

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.
467 U.S. 752 (1984)

*Facts:*¹ In 1972, Copperweld purchased the Regal division from Lear Siegler. Regal manufactured steel tubing for use in heavy equipment, cargo vehicles, and construction. The sale agreement between Copperweld and Lear Siegler contained a noncompetition provision that prevented Lear Siegler, or any subsidiary it controlled, from competing with Regal anywhere in the United States for a period of five years. After the sale, Copperweld transferred all Regal's assets to Regal Tube Company, a newly formed Pennsylvania corporation wholly owned by Copperweld.

At the time of the sale, David Grohne, a former president of Regal and then-currently Lear Siegler's corporate secretary, was actively pursuing establishing his own steel tubing business. In May 1972, he incorporated Independence Tube and sought bids to build a tubing mill, and in December 1972 gave Yoder Company a purchase order for the delivery of the mill by the end of December 1973.

When Copperweld learned of Grohne's plans, it thought that the noncompetition covenant it had with Lear Siegler would prevent Grohne, and through him Independence, from building a mill that would compete with Regal. Copperweld's attorney, however, advised that it did not, though he thought it might be possible to obtain an injunction against Grohne's activities if and when he made use of any of the "know-how, technical information, designs, plans, drawings, trade secrets or inventions of Regal," all of which Copperweld had purchased from Lear Siegler. Notwithstanding this advice, on February 19, 1973, Copperweld sent Yoder a letter (drafted by counsel) stating that Copperweld both was "greatly concerned if (Grohne) contemplates entering the structural tube market . . . in competition with Regal Tube" and vowed to take "any and all steps which are necessary to protect our rights under the terms of our purchase agreement and to protect the know-how, trade secrets, etc., which we purchased from Lear Siegler." Upon receiving the letter, Yoder voided its acceptance of the Independence purchase order. When Independence could not convince Yoder to build the new mill, Independence contracted with Abbey Etna Machine Company. Although Abbey Etna had also received one of Copperweld's warning letters, it nonetheless built the mill, which commenced operations on September 1974—nine months later than the original Yoder December 1973 completion date.

In 1976, Independence filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois against Copperweld, Regal and Yoder.² On special interrogatories, the jury found that

¹ The description of the facts is taken from the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court opinions. *See Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp.*, 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), *rev'd*, 467 U.S. 752 (1984).

² Phillip H. Smith, Copperweld's Chief Executive Officer, was also named as a defendant, but Independence dismissed him from the case before the trial. [Why would Independence drop Smith from the case?]

Copperweld and Regal (but not Yoder) had conspired to restrain trade in the market for steel structural tubing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and that Copperweld induced Yoder to breach a contract with Independence. The jury also found that Regal (but not Copperweld) slandered Independence and wrongfully interfered with the business relationships of Independence and one of its customers. In the damages phase, the court instructed the jury that the damages for the Section 1 violation and for the inducement of the Yoder contract breach should be identical and therefore should not be double-counted. The jury assessed actual damages of \$2,499,009 against Copperweld and Regal jointly and severally for the antitrust and inducement violation, which the court trebled to \$7,497,027.

In sustaining the jury verdict, the Seventh Circuit questioned the wisdom of holding that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary—the only parties the jury found to have conspired—had the legal capacity to conspire with one another when a parent corporation and its unincorporated division (as Regal had been when owned by Lear Siegler) would have lacked the capacity. Even so, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent the court of appeals held that the capacity to conspire existed “when there is enough separation between the two entities to make treating them as two independent actors sensible.” 691 F.2d at 318. The court also held that the jury instructions properly took account of the factors for determining how much separation Copperweld and Regal in fact maintained in the conduct of their respective businesses and that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Regal was more like a separate corporate entity than a mere service arm of the parent.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally capable of conspiring with each other under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

...

III

Petitioners, joined by the United States as *amicus curiae*, urge us to repudiate the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.¹² The central criticism is that the doctrine gives undue significance to the fact that a subsidiary is separately incorporated and thereby treats as the concerted activity of two entities what is really unilateral behavior flowing from decisions of a single enterprise.

We limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the

¹² The doctrine has long been criticized. [Citations omitted]

Sherman Act. We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.

