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16	UNITED STAT	ES DISTRICT COURT
17	NORTHERN DIS	FRICT OF CALIFORNIA
18	SAN FRAN	CISCO DIVISION
19 20	IN RE: TFT-LCD (FLAT PANEL) ANTITRUST LITIGATION	Case No. 3: 07-md-1827 SI MDL No. 1827 INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS'
21	This Document Relates To:	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT LG DISPLAY'S MOTION
22 23	ALL INDIRECT PURCHASER CLASS ACTIONS	FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON WITHDRAWAL
24		Date: September 23, 2011 Time: 9:00 a.m.
25		Dept.: Courtroom 10, 19 th Floor Judge: The Hon. Susan Illston
26		Judge. The Holl, busan histori
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28 MINAMI TAMAKI, LLP 360 Post Street, ⁴⁰ Floor San Francisco, CA 34108 Tel. (415) 788-3000 Fax (415) 398-33887	PLAINTIFFS' OPP TO DEFENDANT LG DISPI	LAY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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I. STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Whether on this record the Court should hold as a <u>matter of law</u> that LG Display
 withdrew from an admitted conspiracy after July 13, 2006, and ceased engaging in a contract,
 combination, and conspiracy to fix prices for TFT-LCD panels in violation of Section 1 of the
 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, and various state antitrust laws.

6 2. Whether withdrawal from a conspiracy may be accomplished when a defendant
7 does not give notice of withdrawal to the other co-conspirators and takes no affirmative acts to
8 disrupt the conspiracy or discontinue its participation.

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
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II. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The evidence adduced in this case overwhelmingly shows that movant LG Display, a self-11 confessed, convicted felon and price-fixer, combined and conspired, along with other defendants, 12 to fix, raise, and stabilize prices for TFT-LCD panels. (ECF No. 749-2, Dec. 8, 2008) (LG Display 13 Guilty Plea). As the guilty plea reflected, LG Display executives were present at price-fixing 14 meetings, exchanged information at those meetings, and otherwise entered into agreements to fix 15 prices for TFT-LCD panels. LG Display now moves for partial summary judgment finding that it 16 withdrew from this conspiracy in July, 2006, and that its liability for damages caused by the 17 conspiracy ends as of the date of its withdrawal. Neither the evidence nor the law supports such a 18 finding. 19

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1	can offer to dispute that it was not price-fixing after July, 2006, is unsupported and inadmissible
2	hearsay and speculation in the Bang Soo Lee Declaration, which opines that unidentified
3	individuals in "senior management" would not "permit" unidentified employees to reach
4	agreements at the price-fixing meetings that LG Display continued to attend after July 2006. Lee
5	Decl. ¶ 3. Significantly, the affidavit does not deny that LG Display employees continued to enter
6	into such illegal agreements. Under Rule 56, the Court of course cannot consider such
7	inadmissible evidence, and LG Display has therefore wholly failed to establish either the absence
8	of material issues of fact or its right to judgment as a matter of law.
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10	III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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24	With clear evidence that the conspiracy and its involvement continued, LG Display
25	implausibly argues that it did not engage in price-fixing after July, 2006. The sole evidentiary
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27	$\frac{1}{1}$ See Exhs. A-C. These exhibits reflect the decision to send lower level employees was made
MINAMI TAMAKI, LLP 360 Post Street, 8th Floor San Francisco, CA 94108	and implemented in mid 2005, and LG Display admits the meetings continued after July 13, 2006. -4-
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basis on which LG Display relies is a skeletal, vague, and conclusory declaration, which on its face
lacks any showing of first-hand knowledge, necessarily based on inadmissibly hearsay, and
concluding with impermissible speculation, from an officer in the "Business Support Center." See,
generally, Lee Decl.²

. Whatever he has to say about the conspiracy and LG Display's role in it both lacks 7 8 foundation and must be entirely hearsay. He also provides no foundation for his "opinion," which 9 is nothing more than sheer speculation and conjecture, that "senior management and legal counsel" 10 would not "permit" price-fixing. There is no statement in his declaration that his purported evidence and conclusions are based on first-hand knowledge and anything other than hearsay. Lee 11 Decl., ¶3. Finally, he does not deny that LG Display continued to enter into price-fixing 12 agreements after July, 2006. There is no other evidence before the Court to support LG Display's 13 motion. 14

Mr. Lee's unsupported speculation that unspecified "senior management" of LG Display would not "permit" price-fixing after July, 2006, is not only inadmissible, but also contradicted by the economic evidence in the record.

