Tr. 684:5-19 (Barton).

A.

There is No Verifiable Evidence that the Merger will Lead to Lower Costs for Consumers of PRR Platforms

314. Bazaarvoice makes no claim that the merger reduces the marginal costs of providing its services. *See* GX871 (Def.'s Am. Resp. to Pl. Interrogs. 3,5,6, & 13 7:25-10:26);
GX494 (Godfrey 30(b)(6) Dep. 19:9-22, 47:13-17); GX1004. Bazaarvoice acknowledges that it expects only limited cost savings from the acquisition. GX494 (Godfrey 30(b)(6) Dep. 41:8-19). 315. Given its value-based pricing strategy (GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 103:10-16); *see also supra* Section II.A.(iii)), rather than passing the benefits through to customers, Bazaarvoice can be expected to charge them higher prices for any improvements in product quality. Trial Tr. 1002:4-13, 1021:20-24 (Shapiro); GX984* at 27.

B. There is No Verifiable Evidence That the Acquisition Will Lead to Cognizable Improvements in Bazaarvoice's Product Technology That Could Not Have Been Made Absent the Merger

316. There is insufficient evidence to support Bazaarvoice's claim that the merger has enabled it to launch "architectural improvements" in its technology. As an initial matter,

Bazaarvoice has ceased development of the PowerReviews platform other than ongoing
maintenance following the acquisition. GX81 (Collins Dep. 408:14-20). Furthermore, any
improvements to the Bazaarvoice platform or service could have been completed independently
without the transaction. Bazaarvoice was working on these improvements independently prior to
the merger and expected to implement them successfully. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 51:1453:9); *see also* GX81 (Collins Dep. 397:11-21); GX82 (Barton Dep. 243:15-24, 244:5-246:17);
GX519; Trial Tr. 1153:3-1154:9 (Godfrey).

317. Bazaarvoice has failed to quantify how much the merger reduced the cost or time of developing architectural improvements to its technology or the value of such improvements to consumers. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 51:14-53:9); GX494 (Godfrey 30(b)(6) Dep. 32:16-33:3, 33:13-34:5, 52:12-53:2).

C. There is no Verifiable Evidence that the Acquisition Has Led to Cognizable Improvements in Bazaarvoice's Ability to Provide Analytics to Customers

318. Bazaarvoice claims that the larger volume of data it will control post-merger will enable unspecified improvements in the company's "analytics" tools. Bazaarvoice acknowledges that it could have shared data with PowerReviews absent the merger and, in the future, Bazaarvoice "fully expect[s]" to share data sets with other online software providers to expand analytic power. GX83 (Collins 30(b)(6) Dep. 46:15-47:8).

319. There is no verifiable evidence that the combination of the Bazaarvoice and
PowerReviews analytics research and development efforts constitute a merger-specific benefit.
Both companies could have increased their efforts even without the merger (*see* GX83 (Collins 30(b)(6) Dep. 40:9-21)); therefore, any benefits from such combined efforts would be speculative.

320. Even if the acquisition did lead to a merger-specific improvement in
Bazaarvoice's analytics capabilities, Bazaarvoice reasonably can be expected to charge a price
commensurate with that greater capability, eliminating any net benefits to consumers. *See*GX984* at 27; GX83 (Collins 30(b)(6) Dep. 50:9-14, 50:17-51:7); GX117 (Parsons 30(b)(6)
Dep. 25:7-17).

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D. Bazaarvoice's Claim that it has "More Rigorous" Authentication and Moderation Standards for Legacy PowerReviews Customers is Not a Cognizable, Merger-Specific Efficiency

321. Prior to the merger, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews each employed different standards and procedures for moderating reviews and ensuring that review content was authentic. GX117 (Parsons 30(b)(6) Dep. 39:3-42:23). These different moderation practices were a point of competition between the two companies. Trial Tr. 112:4-17 (Hurt). After the merger, Bazaarvoice began using its own standards and procedures for most of the former PowerReviews customers. GX494 (Godfrey 30(b)(6) Dep. 42:16-19); GX117 (Parsons 30(b)(6) Dep. 51:15-52:18); GX1000.

322. Although Bazaarvoice characterizes its authentication and moderation standards and procedures as superior to those employed by PowerReviews, some former PowerReviews customers appear to have preferred the legacy PowerReviews system. GX117 (Parsons 30(b)(6) Dep. 51:15-52:18); *see also, e.g.*, GX1000; GX999; GX998. Bazaarvoice has not identified any former PowerReviews customers who complained about PowerReviews' moderation or authentication policies prior to the merger. GX117 (Parsons 30(b)(6) Dep. 43:19-44:9).

323. Even if Bazaarvoice's authentication and moderation practices were superior to PowerReviews' practices, only PowerReviews' own resource allocation decisions prevented it from implementing similar policies on its own prior to the transaction. GX117 (Parsons 30(b)(6) Dep. 44:24-46:8, 52:19-53:12). Moreover, pre-merger any customer that preferred the Bazaarvoice moderation and authentication system had a choice and could have selected Bazaarvoice as its PRR platform provider.

