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- 1 - 09CV2002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The order included a typographic error identifying this as Rule 52(b) rather than 54(b).

with federal claims and therefore, for reasons of economy, clearly ought to be adjudicated now by this Court. In the end it might turn out that they are coextensive, but the Second Amended Complaint has pleaded them as having somewhat different parameters.<sup>2</sup> In any event, those claims are particular to only some of the member cases, and not to the member cases generally. It is not at all clear that this Court's adjudication of claims raised in some member cases but not others would be appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (providing for transfer of cases in order to promote the "just and efficient conduct of such actions" and for remand of cases or claims at any time after that); Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, § 20.133, pp. 225–26 (2004) (discussing issues to be considered when deciding whether claims should be remanded to transferor courts).

The Court rejects the suggestion that the state law claims are necessarily coextensive

Furthermore, Plaintiffs' filing of the notice of appeal divested this Court of jurisdiction over the matters appealed. *See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56, 58–59 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that filing of a notice of appeal divests district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal). Even if altering the judgment to expand the scope of the matters appealed would be helpful to the Ninth Circuit, as Defendants argue, that is now beyond this Court's power.<sup>3</sup>

There is therefore no need to hold a hearing on these issue. The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant Defendants' request now, and will not regain jurisdiction until after the ///

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Second Amended Complaint, in § 178, pleads a theory of recovery under California Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 *et seq.* without reference to Sherman Act. And in § 187, it seeks recovery under Mass. G.L. 93A c. 93A, § 2(b) on theories that would not be cognizable under the Sherman Act, such as merely attempting to fix prices, or exchanging competitive information through the trade association. Whether these claims ultimately succeed is a different question. But, accepting the facts and law as stated in the SAC, these claims might succeed even if the Sherman Act claim fails.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Defendants cite Ninth Circuit cases for the principle that a claim that is factully related to another claim cannot be certified for appeal under Rule 54(b) unless both are certified. But in the cases cited, once the appeal had been taken, the issue of whether the certification was proper was one for the Court of Appeals. See Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 883 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005) (reversing district court's Rule 54(b) certification). If, as Defendants argue, this Court erred in certifying only the Sherman Act claims for appeal, that is up to the Ninth Circuit to decide.

	Case 3:09-md-02121-LAB-DHB Document 207 Filed 09/18/12 Page 3 of 3
1	Ninth Circuit has completed its review of the Sherman Act claim, at which time Defendants'
2	request will be moot. The motion is <b>DENIED</b> .
3	IT IS SO ORDERED.
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5	DATED: September 17, 2012
6	Law A. Bum
7	HONORABLE LARRY ALAN Burns United States District Judge
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- 3 - 09CV2002