GE-Electrolux merger analysis

Michael D. Whinston

November 23, 2015
Maytag/Whirlpool merger

- **Merger retrospectives:** Can be useful if
  - Comparable to current merger
  - There is a convincing control group that shows what would have happened if there had been no merger
    - (AKA a "natural experiment")
    - Requires an absence of confounding effects
  - Does not suffer from other empirical problems
Whirlpool-Maytag merger cannot be used as a “natural experiment”

Electrolux Annual Report 2014

Market demand for core appliances

Million units

50

40

30

98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14

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NO. 15-1039-EGS (D.D.C.)
Whirlpool-Maytag merger cannot be used as a “natural experiment”

New residential construction - housing units under construction: United States seasonally adjusted units (in thousands)

Orszag Study Period

Maytag/Whirlpool Merger Approval

PX02003 (Rebuttal expert report of Michael D. Whinston, October 20, 2015), Fig. 44
Merger analysis

Unilateral Effects
Coordinated Effects

Merger-Induced Price Increases

Efficiencies

Merger-Related Variable Cost Reductions
This merger

- This merger creates a very significant likelihood of price increases due to reduced competition

- Large increase in concentration

- Large degree of "internalization," leading to significant unilateral incentives to raise prices

- Increased risk of coordinated price increases, especially in the contract channel

- New entry or "repositioning" are unlikely to counteract these effects

- Claimed cost-savings are much too small to offset these effects
Agenda

- Important features of the major cooking appliance industry
- Market definition
- Competitive effects
- Other factors are unlikely to prevent this harm
- Recap of conclusions
Shares: overall markets

Pre-merger 2014 unit shares measures for range sales

- Samsung 26%
- LG 3%
- Whirlpool 26%
- Kenmore 11%
- Electrolux 23%
- GE 28%
- Other 2%

Other includes:
- Bosch 0.6%
- Crosley 0.4%
- Dacor 0.1%
- Danby 0.2%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.1%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.0%
- Sub-Zero 0.4%
- Viking 0.2%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 31

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November 23, 2015
Shares: overall markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for range sales

- Samsung 6%
- LG 3%
- Whirlpool 26%
- Kenmore 11%
- Electrolux 52%
- Other 2%

Other includes:
- Bosch 0.6%
- Crosley 0.4%
- Dacor 0.1%
- Danby 0.2%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.1%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.0%
- Sub-Zero 0.4%
- Viking 0.2%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 31
Shares: overall markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for range sales assigning Kenmore sales to Electrolux

- Samsung 6%
- LG 3%
- Whirlpool 26%
- Electrolux 62%
- Other 2%
- Other includes:
  - Bosch 0.6%
  - Crosley 0.4%
  - Dacor 0.1%
  - Danby 0.2%
  - Fisher & Paykel 0.1%
  - Haier 0.0%
  - Midea 0.0%
  - Miele 0.0%
  - Sub-Zero 0.4%
  - Viking 0.2%
Overview: important features of the major cooking appliance industry

Number of unique major cooking appliance SKUs sold in 2014 (excluding sales to Kenmore)

- **GE**: 585
  - Ranges: 137
  - Cooktops: 157
  - Wall ovens: 150

- **Electrolux**: 308
  - Ranges: 150
  - Cooktops: 137

- **Whirlpool**: 416
  - Ranges: 221
  - Cooktops: 214

- **Samsung**: 35
  - Ranges: 0
  - Cooktops: 0

- **LG**: 61
  - Ranges: 14
  - Cooktops: 6

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 2
Overview: important features of the major cooking appliance industry

Paths of product flows through sales channels

Manufacturers

CONTRACT

Distributors

Contract customers

Consumers

RETAIL

Stores

Consumers

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 15
Shares: contract-channel markets

Pre-merger 2014 unit shares for range sales

- GE 46%
- Whirlpool 31%
- Electrolux 18%
- Kenmore 4%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 0%
- Other 1%

Other includes:
- Bosch 0.3%
- Crosley 0.2%
- Dacor 0.0%
- Danby 0.1%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.0%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.0%
- Sub-Zero 0.2%
- Viking 0.1%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 35
Shares: contract-channel markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for range sales

- **Electrolux**: 64%
- **Whirlpool**: 31%
- **Kenmore**: 4%
- **Samsung**: 0%
- **LG**: 0%
- **Other**: 1%