IV. ARGUMENT

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A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment may only be entered if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Further, the Court may grant summary judgment whenever "the pleadings, depositions,... and admissions on $\frac{27}{28}$ Plaintiffs have not deposed Mr. Lee but have asked LG Display to produce him for

² Plaintiffs have not deposed Mr. Lee but have asked LG Display to produce him for deposition. The parties are still negotiating.

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file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2).
Because summary judgment is a "drastic device," the moving party bears a "heavy burden" of
demonstrating the absence of any triable issue of material fact. *Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates*, 603 F.2d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 1979); *Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass'n*, *Inc.*, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999).

In determining whether summary judgment should be granted, the facts and inferences therefore must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Driscoll*, 603 F.3d at 753. A disputed material fact is not "genuine" unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the basis of deciding that fact in favor of the non-moving party. That is, the determination must be "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail is a matter of law." *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of "showing -- that is, pointing out to the District Court -- that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986).

Although it is not enough for the party opposing a properly supported Motion for Summary
Judgment to "rest on mere allegations or denial of his pleadings," all evidence, and all inference
that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. *Anderson, supra*, 477 U.S. at 256. If any genuine issue of material fact appears
to the trial court, it is not the function of the trial court to weigh evidence on that issue. Even if the
weight or believability of the evidence is clearly in favor of one party, the other party is entitled to
a trial by jury to determine the facts. *Id.*

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PLAINTIFFS' OPP TO DEFENDANT LG DISPLAY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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1 2 В.

IN ORDER TO WITHDRAW FROM A CONSPIRACY A CONSPIRATOR MUST NOTIFY THE OTHER CONSPIRATORS

It is well-established law that antitrust co-conspirators are gentle jointly and severally liable 3 for all damages caused by the conspiracy. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 4 5 U.S. 630, 646 (1981) ("[J]oint and several liability simply ensures that the plaintiffs will be able to recover the full amount of damages from some, if not all, participants."); William Inglis & Sons 6 Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1053 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 7 U.S. 825, 74 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1982). It is also well settled that "an accused conspirator's participation 8 in a criminal conspiracy is presumed to continue until all the objects of the conspiracy had been 9 accomplished or until the last overt act is committed by any of the conspirators." United States v. 10 Finestone 816 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1987), citing inter alia, Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 11 347, 369 (1912). A conspiracy is a partnership in crime, and each member of the conspiracy is 12 liable for the actions of their co-conspirators. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 13 U.S. 150, 253-54 (1940). As an admitted member of a price-fixing conspiracy, LG Display is 14 unquestionably jointly and severally liable for the actions of its co-conspirators. 15

Since Hyde, supra., 225 U.S. 347, the Supreme Court has set forth "rigorous
requirements" to show withdrawal from an illegal conspiracy. Thus, "the burden of establishing
withdrawal lies on the defendant." United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (7th Cir. 1964).

A leading modern case on withdrawal from an antitrust conspiracy is United States v. 19 United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). In that case, the Supreme Court considered, inter 20 alia, what constitutes withdrawal from a price-fixing conspiracy. The Court concluded, 21 "Affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner 22 reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to 23 establish withdrawal or abandonment." Id., 438 U.S. at 464-65 (emphasis added); accord, Marino 24 v. United States, 91 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1937) ("...a conspirator may avoid guilt by 25 withdrawing from the conspiracy prior to the commission of an overt act. In this connection, 26 however, affirmative action on the part of the accused is required, to show withdrawal from the 27 conspiracy, for a conspiracy once established is to presumed to continue until the contrary is

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established"); United States v Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642-43 (6th Cir. 1975) ("where a conspiracy
contemplates a continuity of purpose and a continued performance of acts, it is presumed to exist
until there has been an affirmative showing that it has terminated; and its members continue to be
conspirators until there has been an affirmative showing that they have withdrawn").

11 withdrawal from the conspiracy.