324. Prior to the merger, Bazaarvoice's per-review moderation costs were much higher than PowerReviews'. GX494 (Godfrey 30(b)(6) Dep. 42:16-45:3, 46:13-16); GX1003. As a result, over time customers are likely to be charged a higher price for Bazaarvoice's moderation services, reducing any net benefit to customers.

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E. There is No Verifiable Evidence That the Ability of Customers to Syndicate Content to a Larger Network is a Cognizable, Merger-Specific Efficiency

325. The ability to syndicate PRR content between PowerReviews and Bazaarvoice customers or "cross network syndication" is not a merger specific efficiency. Such syndication was feasible and was occurring for some customers prior to the merger. *See, e.g.*, GX493 (Parsons Dep. 82:20-83:13); GX117 (Parsons 30(b)(6) 34:9-35:4); GX4 at -460; GX699* at -311; GX276 at -765; *cf.* GX1009 (Curtin Dep. 49:8-19, 50:8-16); GX1119 (Godfrey Dep. 52:1-53:7). Bazaarvoice estimated that it would take a minimal amount of time to create a way to syndicate Bazaarvoice reviews to PowerReviews customers and vice-versa. GX6 at -577; GX27 at -376. To the extent it was not happening more it was because prior to the merger, Bazaarvoice deliberately worked to frustrate efforts to enable cross-network syndication with PowerReviews customers to prevent PowerReviews from offering free and open syndication of PRR to compete with Bazaarvoice. *See, e.g.*, GX711; *see also supra* Section IV.B.

326. As part of its "value-based" pricing strategy, Bazaarvoice considers, among other things, the volume of content and number of "nodes" a customer wishes to syndicate content to when setting each customer's individualized price. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 102:8-103:20); *cf*. GX1009 (Curtin Dep. 39:19-22, 105:20-106:21). Accordingly, any increase in syndication postmerger is not a cognizable, merger-specific efficiency because there is insufficient evidence to show that Bazaarvoice will pass through that benefit to customers instead of simply raising prices to customers by a commensurate amount. *See* Trial Tr. 1002:4-13, 1021:20-24 (Shapiro); GX984* at 27.

VIII. POWERREVIEWS' FINANCIAL CONDITION DOES NOT CREATE A DEFENSE

327. There is no evidence that PowerReviews was in dire financial straits or would have imminently exited the market. To the contrary, immediately prior to being acquired by Bazaarvoice, PowerReviews had achieved its highest quarterly sales in its history. GX643; GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 181:21-182:5); GX88 (Hossain Dep. 196:4-6, 196:9-18).

328. Prior to the acquisition, PowerReviews was becoming increasingly competitive and continued to compete aggressively with Bazaarvoice up until the time of the acquisition. GX89 (Hurt Dep. 360:19-361:14); *see also* GX1264 at -759 (PowerReviews' CEO received suggestions to a press release in April 2012 so that "the C-level at BV will now read this as PR very squarely coming after them"); GX419 at -484; GX89 (Hurt Dep. 377:14-378:16); GX1105 at -047. For example, less than two months prior to the merger, PowerReviews announced that it had "added more than 30 major brands to its roster." GX619 at -390.¹²

329. While Bazaarvoice paid PowerReviews' shareholders a premium for their shares, PowerReviews' former CEO, Ken Comée, testified that he is "confident in myself as a CEO, that I could have built even more value" for PowerReviews shareholders had the company remained independent. GX84 (Comée Dep. 201:17-20, 202:3-4) and Trial Tr. 1839:5-24 (Comée).

330. Bazaarvoice itself estimated that PowerReviews could continue operating up to 18 months before seeking any type of additional cash investment. GX87 (Godfrey CID Dep. 182:8-183:3). Bazaarvoice Director Chris Pacitti fully expected that PowerReviews "intended to continue competing with Bazaarvoice if the company were not to be acquired by Bazaarvoice."
GX492 (Pacitti Dep. 145:7-11).

331. If PowerReviews needed additional capital, there were a number of sources the company could have turned to for additional funding other than Bazaarvoice. GX83 (Collins 30(b)(6) Dep. 60:5-61:4). Additional funding alternatives for PowerReviews included the potential acquisition of PowerReviews by companies other than Bazaarvoice. GX83 (Collins 30(b)(6) Dep. 78:15-79:3). As Bazaarvoice co-founder Brett Hurt testified, "there's reasons why you might opt for growth rather than profitability." Trial Tr. 265:11-13 (Hurt).

¹² Even Defendant's economic expert admits that Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews "clearly would have continued to compete" absent the merger. Trial Tr. 1973:19-25, 2033:24-2034:3 (Shehadeh).

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