Other includes:
- Bosch 0.3%
- Crosley 0.2%
- Dacor 0.0%
- Danby 0.1%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.0%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.0%
- Sub-Zero 0.2%
- Viking 0.1%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 35
Shares: **contract-channel markets**

**Post-merger 2014 unit shares for range sales assigning Kenmore sales to Electrolux**

- **Electrolux**: 68%
- **Whirlpool**: 31%
- **Other**: 1%
- **Samsung**: 0%
- **LG**: 0%
- **Other includes**:
  - Bosch 0.3%
  - Crosley 0.2%
  - Dacor 0.0%
  - Danby 0.1%
  - Fisher & Paykel 0.0%
  - Haier 0.0%
  - Midea 0.0%
  - Miele 0.0%
  - Sub-Zero 0.2%
  - Viking 0.1%

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PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 35

November 23, 2015

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Competitive effects: direct evidence of competition that will be eliminated

Percentage of competitor mentions on final quotes in GE SmartQuote data for 2014

(ranges)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brand</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>2,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whirlpool</td>
<td>1,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenmore</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosch</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsung</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 56
Competitive effects: direct evidence of competition that will be eliminated

Percentage of GE meet comp events for **ranges** in the **indirect** channel for 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brand</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whirlpool</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG and Samsung</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 54
Competitive effects: Electrolux has a competitive significance in the contract channel beyond its current share

Electrolux's historical unit shares of cooking in the contract channel among sales by GE, Whirlpool and Electrolux

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 62
Competitive effects: direct evidence of competition that will be eliminated

Percentage of GE meet comp events for ranges in the retail channel for 2014

- Whirlpool: 71%
- Electrolux: 22%
- LG and Samsung: 3%
- Other: 4%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 53
Agenda

- Important features of the major cooking appliance industry
- **Market definition**
- Competitive effects
- Other factors are unlikely to prevent this harm
- Recap of conclusions
Market definition: principles and methods

- **Goal of market definition:** Identify commerce potentially at risk for competitive harm

- **Method:** Identify products that are close substitutes in demand to those of the merging firms
  - If many customers would readily switch to other products, the merged firm will not be able to profitably raise prices

- **Market definition is a useful tool,** even if market boundaries are a bit blurry and/or hard to measure precisely
Market definition: principles and methods

- A starting point is to look at how the industry thinks about competition

- Markets can then be tested using the Hypothetical Monopolist Test:
  - An antitrust market is a group of products over which a hypothetical monopolist that controls the price of those products likely would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP)
  - Since a merger to monopoly of these products would lead to price increases, this identifies an area of potential harm were competition to be significantly reduced

- Then one conducts a “competitive effects” analysis to ask whether the merger likely to significantly lessen competition
Market definition: principles and methods

- "Price discrimination markets":
  
  - In some cases, firms are able to charge different ("targeted") prices to different groups of customers
    - They may wish to do so because of differing demand characteristics of those buyers
    - Sometimes a group can even be an individual buyer
  
  - In such cases, a merger could raise prices to some "targeted" buyers, even if it does not lead to price increase for other buyers
Market definition: conclusions

- **Markets identified using the hypothetical monopolist test:**
  - Ranges sold in the United States
  - Cooktops sold in the United States
  - Wall ovens sold in the United States
  - Ranges sold to contract-channel customers in the United States
  - Cooktops sold to contract-channel customers in the United States
  - Wall ovens sold to contract-channel customers in the United States
Markets for ranges, cooktops, and wall ovens

- How do we test whether a hypothetical monopolist would want to raise price?

- Monopolist faces a trade-off:
  - raising price earns additional profit on existing customers, but
  - may lose some customers on whom the monopolist is earning a profit

- Analyze how many customers would have to be lost to make the price increase unprofitable
Markets for ranges, cooktops, and wall ovens

Loss in sales required to make a 5% price increase unprofitable for the hypothetical monopolist

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ranges</td>
<td>13% - 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooktops</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall ovens</td>
<td>8% - 9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), ¶ 71 and footnote 147

- These are much larger than any plausible loss in sales from a 5% price increase
Contract-channel markets

Characteristics of the contract channel:

- Industry participants all recognize a distinct contract channel
  - Industry assets, investments, and organization reflect this
  - Different prices are charged to contract channel purchasers than to retail purchasers
Contract-channel markets

