Applied Antitrust Law

Dale Collins
NYU School of Law

NB: "±" indicates that the hyperlink will take you to another site.

   

Home page
Topical index
Case studies index

 

2. Early Foundations

1. Introduction to Price Fixing: Legal and Economic Foundations

Class notes and Reading
Mechanics of a price-fixing cartel
Reference materials
Case studies—Horizontal price fixing

 

Primary Materials

Supplemental Materials

Class Notes and Reading

Survey course
Procedure course

 

Unit 1 notes (full page format)

Unit 1 notes (half-page notes format)

Unit 1 reading (complete set)

A Little Algebraic Insight on Profit Maximization

Mechanics of a Price-Fixing Cartel

The Indianapolis Ready-Mix Concrete Price Fixing Conspiracy

Indianapolis Ready-Mix Concrete Price Fixing Conspiracy

United States v. Beaver, No. 07-1381 (7th Cir. Feb. 4, 2008) (affirming conviction) (reported at 515 F.3d 730)

Frank J. Vondrak, Ass't Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. Chicago Field Office, Case Study: Ready Mixed Concrete (undated)

Seventh Circuit Docket sheet

Defendant Ready-Mixed Concrete Plants in the Central Indiana Area

Reference Materials

Evolution of basic price-fixing law

Wayne D. Collins, The Common Law Evolution of the Fundamental Rules of Horizontal Restraints (edited cases and notes on the major cases).

± William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 Antitrust L.J. 377 (2003).

See here for significant precedents on proving conspiracy
See here for significant precedents on proving unreasonableness

Buyer cartels

± Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).

In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., No. 06-4511 (6th Cir. May 15, 2008) (reported at 527 F.3d 517).

± Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).

In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., 555 F. Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. Tenn. 2008).

± Chris Doyle & Martijn A. Han, Efficient Cartelization Through Buyer Groups (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2009-03, February 2, 2009).

Economics of collusion

Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings (2012).

± B. Douglas Bernheim & Erik Madsen, Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels (March 2014)

± Joe Harrington, Lectures on Collusive Practices, Slides from a course at CRESSE (June 29-30, 2011).

± Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Collusion, in 2 Issues in Competition Law and Policy 1069 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., .How Do Cartels Operate?, 2 Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 1 (2005)..

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez & Praveen Kujal, The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings (September 16, 2013).

± Johannes Paha, Cartel Formation With Endogenous Capacity and Demand Uncertainty (September 12, 2013).

± Igor Mouraviev, Explicit Collusion Under Antitrust Enforcement (Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 494, July 14, 2013).

± John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays (2012), final version at 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 427 (2012).

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Game-Theoretic Ruminations on Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Slides from the Bayard W. Heath Memorial Lecture, University of Florida Levin College of Law (March 30, 2012).

± Malcolm B. Coate, Should Economic Theory Control Price Fixing Analysis? (August 21, 2012).

± Anton-Giulio Manganelli, Cartel Pricing Dynamics, Price Wars and Cartel Breakdown (Toulouse School of Economics Working Paper No. 12-309, May 2012)

± Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 Antitrust L.J. 343 (2011).

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices (rev. April 2010), final version at 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 2425 (2011) (± online appendix).

± Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Jorge Guillen, On Collusion and Industry Size, 21 Annals of Econ. & Finance 31 (2011).

D. W. Carlton & S. Peltzman, Introduction to Stigler's Theory of Oligopoly. 6 Competition Pol'y Int'l 237 (2010).

± Paul R. Zimmerman, On the Sustainability of Collusion in Bertrand Supergames with Discrete Pricing andMnonlinear Demand (2010)

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices (rev. Apr. 2010).

± Marc Escrihuela Villar, A Note on Cartel Stability and Endogenous Sequencing with Tacit Collusion (2008), final version at 96 J. Econ. 137 (2009),

± Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx. Explicit Collusion and Market Share Allocations (2008).

± Iwan Bos & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms (November 12, 2008).

± A. Gallice, The Neglected Effects of Demand Characteristics on the Sustainability of Collusion (2008)

± Johannes Horner & Julian Jamison, Collusion with (Almost) No Information, 38 RAND J. Econ. 804 (2007).

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., How Do Cartels Operate?, in 2 Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 1 (2006).