A

The Sherman Act contains a “basic distinction between concerted and independent action.” *Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.*, 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization.¹³ It is not enough that a single firm appears to “restrain trade” unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own ability to compete may suffer as a result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster.¹⁴ In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” between *separate* entities. It does not reach conduct that is “wholly unilateral.” *Albrecht v. Herald Co.*, 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); accord, *Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Corp.*, *supra*, at 761. Concerted activity subject to § 1 is judged more sternly than unilateral activity under § 2. Certain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are thought so inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal *per se* without inquiry into the harm it has actually caused. See generally *Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States*, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Other combinations, such as mergers, joint ventures, and various vertical agreements, hold the promise of increasing a firm’s efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such combinations are judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and market structure designed to assess the combination’s actual effect. See, e.g., *Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.*, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); *Chicago Board of Trade v. United States*, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Whatever form the inquiry takes, however, it is not necessary to prove that concerted activity threatens monopolization.

The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of

¹³ [Omitted]

¹⁴ For example, the Court has declared that § 2 does not forbid market power to be acquired “as a consequence of a superior product, [or] business acumen.” *United States v. Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). We have also made clear that the “antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’” *Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.*, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (damages for violation of Clayton Act § 7) (quoting *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).

decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such mergings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.

B

The distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct is necessary for a proper understanding of the terms “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” in § 1. Nothing in the literal meaning of those terms excludes coordinated conduct among officers or employees of the *same* company. But it is perfectly plain that an internal “agreement” to implement a single, unitary firm’s policies does not raise the antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to police. The officers of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals. Coordination within a firm is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort to stifle competition. In the marketplace, such coordination may be necessary if a business enterprise is to compete effectively. For these reasons, officers or employees of the same firm do not provide the plurality of actors imperative for a § 1 conspiracy.¹⁵

Nothing in the language of the Sherman Act is inconsistent with the view that corporations cannot conspire with their own officers. It is true that a “person” under the Act includes both an individual and a corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 7. But § 1 does not declare every combination between two “persons” to be illegal. Instead it makes liable every “person” engaging in a combination or conspiracy “hereby declared to be illegal.” As we note, the principles governing § 1 liability plainly exclude from unlawful combinations or conspiracies the activities of a single firm.

There is also general agreement that § 1 is not violated by the internally coordinated conduct of a corporation and one of its unincorporated divisions.¹⁶ Although this Court has not previously addressed the question,¹⁷ there can be little doubt that the operations of a corporate enterprise organized into divisions must be judged as the conduct of a single actor. The existence of an unincorporated division reflects no more than a firm’s decision to adopt an organizational division of labor. A division within a corporate structure pursues the common interests of the whole rather than interests separate from those of the corporation itself; a business enterprise establishes divisions to further its own interests in the most efficient manner. Because coordination between a corporation and its division does not

¹⁵ [Omitted]

¹⁶ [Omitted]

¹⁷ [Omitted]

represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of economic power previously pursuing separate interests, it is not an activity that warrants § 1 scrutiny.

Indeed, a rule that punished coordinated conduct simply because a corporation delegated certain responsibilities to autonomous units might well discourage corporations from creating divisions with their presumed benefits. This would serve no useful antitrust purpose but could well deprive consumers of the efficiencies that decentralized management may bring.

C

For similar reasons, the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver. With or without a formal “agreement,” the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder. If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do “agree” to a course of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.

Indeed, the very notion of an “agreement” in Sherman Act terms between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning. A § 1 agreement may be found when “the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement.” *American Tobacco Co. v. United States*, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946). But in reality a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary *always* have a “unity of purpose or a common design.” They share a common purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent’s best interests.¹⁸

The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine looks to the form of an enterprise’s structure and ignores the reality. Antitrust liability should not depend on whether a corporate subunit is organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly owned subsidiary. A corporation has complete power to maintain a wholly owned subsidiary in either form. The economic, legal, or other considerations that lead corporate management to choose one structure over the other are not relevant to whether the enterprise’s conduct seriously threatens competition.¹⁹ Rather, a corporation may adopt the subsidiary form of organization for valid management and related

¹⁸ [Omitted]