Characteristics of the contract channel:

- Appliances are delivered to final consumers by the contract customer as part of a bundle
  - e.g., an entire house or apartment
- Delivery performance is critical
- Service is key, both before and after the sale
- Many large contract channel customers want a supplier with a full line of appliances and price points
- A contract customer (e.g., single or multi-family builder) can more easily focus on one or two manufacturers than can a retailer who wants to build traffic in his/her store
- Some contract customers desire direct contracting with the manufacturer
Contract-channel markets for ranges, cooktops, and wall ovens

- Contract-channel customers are at risk for post-merger 5% price increase, even if retail prices are unaffected, because:
  - They value distributor / manufacturer services not available through retail channel
  - Many are receiving much more than a 5% discount relative to retail
  - Would have better pricing in contract channel even after a 5% price increase
Contract-channel markets for ranges, cooktops, and wall ovens

Fraction of GE direct contract-channel **range** sales for which the lowest average weekly retail price (Best Buy, Lowe's, or The Home Depot) in the same week exceeds the direct-contract price by various percentages (2014)

PX02004 (Supplemental expert report of Michael D. Whinston, November 7, 2015), Fig. 34
Agenda

- Overview: important features of the major cooking appliance industry
- Market definition
- **Competitive effects**
- Other factors are unlikely to prevent this harm
- Recap of conclusions
Shares and concentration

- Concentration is usually measured by the "Herfindahl-Hirschman Index" (HHI)
  - $\text{HHI} = \text{sum of squared market shares}$
  - Examples:
    - Monopoly: $\text{HHI} = 10,000$
    - Two equal-sized firms: $\text{HHI} = 5,000$
    - Four equal-sized firms: $\text{HHI} = 2,500$
    - Many very small firms: $\text{HHI}$ is close to 0
Shares and concentration

- *Merger Guidelines* define various presumptions based on

  - the *post-merger HHI* and
  - the *change in the HHI*

- Presumption of enhanced market power if:
  - *Post-merger HHI* > 2500 and
  - *HHI change* > 200

- Mergers that greatly increase the concentration in already concentrated industries are likely to lead to higher prices
## 2014 unit shares for cooking appliance sales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brand</th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
<th>All cooking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenmore</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whirlpool</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsung</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosch</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crosley</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dacor</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danby</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher &amp; Paykel</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haier</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midea</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miele</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Zero</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viking</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE and Electrolux</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE, Electrolux, and Kenmore</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units sold</td>
<td>6.379 million</td>
<td>729 thousand</td>
<td>705 thousand</td>
<td>7.814 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollars sold</td>
<td>$3.666 billion</td>
<td>$533 million</td>
<td>$1.005 billion</td>
<td>$5.204 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 29, 30, and 31
### 2014 concentration measures for cooking appliance sales (units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
<th>All cooking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-merger HHI</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>2,413</td>
<td>2,449</td>
<td>2,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-merger HHI</td>
<td>3,506</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>3,056</td>
<td>3,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in HHI (delta HHI)</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>1,171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 31, and 44

November 23, 2015

CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CASE NO. 15-1039-EGS (D.D.C.)
# 2014 concentration measures for cooking appliance sales (units)

with Kenmore treated as Electrolux

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
<th>All cooking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-merger HHI</td>
<td>2,698</td>
<td>2,573</td>
<td>2,690</td>
<td>2,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-merger HHI</td>
<td>4,625</td>
<td>3,501</td>
<td>3,785</td>
<td>4,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in HHI (delta HHI)</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>1,745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why these measures understate the likelihood of competitive harm

- HHI measures treat all firms as if they are equally close competitors to the merging firms

- In the markets for ranges, cooktops, and wall ovens, all firms are not equally close competitors to the merging firms:
  - Only three firms have a significant contract channel presence
  - Much of Electrolux, GE, and Whirlpool's sales occur at lower price points than for the other firms in the market, such as LG and Samsung
Why these measures understate the likelihood of competitive harm

Pre-merger 2014 unit shares for overall range sales

- Samsung 6%
- LG 3%
- Whirlpool 26%
- Electrolux 23%
- Kenmore 11%
- Other 2%

Other includes:
- Bosch 0.6%
- Crosley 0.4%
- Dacor 0.1%
- Danby 0.2%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.1%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.0%
- Sub-Zero 0.4%
- Viking 0.2%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 31
Why these measures understate the likelihood of competitive harm