± Stephen Martin, Competition Policy, Collusion, and Tacit Collusion, 24 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 1299 (2006).

± Kai-Uwe Kühn & Michael S. Rimler, The Comparative Statics of Collusion Models (May 2006).

± John M. Connor, Collusion and Price Dispersion (Purdue University, Department Staff Paper No. 10-14, March 20, 2005).

± Paul A Grout & Silvia Sonderegger, Predicting Cartels, Report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading (Mar. 2005).

Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 Antitrust L.J. 719 (2004).

± Nicolas de Roos, A Model of Collusion Timing (____), final version at 22 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 351 (2004).

± Michael D. Whinston, Price Fixing (CSIO Working Paper #0040, 2003).

± Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, Deciding Between Competition and Collusion, 85 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 971 (2003).

± Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, Optimal Collusion with Private Information, 32 RAND J. Econ. 428 (2001).

± Chaim Fersthman & Ariel Pakes, A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars, 31 RAND J. Econ. 207 (2000).

Luca Lambertini, Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand (December 1994), final version at 48 Bull. Econ. Res. 329 (1996)

Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in Handbook of Industrial Organization 329 (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig ed., 1989).

± Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Cartels, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 295 (1987).

± Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring, 39 J. Econ. Theory 251 (1986).

William A. Brock, & Jose A. Scheinkman, Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints, 52 Rev. Econ. Stud. 371 (1985).

± Robert H. Porter, Optimal Cartel Trigger Price Strategies, 29 J. Econ. Theory 313 (1983).

Dale K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 835 (1976).

± George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964).

Auctions

± Luke M. Froeb & Mikhael Short, Auctions, Evidence, and Antitrust (___), final version at Auction Models, in Econometrics: Legal, Practical, and Technical Issues ch. 9 (John Harkrider ed., 2005).

± Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby’s and Christie’s (October 2004), final version published in 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 3 (2005).

± Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and Antitrust Law: Refining the Analysis of Price Fixing to Account for the Special Features of Auction Markets, 72 Antitrust L.J. 83 (2004).

± Martin Pesendorfer, A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions, 67 Rev. Econ. Studies 381 (2000).

± Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 518 (1993).

± Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. Econ. Perspectives 3 (1989).

± R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. Econ. Literature 699 (1987).

Bidding rings

± John Asker, Bidding Rings (November 2, 2009).

± K. Hendricks, R. Porter & G. Tan, Bidding Rings and the Winner’s Curse (June 29, 2004), final version at 39 RAND J. Econ. 1018 (2008).

± R. P. McAfee & J. McMilliam, Bidding Rings, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 579 (1992).

Communications among competitors

Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication between Firms, 32 Econ. Pol'y 1 (2001).

Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfeld, Communication among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, Geo. Mason L. Rev. 423 (1997).

Screens for collusion

± Danilo Samà, Cartel Detection and Collusion Screening: An Empirical Analysis of the London Metal Exchange (2014)

± Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz , Sofia B. Villas-Boas & George Judge, Tracking the Libor Rate (2013)

± Peter L.Ormosi, How Big is a Tip of the Iceberg? A Parsimonious Way to Estimate Cartel Detection Rate (ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper Series, May 19, 2011).

± Rosa Abrantes-Metzand & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and their Multiple Applications, Antitrust, Vol. 24, No. 1, Fall 2009, at 66.

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Detecting Cartels (rev. July 2005), final version published in Handbook of Antitrust Economics 353 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Luke M. Froeb, John F. Geweke & Christopher T. Taylor, A Variance Screen for Collusion, 24 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 467 (2006).

± Patrick Rey, On the Use of Economic Analysis in Cartel Detection (2006).

± Robert H. Porter, Detecting Collusion (Northwestern University, The Center for the Study of Industrial Organization Working Paper #0051, 2004), final version at 26 Rev. Indus. Org. 147 (2005).

Welfare economics

± Iwan Bos & Erik Pot, Welfare-Enhancing Hard Core Cartels (Feb. 10, 2010).

Luis C. Corchón DÍaz, Welfare Losses Under Cournot Competition (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economía, Working Paper 06-39, June 2006), final version at 26 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 1120 (2008).

Keith Cowling & Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 Econ. J. 727 (1978).

± Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 Am. Econ. Rev. 77 (1954).

Game theory background

± Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory (2003).

± Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (1992) (technical).

± Jean Tirole, Noncooperative Game Theory: A User’s Manual, in The Theory of Industrial Organization ch. 11 (1988).

± David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling (1990) (lectures on the strengths and weaknesses of game theory).

± Robert Gibbons, An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory, 11 J. Econ. Perspectives 127 (1997).

± Kyle Bagwell & Asher Wolinsky, Game Theory and Industrial Organization (Columbia University Dep't of Economics Discussion Paper No. 9900-03, April 3, 2000).

A very easy way to gain a basic understanding of game theory is to read the lecture notes in Muhamet Yildiz's course on ± Economic Applications of Game Theory, which was taught at MIT in 2005 (available at part of MIT's OpenCourseWare program).

There are a couple of interesting game theory web sites. You can find links to most of them in ± Game Theory.net

Game theory and cartels

± Joseph E., Harrington, Jr., A Theory of Tacit Collusion (Jan. 2012).

± Harold Houba, Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2010-047/1, April 2010).

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (June 1, 2010).

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority, 46 Int'l Econ. Rev. 145 (2005).

± Joseph E. Harrington, Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority, 35 RAND J. Econ. 651 (2004).

± Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution (February 13, 2001), final version at 21 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 347 (2003).

Jean-Pierre Benoˆît & Vijay Krishna, The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (March 10, 2000).

Cartel success

± Florian Smuda, Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law (ZEW Discussion
Paper No. 12-050, 2012).

± J. Douglas Zona, Structural Approaches to Estimating Overcharges in Price-Fixing Cases, 77 Antitrust L.J. 473 (2011).

± Rachidi Kotchoni & Marcel Boyer, The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges (March 15, 2011).

± Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration (U. Mich. Ross School of Business, Working Paper No. 1150, September 2010).

± John M. Connor, Price Fixing Overcharges: Revised 2nd Edition (April 27, 2010).

± Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Myong-Hun Chang, Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Competition Policy, 7 J. Eur. Econ. Ass'n 1400 (2009).

± John M. Connor, Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed: Private International Cartels from 1990 to 2008 (Sept. 1, 2009).

± Benjamin Bridgman, Shi Qi & James A. Schmitz, The Economic Performance of Cartels: Evidence from the New Deal U.S. Sugar Manufacturing Cartel, 1934—74 (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,Research Department Staff Report 437, 2009).

± Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success? (Jan. 31, 2002), final version at 44 J. Econ. Literature 43 (2006).

± Robert H. Lande & John M. Connor, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Reform of the Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines, 80 Tulane L. Rev. 513 (2005).

± John M. Connor & Yuliya Bolotova, Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis (Purdue University, Dep' of Agricultural Econ., Working Paper, 2005).

± Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral Economics Analysis of Cartels (Jan. 12, 2010).

± Jason E. Taylor & Peter G. Klein, An Anatomy of a Cartel: The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the Compliance Crisis of 1934 (2008), final version at 26 Research in Economic History 235 (2008).

Multimarket contacts

B. D. Bernheim & M. D. Whinston (1990), Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior, 21 RAND J. Econ. 1 (1990).

Hitoshi Matsushima, Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion, 98 J. Econ. Theory 158 (2001).

Empirical studies

Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde, Collusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case (Oct. 22, 2012), final version at 5 Am. Econ. J.: Microeconomics 97 (2013).

± John M. Connor, Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed: Private International Cartels from 1990 to 2008 (August 31, 2009).

Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Studies of Cartel Stability: A Comparison of Methodological Approaches, in How Cartels Endure and How They Fail (Peter Z. Grossman ed., 2004).

David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 379 (2001).

± Robert H. Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880–1886, 14 Bell J. Econ. 301 (1983).

± Glenn Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, 25 RAND J. Econ. 37 (1994).

Peter Asch & Joseph J. Seneca, Characteristics of Collusive Firms, 23 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (1975).

Social costs of monopoly

± James A. Schmitz, Jr., New and Larger Costs of Monopoly and Tariffs (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department Staff Report 468, July 2012).

William P. Rogerson, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, 13 Bell J. Econ. 391 (1982).