¹⁹ Because an “agreement” between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary is no more likely to be anticompetitive than an agreement between two divisions of a single corporation, it does not matter that the parent “availed [itself] of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations,” *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.*, 392 U.S. 134, 141 (1968). The purposeful choice of a parent corporation to organize a subunit as a subsidiary is not itself a reason to heighten antitrust scrutiny, because it is not laden with anticompetitive risk.

purposes. Separate incorporation may improve management, avoid special tax problems arising from multistate operations, or serve other legitimate interests.²⁰ Especially in view of the increasing complexity of corporate operations, a business enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency of control, economy of operations, and other factors dictated by business judgment without increasing its exposure to antitrust liability. Because there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about a corporation's decision to create a subsidiary, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine "impose[s] grave legal consequences upon organizational distinctions that are of *de minimis* meaning and effect." *Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co.*, 370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962).²¹

If antitrust liability turned on the garb in which a corporate subunit was clothed, parent corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries into unincorporated divisions. Indeed, this is precisely what the Seagram company did after this Court's decision in *Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.*, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).²² Such an incentive serves no valid antitrust goals but merely deprives consumers and producers of the benefits that the subsidiary form may yield.

The error of treating a corporate division differently from a wholly owned subsidiary is readily seen from the facts of this case. Regal was operated as an unincorporated division of Lear Siegler for four years before it became a wholly owned subsidiary of Copperweld. Nothing in this record indicates any meaningful difference between Regal's operations as a division and its later operations as a separate corporation. Certainly nothing suggests that Regal was a greater threat to competition as a subsidiary of Copperweld than as a division of Lear Siegler. Under either arrangement, Regal might have acted to bar a new competitor from entering the market. In one case it could have relied on economic power from other quarters of the Lear Siegler corporation; instead it drew on the strength of its separately incorporated parent, Copperweld. From the standpoint of the antitrust laws, there is no reason to treat one more harshly than the other. As Chief Justice Hughes cautioned, "[r]ealities must dominate the judgment." *Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States*, 288 U.S., at 360.²³

D

²⁰ [Omitted]

²¹ [Omitted]

²² [Omitted]

²³ The dissent argues that references in the legislative history to "trusts" suggest that Congress intended § 1 to govern the conduct of all affiliated corporations. See *post*, at 787-788. But those passages explicitly refer to combinations created for the very purpose of restraining trade. None of the cited debates refers to the postacquisition conduct of corporations whose initial affiliation was lawful. Indeed, Senator Sherman stated:

"It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and human experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination."
121 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890).

Any reading of the Sherman Act that remains true to the Act's distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct will necessarily disappoint those who find that distinction arbitrary. It cannot be denied that § 1's focus on concerted behavior leaves a "gap" in the Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade. See *post*, at 789. An unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not only by two independent firms acting in concert; a single firm may restrain trade to precisely the same extent if it alone possesses the combined market power of those same two firms. Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such—but only restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy—it leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive conduct (short of threatened monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct of two firms subject to § 1 liability.

We have already noted that Congress left this "gap" for eminently sound reasons. Subjecting a single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to promote. See *supra*, at 767-769. Moreover, whatever the wisdom of the distinction, the Act's plain language leaves no doubt that Congress made a purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted conduct. Had Congress intended to outlaw unreasonable restraints of trade as such, § 1's requirement of a contract, combination, or conspiracy would be superfluous, as would the entirety of § 2.²⁴ Indeed, this Court has recognized that § 1 is limited to concerted conduct at least since the days of *United States v. Colgate & Co.*, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Accord, *post*, at 789.

The appropriate inquiry in this case, therefore, is not whether the coordinated conduct of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary may ever have anticompetitive effects, as the dissent suggests. Nor is it whether the term "conspiracy" will bear a literal construction that includes parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries. For if these were the proper inquiries, a single firm's conduct would be subject to § 1 scrutiny whenever the coordination of two employees was involved. Such a rule would obliterate the Act's distinction between unilateral and concerted