Pre-merger 2014 unit shares for range sales in the bottom two quintiles (net wholesale prices below $365)

- Samsung 28%
- GE 32%
- Whirlpool 28%
- Electrolux 24%
- Kenmore 16%
- LG 0%
- Other 2%

Other includes:
- Bosch 0.0%
- Crosley 1.0%
- Dacor 0.0%
- Danby 0.5%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.0%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.0%
- Sub-Zero 0.0%
- Viking 0.0%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 39
Why these measures understate the likelihood of competitive harm

**Post-merger 2014 unit shares for range sales in the bottom two quintiles (net wholesale prices below $365)**

- Samsung: 1%
- LG: 0%
- Whirlpool: 28%
- Kenmore: 16%
- Electrolux: 55%
- Other 2%
- Other includes:
  - Bosch 0.0%
  - Crosley 1.0%
  - Dacor 0.0%
  - Danby 0.5%
  - Fisher & Paykel 0.0%
  - Haier 0.0%
  - Midea 0.0%
  - Miele 0.0%
  - Sub-Zero 0.0%
  - Viking 0.0%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 39
Why these measures understate the likelihood of competitive harm

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for range sales in the bottom two quintiles (net wholesale prices below $365) assigning Kenmore sales to Electrolux

- Samsung 1%
- LG 0%
- Whirlpool 28%
- Electrolux 71%
- Other 2%
  - Other includes:
    - Bosch 0.0%
    - Crosley 1.0%
    - Dacor 0.0%
    - Danby 0.5%
    - Fisher & Paykel 0.0%
    - Haier 0.0%
    - Midea 0.0%
    - Miele 0.0%
    - Sub-Zero 0.0%
    - Viking 0.0%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 39
## 2014 unit shares for cooking appliance sales in the contract channel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
<th>All cooking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenmore</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whirlpool</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsung</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosch</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crosley</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dacor</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danby</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher &amp; Paykel</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haier</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midea</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miele</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Zero</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viking</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE and Electrolux</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE, Electrolux, and Kenmore</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Units sold</th>
<th>Dollars sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.594 million</td>
<td>$777 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>223 thousand</td>
<td>$149 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>232 thousand</td>
<td>$287 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.050 million</td>
<td>$1.213 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2014 concentration measures for cooking appliance sales in the contract channel (units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
<th>All cooking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-merger HHI</td>
<td>3,387</td>
<td>3,428</td>
<td>3,433</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-merger HHI</td>
<td>5,016</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>4,167</td>
<td>4,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in HHI (delta HHI)</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>1,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 35 and 46

November 23, 2015

CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CASE NO. 15-1039-EGS (D.D.C.)
2014 concentration measures for cooking appliance sales in the contract channel (units)

with Kenmore treated as Electrolux

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
<th>All cooking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-merger HHI</td>
<td>3,541</td>
<td>3,474</td>
<td>3,492</td>
<td>3,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-merger HHI</td>
<td>5,570</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>5,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in HHI (delta HHI)</td>
<td>2,029</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>1,771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Electrolux has a competitive significance beyond its current share

Percentage of competitor mentions on final quotes in GE SmartQuote data for 2014 (ranges)

- Electrolux: 2,622
- Whirlpool: 1,995
- Other: 332
- Kenmore: 290
- Bosch: 21
- LG: 8
- Samsung: 3

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 56
Competitive effects: direct evidence of competition that will be eliminated

- **GE SmartQuote data** record the full history of price revisions for each quoting opportunity and the primary competitor

- Revisions that lowered price (with no revision of quantity) **named Electrolux as the main competitor 45% of the time**
  - Whirlpool was named 42% of the time

- On average, those quote revisions listing Electrolux **reduced price 7% for ranges, 15% for cooktops, and 12% for wall ovens**
Competitive effects: incentives to raise price

- One can measure the incentive to raise price by calculating "upward pricing pressure" (UPP)

- A standard tool used by economists and recognized in the *Horizontal Merger Guidelines*
Competitive effects: incentives to raise price

Where Does the UPP Formula Come From? (cont)

- Intellectual underpinnings go back a long way.
- Willig (1991) included the basic concept
- Shapiro, as chief economist at the DOJ, extended the idea in 1995
- Shapiro and Farrell as academics provided more intellectual heft to UPP idea
- Shapiro and Farrell as Chief Economists at DOJ/FTC, respectively, introduced idea into Guidelines
Pre-merger effects of a price increase for GE ranges

GE price increase causes some customers to switch to other brands. Sales lost to GE's competitors reduce profitability of the price increase.
Pre-merger effects of a price increase for GE ranges.