Keith Cowling & Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 Econ. J. 727 (1978).

Keith Cowling & Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Costs of Monopoly Power Revisted, 91 Econ. J. 721 (1981).

± Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807 (1975).

Franklin M. Fisher, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner Reconsidered, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 410 (1985).

Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 Am. Econ. Rev. 77 (1954).

Case Studies—Horizontal Price Fixing

NCAA (private 2014)
DIPF (FTC 2012)
Lysine cartel
Milk cases
Sotheby's-Christie's
Airline tariff publishing
NASDAQ market-makers
Stamp dealers cartel
Detroit auto dealers
Other cases examining price-fixing cartel mechanics
Other studies

NCAA
(private 2014)

Complaint and Jury Demand—Class Action Seeking Injunction and Individual Damages, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 3:14-cv-01678 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 17, 2014)

DIPF
(FTC 2012)

Complaint, In re McWane, Inc., No. 9351 (F.T.C. filed Jan. 4, 2012) (± FTC news release) (± FTC web page)

Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part in the Matter of McWane, Inc. and Star Pipe Products, Ltd., and in the Matter of Sigma Corporation (Jan. 4, 2012)

Prior settlement by Sigma Corp.:

Complaint, In re Sigma Corp., C-4347 (F.T.C.accepted for public comment Jan. 4, 2012)
Agreement Containing Consent Order To Cease and Desist (Jan. 4, 2012)
Decision and Order (Jan. 4, 2012) (accepting consent order for public comment)
Federal Register notice (Jan. 10, 2012)

Complaint (Feb. 27, 2012)
Decision and Order (Feb. 27, 2012) (final acceptance of consent order)

± FTC web page

Order Designating Administrative Law Judge (Jan. 5, 2012)

Protective Order Governing Discovery Material (Jan. 5, 2012)

Answer of Respondent Star Pipe Products, Ltd. To Complaint of Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 23, 2012)

Answer of Respondent McWane Inc. to the Federal Trade Commission’s Administrative Complaint (Feb. 2, 2012)

Scheduling Order (Feb. 15, 2012)

Star Pipe settlement

Joint Motion to Withdraw Matter from Adjudication (Feb. 23, 2012)

Commission Order Withdrawing Matter from Adjudication as to Respondent Star Pipe Products, Ltd., for the Purpose of Considering A Proposed Consent Agreement (Feb. 23, 2012)

Star Pipe Products, Ltd.’s Notice to McWane, Inc. of Stay and Withdrawal from Adjudication, and Objections to Pending Discovery Requests (Feb. 28, 2012)

Agreement Containing Consent Order (Mar. 20, 2012) (± FTC news release)

Decision and Order (Mar. 20, 2012)

Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment (Mar. 20, 2012)

Federal Register Notice (Mar. 26, 2012)

Commission Order Extending Withdrawal from Adjudication as to Respondent Star Pipe Products, Ltd. (Mar. 29, 2012)

Decision and Order (May 11, 2012) (± FTC news release)

Commission Order Withdrawing Respondent Star Pipe Products, Ltd. from Adjudication (May 21, 2012) (permanently withdrawing from adjudication all claims against Star Pipe)

Complaint Counsel’s Requests for Admissions to Respondent McWane, Inc. (May 22, 2012)

Respondent McWane, Inc.’s Objections and Responses to Complaint Counsel's Requests for Admission (June 15, 2012)

 

Complaint Counsel’s Motion For Partial Summary Decision (June 8, 2012)

Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent McWane, Inc.'s Opposition to and Motion to
Strike Complaint Counsel's Motion for Partial Summary Decision
(June 25, 2012)

Complaint Counsel’s Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion For Partial Summary Decision (June 27, 2012)

Order Denying Respondent's Motion For Summary Decision and Complaint Counsel's Motion For Partial Summary Decision (Aug. 9, 2012) (by full commission)

Respondent McWane, Inc.’s Motion [And Proposed Order] For Summary Decision (June 8, 2012)

Complaint Counsel's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Decision (June 22, 2012)

Reply Brief in Support of Respondent McWane, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Decision (June 28, 2012)

Order Denying Respondent's Motion For Summary Decision and Complaint Counsel's Motion For Partial Summary Decision (Aug. 9, 2012) (by full commission)