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12 LG Display cites a number of cases in support of the notion that because they spoke to the government, as a matter of law they must be free of civil liability. These cases do not so hold. In 13 14 Borelli, the Seventh Circuit considered the statute of limitations in the context of the withdrawal defense and reiterated the test that: "...until he does some act to disavow or defeat the purpose he 15 is in no situation to claim the delay of the law. Mere cessation activity is not enough to start the 16 running of the statute; there must be also be affirmative action either the making of a clean breast 17 to the authorities or... communication of the abandonment in a manner reasonably calculated to 18 reach co-conspirators." Borelli, 336 F.2d at 388. 19

United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1992), which Defendant also cites,
involved a mail fraud conviction where the Plainitff Government chose not to rebut a *prima face*showing of withdrawal. There was no private plaintiff in a civil case as there is here. In that case,
the standard of prove was beyond a reasonable boubt. While not factually similar, it is instructive
because it makes clear that withdrawl will not shield a defendant from liability from the inevitable
consequences of the actions the defendant took what was participating in the conspiracy. *Id.*, 976
F.2d at 1263. Further, the case makes clear that the issue of withdrawal is a factual matter.

Because withdrawal from a conspiracy is closely akin to withdrawal from a mail or wire fraud scheme, we begin with the withdrawal defense as it applies to a charge of conspiracy. To withdraw from a conspiracy a defendant must either disavow the unlawful goal of the conspiracy, affirmatively act to defeat the purpose of the -8-

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conspiracy, or take "'definite, decisive, and positive' steps to show that the [defendant's] disassociation from the conspiracy is sufficient." United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483, 1493 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Smith, 623 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1980)). The crime of conspiracy consists of two elements: the defendant's agreement to accomplish an illegal objective and an overt act on the part of some member of the conspiracy toward achieving that objective. Id. Withdrawal negates the element of agreement to the conspiracy's unlawful objective because it "marks [the] conspirator's disavowal or abandonment of the conspiratorial agreement."

United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1981).

Defendants also cite Krause v. Perryman, 827 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1987) but in that case, the 7 defendant had already withdrawn from the conspiracy prior to the events that cause the plaintiff's 8 injury. 827 F.2d at 351. Since the plaintiff did not disprove that the defendants had withdrawn Q prior to the injury, there was no tribal issue of fact and summary judgment was affirmed in favor of 10 the defendant. These facts are inapplicable here. The moving party also relies on another criminal 11 case outside the circuit, United States v. Greenfield, 44 F.3d 1141 (2d Cir. 1995) where the 12 defendant plotted with a longtime friend to use American Express cards fraudulently and building a 13 fraudulent ATM. The ATM scam was uncovered and the defendant Greenfield surrendered to 14 authorities soon thereafter. A third defendant, Lyons, was arrested later in all three defendants were 15 charged on an indictment concerning bank fraud. Lyons argued on appeal that the District Court's 16 sentencing calculations were in error and he should not have been held responsible for the value of 17 the equipment fraudulently obtained by co-conspirators and that the court should not have rejected 18 his withdrawal from the conspiracy. This Second Circuit case provides no assistance for the 19 defendants because siding with the Government, that Court held that the claim of withdrawal was 20 incorrect. (The Court did remand the case for factual consideration in connection with calculating 21 the sentence). More importantly, this case once again affirms that "cessation" --- which plaintiffs 22 here dispute even occurred — is not enough; the law generally requires the taking some 23 "affirmative action," citing Borelli, su pra., 336 F.2d at 388. In considering the reasons for this, the 24 Second Circuit explained that "affirmative evidence," including "the communication of the 25 abandonment in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators," is a critical component 26 that assures that the purported withdrawal is not being created ex post. 27

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Under the law, LG Display has failed to meet its summary judgment burden. LG Display admits that it did not tell any the co-conspirators LGDisplay did not even tell its own employees to stop exchanging information or participation in the conspiracy; they continued to attend the meetings. LG Display's pricing remained unchanged. *Netz Decl.* at ¶ 8. At the very least, there are issues of fact precluding partial summary judgment on the issue of LG Display's withdrawal.

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THE LEE DECLARATION IS INADMISSIBLE AND MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED IN SUPPORT OF LG'S MOTION

The declaration of Lee Declaration is the only evidence on which LG relies for its assertion 13 that, after July 13, 2006, it merely continued meeting with its co-conspirators but did not actually 14 reach any agreements. Lee Decl. at ¶ 3. This so-called evidence gets LG nowhere because it is 15 inadmissible. Mr. Lee has no foundation for his statements, and everything he avers is hearsay or 16 speculation. For these reasons Paragraph 3 of the Lee Declaration should be stricken from the 17 record and not considered on LG's motion. Radobenko v. Automated Equipment Corp., 520 F.2d 18 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1975) (precluding the use of "sham" affidavit testimony during summary 19 judgment). 20