GE price increase causes some customers to switch to other brands. Sales lost to GE’s competitors reduce profitability of the price increase.
Post-merger effects of a price increase for GE ranges

The same GE price increase becomes profitable after the merger, because some of GE's loss is a gain for Electrolux. ("Internalization")
Post-merger effects of a price increase for GE ranges

The same GE price increase becomes profitable after the merger, because some of GE's loss is a gain for Electrolux. ("Internalization")
Post-merger effects of a price increase for GE ranges

The merged firm also profits from GE sales diverted to Kenmore
Post-merger effects of a price increase for GE ranges

Upward Pricing Pressure for GE brand =
[sales diverted to Electrolux and Kenmore] x [margin on those sales]
Competitive effects: unilateral incentives to raise price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Means that the merger must lead to a 16% reduction in marginal cost to prevent there being a unilateral incentive to raise Electrolux range prices after the merger.

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 50
Competitive effects: unilateral incentives to raise price

**UPP as a percentage of cost in the overall markets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- These UPPs likely under-estimate true upward pricing pressure
- Claimed variable cost efficiencies for cooking are only 3.25%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 50
Competitive effects: unilateral incentives to raise price

**UPP as a percentage of cost in the contract channel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- These UPPs likely under-estimate true upward pricing pressure
- Claimed variable cost efficiencies for cooking are only 3.25%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 51
## Predicted price increases implied by UPP

### Unilateral price increases implied by UPP, assuming various demand functions, using a first-order approximation (lower bounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>5% to 10%</td>
<td>11% to 21%</td>
<td>7% to 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>6% to 11%</td>
<td>3% to 5%</td>
<td>4% to 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 60
Predicted price increases for the contract channel implied by UPP

Unilateral price increases for the contract channel implied by UPP, assuming various demand functions, using a first-order approximation (lower bounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>8% to 16%</td>
<td>12% to 25%</td>
<td>9% to 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>5% to 11%</td>
<td>3% to 6%</td>
<td>3% to 7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 61
Agenda

- Important features of the major cooking appliance industry
- Market definition
- Competitive effects
- Other factors are unlikely to prevent this harm
- Recap of conclusions
REDACTED
REDACTED
Growth by LG and Samsung is unlikely to prevent post-merger price increases

- Even if Samsung and LG (or other rivals) grow twice as fast over the next 4 years as in 2010–2014, there would still be a large incentive to exercise a unilateral price increase

UPP as a percentage of cost based on all unit sales, increasing Samsung and LG’s joint share by 10.4 percentage points in each market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Agenda

- Important features of the major cooking appliance industry
- Market definition
- Competitive effects
- Other factors are unlikely to prevent this harm
- Recap of conclusions
Recap of conclusions

- This merger creates a very significant likelihood of price increases due to reduced competition
  - Large increase in concentration
  - Large degree of "internalization," leading to significant unilateral incentives to raise prices
  - Increased risk of coordinated price increases, especially in the contract channel
  - New entry or "repositioning" are unlikely to counteract these effects
  - Claimed cost-savings are much too small to offset these effects
GE-Electrolux merger analysis
Michael D. Whinston
November 23, 2015
Appendix A
Cooktop and wall oven figures
REDACTED
Shares: overall markets

Pre-merger 2014 unit shares for cooktop sales

- Whirlpool: 39%
- GE: 25%
- Bosch: 10%
- Electrolux: 11%
- Kenmore: 7%
- Samsung: 0%
- LG: 1%
- Other 7%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 1.2%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.5%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.7%
- Sub-Zero 3.6%
- Viking 1.2%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 31
Shares: overall markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for cooktop sales

- Electrolux 37%
- Whirlpool 39%
- Kenmore 7%
- Bosch 10%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 1%

Other 7%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 1.2%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.5%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.7%
- Sub-Zero 3.6%
- Viking 1.2%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 31
Shares: overall markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for cooktop sales assigning Kenmore sales to Electrolux