²⁴ Even if common-law intracorporate conspiracies were firmly established when Congress passed the Sherman Act, the obvious incompatibility of an intracorporate conspiracy with § 1 is sufficient to refute the dissent's suggestion that Congress intended to incorporate such a definition. See *post*, at 784-787. Moreover, it is far from clear that intracorporate conspiracies were recognized at common law in 1890. Even today courts disagree whether corporate employees can conspire with themselves or with the corporation for purposes of certain statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Compare, *e.g.*, *Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.*, 584 F.2d 1235 (CA3 1978) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), with *Dombrowski v. Dowling*, 459 F.2d 190 (CA7 1972). And in 1890 it was disputed whether a corporation could itself be guilty of a crime that required criminal intent, such as conspiracy. Commentators appear to agree that courts began finding corporate liability for such crimes only around the turn of the century. See generally Edgerton, *Corporate Criminal Responsibility*, 36 Yale L.J. 827, 828, and n. 11 (1927); Miller, *Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle Extended to Its Limits*, 38 Fed. Bar J. 49 (1979); Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 284, and n. 9 (1946). Of course, Congress changed that common-law rule when it explicitly provided that a corporation could be guilty of a § 1 conspiracy. But the point remains that the Sherman Act did not import a pre-existing common-law tradition recognizing conspiracies between corporations and their own employees.

conduct, contrary to the clear intent of Congress as interpreted by the weight of judicial authority. See n. 15, *supra*. Rather, the appropriate inquiry requires us to explain the logic underlying Congress' decision to exempt unilateral conduct from § 1 scrutiny, and to assess whether that logic similarly excludes the conduct of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. Unless we second-guess the judgment of Congress to limit § 1 to concerted conduct, we can only conclude that the coordinated behavior of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary falls outside the reach of that provision.

Although we recognize that any “gap” the Sherman Act leaves is the sensible result of a purposeful policy decision by Congress, we also note that the size of any such gap is open to serious question. Any anticompetitive activities of corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries meriting antitrust remedies may be policed adequately without resort to an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. A corporation's initial acquisition of control will always be subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 18. Thereafter, the enterprise is fully subject to § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45. That these statutes are adequate to control dangerous anticompetitive conduct is suggested by the fact that not a single holding of antitrust liability by this Court would today be different in the absence of an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. It is further suggested by the fact that the Federal Government, in its administration of the antitrust laws, no longer accepts the concept that a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries can “combine” or “conspire” under § 1.²⁵ Elimination of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine with respect to corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries will therefore not cripple antitrust enforcement. It will simply eliminate treble damages from private state tort suits masquerading as antitrust actions.

IV

We hold that Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary Regal are incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. To the extent that prior decisions of this Court are to the contrary, they are disapproved and overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

²⁵ “[T]he [intra-enterprise conspiracy] doctrine has played a relatively minor role in government enforcement actions, and the government has not relied on the doctrine in recent years.” Brief for United States as *Amicus Curiae* 26, n. 42.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

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III

The Court's reason for rejecting the concept of a combination or conspiracy among a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary is that it elevates form over substance—while in form the two corporations are separate legal entities, in substance they are a single integrated enterprise and hence cannot comprise the plurality of actors necessary to satisfy § 1. *Ante*, at 771-774. In many situations the Court's reasoning is perfectly sensible, for the affiliation of corporate entities often is procompetitive precisely because, as the Court explains, it enhances efficiency. A challenge to conduct that is merely an incident of the desirable integration that accompanies such affiliation should fail. However, the protection of such conduct provides no justification for the Court's new rule, precisely because such conduct cannot be characterized as an unreasonable restraint of trade violative of § 1. Conversely, the problem with the Court's new rule is that it leaves a significant gap in the enforcement of § 1 with respect to anticompetitive conduct that is entirely unrelated to the efficiencies associated with integration.

Since at least *United States v. Colgate & Co.*, 250 U.S. 300 (1919), § 1 has been construed to require a plurality of actors. This requirement, however, is a consequence of the plain statutory language, not of any economic principle. As an economic matter, what is critical is the presence of market power, rather than a plurality of actors.²¹ From a competitive standpoint, a decision of a single firm possessing power to reduce output and raise prices above competitive levels has the same consequence as a decision by two firms acting together who have acquired an equivalent amount of market power through an agreement not to compete.²²

²¹ Market power is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market. See *Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2, 27, n. 46 (1984); *United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.*, 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977); *United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).