"A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment." Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted). "At the summary judgment stage, [the court] do[es] not focus on the admissibility of the
evidence's form. [The court] instead focus[es] on the admissibility of its contents." Fraser v.
Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (finding contents of plaintiff's
diary admissible for summary judgment purposes, even though diary itself was inadmissible,
because the diary's contents were "mere recitations of events within [plaintiff's] personal

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Ex. A-C to the *Howard Decl.*; *Lee Decl.* at ¶¶ 1-2.

knowledge"). LG bears the burden of showing that Mr. Lee has first-hand knowledge of the
assertions in Paragraph three of the Lee Declaration. See Cermetek Inc. v. Butler Avpak, Inc., 573
F.2d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1978) (offering party must show that affiant is competent to testify about
matters in the declaration). LG cannot meet its burden.

Rule 56(c) sets out the requirements for declarations made in support of summary judgment:

An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on **personal knowledge**, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4) (emphasis added); accord. Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F.Supp.2d 1015,
1023 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ("[t]he matters must be known to the declarant personally, as
distinguished from matters of opinion or hearsay") (emphasis added).

It is plain from the Lee Declaration that Mr. Lee does not have personal knowledge of the 13 supposed facts in Paragraph 3. In fact, Mr. Lee asserts "knowledge," but not personal knowledge. 14 Lee Decl. at ¶ 1. Nowhere does he even attempt to show how he has the knowledge of the facts he 15 asserts. How does Mr. Lee know, for example, that LG "did not instruct its employees to stop 16 communications with competitors?" Id. at ¶ 3. How does he know that "senior management and 17 the legal department were then aware of both the earlier competitor communications and the DOJ 18 How does he know that "they would not permit any employees' investigation?" 19 Id. communication with a competitor to result in a price-fixing agreement by LG Display?" Id. 20 Presumably, Mr. Lee is not including himself among the unnamed "they." And his use of a third-21 person pronoun in this regard is telling. Clearly, Mr. Lee has no personal knowledge. 22

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Not only is it apparent that Mr. Lee does not have personal knowledge of the assertions in Paragraph 3, but it also appears from the Declaration that he does not know of any person with personal knowledge. He identifies no one at LG that purportedly made any of the decisions or took any of the actions he asserts. Instead, he "identifies" only "LG Display," "employees," and "senior management and the legal department." *Id.* Foundation is not laid by a third person's assertion that nameless, faceless other persons have personal knowledge.

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Since Mr. Lee has no personal knowledge of his assertions in Paragraph 3, he is either speculating (reinforcing his lack of foundation), or he was told the information by some other person or persons. If he was told the information, his statements are hearsay. "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Orr, 285 F.3d at 778 (citation and quotation omitted). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it is defined as non-hearsay by Rule 801(d) or meets a hearsay exception set out in Rules 803, 804, or 807. See Id. The ultimate issue where, as here, hearsay evidence is offered as a basis for summary judgment, is "whether the hearsay evidence offered [] is reliable." See Till v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 06-CV-1376-BR; 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50715, * 14 (D. Or. June 26, 2007), citing 2 McCormick On Evidence 253 (6th ed.) (other citation omitted).

Clearly, LG offers Paragraph 3 of the Lee Declaration for the truth of the matter asserted; namely that, even though its employees continued to communicate with its co-conspirators, LG did not fix any prices during those communications. It is equally clear that Mr. Lee has no personal knowledge of the matter asserted. He is regurgitating what he was told. This is rank hearsay. See, e.g., Stockdale v. Hartley, CV 09-236-RGK (PJW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94122, * 13-14 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2010) (witnesses' "account of what happened was based on what someone told them, rendering it rank hearsay and inadmissible"); Stowers v. Evans, CIV S-05-2067 MCE GGH P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38514, * 27 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2008) ("defense investigator[']s recitation of what [witness] supposedly said to him was rank hearsay ...").

Paragraph 3 of the Lee Declaration is inadmissible both in form and in substance. Mr. Lee lacks personal knowledge of the matters stated; and whatever he states is either hearsay or his own unsubstantiated speculation — all of which makes the declaration inadmissible. Because this paragraph is the only purported proof that LG did not fix prices after July 13, 2006, LG has no 25 admissible evidence of this asserted fact, and its motion for partial summary judgment must 26 therefore be denied.

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PLAINTIFFS' OPP TO DEFENDANT LG DISPLAY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-12-

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1	V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>
2	For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the Motion for Partial Summary
3	Judgment.
4	
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