Electrolux 44%

Whirlpool 39%

Bosch 10%

Samsung 0%

LG 1%

Other 7%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 1.2%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.5%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.7%
- Sub-Zero 3.6%
- Viking 1.2%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 33
Shares: overall markets

Pre-merger 2014 unit shares for wall oven sales

- Bosch 7%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 1%
- GE 25%
- Electrolux 12%
- Whirlpool 39%
- Kenmore 10%
- Other 6%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 0.7%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.2%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 1.5%
- Sub-Zero 3.1%
- Viking 0.8%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Fig. 31
Shares: overall markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for wall oven sales

- Bosch 7%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 1%
- Whirlpool 39%
- Kenmore 10%
- Electrolux 37%
- Other 6%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 0.7%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.2%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 1.5%
- Sub-Zero 3.1%
- Viking 0.8%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 31
Shares: overall markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for wall oven sales assigning Kenmore sales to Electrolux

- Bosch 7%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 1%
- Other 6%
- Electrolux 47%
- Whirlpool 39%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 0.7%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.2%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 1.5%
- Sub-Zero 3.1%
- Viking 0.8%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 33

November 23, 2015
CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CASE
NO. 15-1039-EGS (D.D.C.)
Shares: contract-channel markets

Pre-merger 2014 unit shares for cooktop sales

- GE 41%
- Whirlpool 41%
- Bosch 3%
- Other 3%
- Galley 2%
- Electrolux 10%
- LG 0%
- Samsung 0%
- Kenmore 2%
- Other includes:
  - Crosley 0.0%
  - Dacor 0.3%
  - Danby 0.0%
  - Fisher & Paykel 0.1%
  - Haier 0.0%
  - Midea 0.0%
  - Miele 0.6%
  - Sub-Zero 1.6%
  - Viking 0.6%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 35
Shares: contract-channel markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for cooktop sales

- Electrolux: 51%
- Whirlpool: 41%
- Kenmore: 2%
- Bosch: 3%
- Samsung: 0%
- LG: 0%
- Other: 3%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 0.3%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.1%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.6%
- Sub-Zero 1.6%
- Viking 0.6%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 35

November 23, 2015
CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CASE NO. 15-1039-EGS (D.D.C.)
Shares: contract-channel markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for cooktop sales assigning Kenmore sales to Electrolux

- Electrolux: 53%
- Whirlpool: 41%
- Samsung: 0%
- LG: 0%
- Bosch: 3%
- Other: 3%

Other includes:
- Crosley: 0.0%
- Dacor: 0.3%
- Danby: 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel: 0.1%
- Haier: 0.0%
- Midea: 0.0%
- Miele: 0.6%
- Sub-Zero: 1.6%
- Viking: 0.6%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 35

CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CASE
NO. 15-1039-EGS (D.D.C.)

November 23, 2015
Shares: contract-channel markets

Pre-merger 2014 unit shares for wall oven sales

- GE 37%
- Whirlpool 44%
- Electrolux 10%
- Kenmore 3%
- Bosch 3%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 0%
- Other 3%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 0.2%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.1%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 1.0%
- Sub-Zero 1.3%
- Viking 0.3%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 35
Shares: contract-channel markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for wall oven sales

- Electrolux: 47%
- Whirlpool: 44%
- Other: 3%
- Samsung: 0%
- LG: 0%
- Bosch: 3%
- Kenmore: 3%
- Other includes:
  - Crosley: 0.0%
  - Dacor: 0.2%
  - Danby: 0.0%
  - Fisher & Paykel: 0.1%
  - Haier: 0.0%
  - Midea: 0.0%
  - Miele: 1.0%
  - Sub-Zero: 1.3%
  - Viking: 0.3%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 35

November 23, 2015

CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CASE NO. 15-1039-EGS (D.D.C.)
Shares: contract-channel markets

Post-merger 2014 unit shares for wall oven sales assigning Kenmore sales to Electrolux

- Bosch 3%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 0%
- Whirlpool 44%
- Electrolux 50%
- Other 3%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 0.2%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.1%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 1.0%
- Sub-Zero 1.3%
- Viking 0.3%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, as revised in October 20, 2015 rebuttal expert report appendix), Figs. 35
Why these measures understate the likelihood of competitive harm

2014 unit shares for cooktop sales in the bottom two quintiles (net wholesale prices below $392)