²² Significantly, the Court never suggests that the plurality-of-actors requirement has any intrinsic economic significance. Rather, it suggests that the requirement has evidentiary significance: combinations are more likely to signal anticompetitive conduct than is unilateral activity: "In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction." *Ante*, at 769. That is true, but it is also true of any ordinary commercial contract between separate entities, as can be seen if one substitutes the word "contract" for "conspiracy" in the passage I have quoted. The language of the Sherman Act indicates that it treats "contracts" and "conspiracies" as equivalent concepts—both satisfy the multiplicity-of-actors requirement—and yet one of the most fundamental points in antitrust jurisprudence, dating at least to *Standard Oil*, is that there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about a contract. Similarly, an agreement to act "for common benefit" in itself is unremarkable—all agreements are in some sense a restraint of trade be they contracts or conspiracies. It is only when trade is unreasonably restrained that § 1 is implicated. The Court's evidentiary concern lacks merit.

Unilateral conduct by a firm with market power has no less anticompetitive potential than conduct by a plurality of actors which generates or exploits the same power,²³ and probably more, since the unilateral actor avoids the policing problems faced by cartels.

The rule of *Yellow Cab* [*United States v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 332 U.S. 218 (1947), which holds that affiliated corporations have the capacity to conspire] thus has an economic justification. It addresses a gap in antitrust enforcement by reaching anticompetitive agreements between affiliated corporations which have sufficient market power to restrain marketwide competition, but not sufficient power to be considered monopolists within the ambit of § 2 of the Act.²⁴ The doctrine is also useful when a third party declines to join a conspiracy to restrain trade among affiliated corporations, and is harmed as a result through a boycott or similar tactics designed to penalize the refusal. In such cases, since there has been no agreement with the third party, only an agreement between the affiliated corporations can be the basis for § 1 inquiry.²⁵ Finally, it must be remembered that not all persons who restrain trade wear grey flannel suits. Businesses controlled by organized crime often attempt to gain control of an industry through violence or intimidation of competitors; in such cases §1 can be applied to separately incorporated businesses which benefit from such tactics, but which may be ultimately controlled by a single criminal enterprise.²⁶

The rule of *Yellow Cab* and its progeny is not one that condemns every parent-subsidiary relationship. A single firm, no matter what its corporate structure may be, is not expected to compete with itself.²⁷ Functional integration by its very nature requires unified action; hence in itself it has never been sufficient to establish the existence of an unreasonable restraint of trade: “In discussing the charge in the *Yellow Cab* case, we said that the fact that the conspirators were integrated did not insulate them from the act, not that corporate integration violated the act.” *United States v. Columbia Steel Co.*, 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948). Restraints that act only on the parent or its subsidiary as a consequence of an otherwise lawful integration do not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.²⁸ But if the behavior at issue is unrelated to any

²³ [Omitted]

²⁴ “[I]t is the potential which this conspiracy concept holds for the development of a rational enforcement policy which, if anything, will ultimately attract the courts. If conduct of a single corporation which restrains trade were to violate Section 1, a forceful weapon would be available to the government with which to challenge conduct which in oligopolistic industries creates or reinforces entry barriers. Excessive advertising in the cereal, drug, or detergent industries, annual style changes in the auto industry, and other such practices could be reached as soon as they threatened to inhibit competition; there would be no need to wait until a ‘dangerous probability’ of monopoly had been reached, the requirement under Section 2 ‘attempt’ doctrine. Nor would a single firm restraint of trade rule be overbroad. It would in no way threaten single firm activity-setting a price, deciding what market it would deal in, or the like-which did not threaten competitive conditions.” L. Sullivan, [Law of Antitrust] *supra*, n. 9, § 114, at 324 [(1977)] (footnotes omitted).

²⁵ [Omitted]

²⁶ [Omitted]

²⁷ [Omitted]

²⁸ [Omitted]

functional integration between the affiliated corporations and imposes a restraint on third parties of sufficient magnitude to restrain marketwide competition, as a matter of economic substance, as well as form, it is appropriate to characterize the conduct as a “combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.”²⁹

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In sum, the question that the Court should ask is not why a wholly owned subsidiary should be treated differently from a corporate division, since the immunity accorded that type of arrangement is a necessary consequence of *Colgate*. Rather the question should be why two corporations that engage in a predatory course of conduct which produces a marketwide restraint on competition and which, as separate legal entities, can be easily fit within the language of § 1, should be immunized from liability because they are controlled by the same godfather. That is a question the Court simply fails to confront. I respectfully dissent.

²⁹ [Omitted]