- Bosch 1%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 0%
- GE 20%
- Electrolux 19%
- Kenmore 12%
- Other 0%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 0.0%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.0%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.0%
- Sub-Zero 0.0%
- Viking 0.0%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 39
Why these measures understate the likelihood of competitive harm

2014 unit shares for wall oven sales in the bottom two quintiles (net wholesale prices below $873)

- Bosch 0%
- Samsung 0%
- LG 0%
- Whirlpool 38%
- GE 26%
- Electrolux 17%
- Kenmore 19%
- Other 0%

Other includes:
- Crosley 0.0%
- Dacor 0.0%
- Danby 0.0%
- Fisher & Paykel 0.0%
- Haier 0.0%
- Midea 0.0%
- Miele 0.0%
- Sub-Zero 0.0%
- Viking 0.0%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 39
Competitive effects: direct evidence of competition that will be eliminated

Percentage of competitor mentions on final quotes in GE SmartQuote data for 2014 (cooktops)

- Whirlpool: 400
- Electrolux: 265
- Other: 70
- Kenmore: 25
- Bosch: 20
- LG: 3
- Samsung: 0

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 58
Competitive effects: direct evidence of competition that will be eliminated

Percentage of competitor mentions on final quotes in GE SmartQuote data for 2014 (wall ovens)

- Whirlpool: 382
- Electrolux: 259
- Other: 51
- Bosch: 20
- Kenmore: 20
- Samsung: 0
- LG: 0

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 57
Competitive effects: direct evidence of competition that will be eliminated

Percentage of GE meet comp events in the retail channel for 2014

- **Ranges**: 71% (Whirlpool), 22% (Electrolux), 3% (LG and Samsung), 4% (Other)
- **Cooktops**: 79% (Whirlpool), 19% (Electrolux), 0% (LG and Samsung), 2% (Other)
- **Wall ovens**: 80% (Whirlpool), 20% (Electrolux), 0% (LG and Samsung), 0% (Other)

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 53
Competitive effects: direct evidence of competition that will be eliminated

Percentage of GE meet comp events in the **indirect** contract channel for 2014

- **Ranges**: Whirlpool 39%, Electrolux 54%
- **Cooktops**: Whirlpool 43%, Electrolux 52%
- **Wall ovens**: Whirlpool 37%, Electrolux 58%

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 54
REDACTED
Appendix B

Additional figures
Figure 16, initial report

Unit share of purchases by sales channel for cooktops, wall ovens, and ranges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Retail</th>
<th>Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooktops</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall ovens</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranges</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cooking</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
Figure 52, initial report

**UPP as a percentage of cost based on retail and indirect contract-channel unit sales**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux—retail</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE—retail</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrolux—indirect contract</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE—indirect contract</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 59, initial report

**UPP for GE based on 2014 SmartQuote data for the contract channel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GE—diversions based on share of mentions</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE—diversions based on share of quantity</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 59
Figure 55, initial report

UPP for GE based on GE meet comp events in the retail and indirect contract channels for 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ranges</th>
<th>Cooktops</th>
<th>Wall ovens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GE—retail</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE—indirect contract</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 55
Figure 41, initial report

LG and Samsung unit share of overall range sales by wholesale price quintile in 2014 (based on sales of GE, Electrolux, Whirlpool, LG, and Samsung)

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 41
Figure 42, initial report

LG and Samsung unit share of overall **cooktop** sales by wholesale price quintile in 2014 (based on sales of GE, Electrolux, Whirlpool, LG, and Samsung)

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 42
Figure 43, initial report

LG and Samsung unit share of wall oven sales by wholesale price quintile in 2014 (based on sales of GE, Electrolux, Whirlpool, LG, and Samsung)

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 43
Figure 64, Initial Report

LG and Samsung unit share of retail range sales by wholesale price quintile 2010–2014 (based on sales of GE, Electrolux, Whirlpool, LG, and Samsung only)

PX02002 (Initial expert report of Michael D. Whinston, September 30, 2015), Fig. 64
Contract-channel markets for ranges, cooktops, and wall ovens

Fraction of Electrolux direct contract-channel range sales for which the lowest average weekly retail price (Best Buy, Lowe's, or The Home Depot) in the same week exceeds the direct-contract price by various percentages (2014)

PX02004 (Supplemental expert report of Michael D. Whinston, November 7, 2015), Fig. 34
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