Opinion of the Commission (Aug. 9, 2012) (provisional redacted public version)

Joint Stipulations of Law and Fact (Aug. 28, 2012)

Complaint Counsel’s Pre-Trial Brief and Exhibits (Aug. 23, 2012) (redacted public version)

Respondent McWane, Inc.'s Pre-Trial Brief (Aug. 31, 2012)

Administrative trial commenced on September 4, 2012

Respondent McWane, Inc.'s Proposed Stipulations of Law, Fact, and Authenticity (Sept. 20, 2012)

Complaint Counsel rested on October 18, 2012
McWane moved for judgment as a matter of law on October 19, 2012

Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at the Close of Evidence Offered in Support of the Complaint (Nov. 7, 2012)

Order Closing Hearing Record (Nov. 7, 2012)

Respondent McWane, Inc.'s Proposed Conclusions of Law (Dec. 14, 2012)

Order on Post-Trial Briefs (Nov. 13, 2012)

Complaint Counsel’s Post-Trial Brief (Dec. 19, 2012)

Post-Trial Brief of Respondent McWane, Inc. (Dec. 21, 2012)

Post Trial Reply Brief of Respondent McWane, Inc. (Jan. 25, 2013)

Complaint Counsel’s Post-Trial Reply Brief (Jan. 28, 2013)

Complaint Counsel’s Post-Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dec. 19, 2012)

Respondent McWane, Inc.'s Proposed Findings of Fact (Dec. 21, 2012)

Respondent McWane, Inc.’s Reply to Complaint Counsel’s Post-Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Jan. 25, 2013)

Complaint Counsel’s Post-Trial Reply Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Jan. 28, 2013)

Order Extending Time for Filing Initial Decision Pursuant to Commission Rule 3.51 (Mar. 28, 2013)

Initial Decision (May 9, 2013) (FTC news release)

 

Appeal to the full Commission

Complaint Counsel's Notice of Appeal (May 13, 2013)

Notice of Appeal (May 13, 2013)

Complaint Counsel's Appeal Brief (June 4, 2013)

Respondent McWane, Inc.'s Answering Brief to Complaint Counsel's Appeal Brief (July 8, 2013)

Complaint Counsel’s Reply Brief (July 12, 2013)

Respondent McWane, Inc.'s Appeal Brief (June 4, 2013)

Complaint Counsel's Answering Brief to Respondent's Appeal Brief (July 8, 2013)

Respondent McWane, Inc.’s Reply Brief in Support of Appeal (July 16, 2013)

Complaint Counsel's Oral Argument on Appeal August 22, 2013 (Aug. 15, 2013)

Respondent's Compilation of Materials to Present During Oral Argument (Aug. 15, 2013)

[Corrected] Transcript of Oral Argument (Jan. 29, 2014)

Opinion of the Commission (Feb. 6, 2014) (sustaining only Count 6) (FTC news release)

Final Order (Feb. 6, 2014)

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright (Feb. 6, 2014)

Respondent's Application for Stay of Order Pending Review by U.S. Court of Appeals (Mar. 13, 2014)

Commission Order Denying Respondent's Application for a Stay of Order Pending Review by U.S. Court of Appeals (Apr. 11, 2014)

Eleventh Circuit

Docket sheet (No. 14-11363) (downloaded July 11, 2014)

 

Lysine cartel

Information, United States v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., Crim. No. 96-CR-00640 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 15, 1996)

± U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Press Release, Archer Daniels Midland Co. to Plead Guilty and Pay $100 Million for Role in Two International Price-Fixing Conspiracies (Oct. 15, 1996)

Indictment, United States v. Andreas, Crim. No. 96-CR-00762 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 3, 1996)

Docket sheet (downloaded August 28, 2011)

United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1998 WL 42261 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1998) (denying defendant Wilson's motion to suppress the surreptitious tapes recorded in Japan), aff'd, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000)

United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1998 WL 214666 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 1998) (denying motions to compel a grant of use immunity, suppress the audiotapes for selective taping and destruction of exculpatory evidence, and for disclosure of Brady material), aff'd, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000

United States v. Andreas, 23 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1998) (deciding various pretrial motions), aff'd, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000)

Jury instructions

United States v. Andreas, 23 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1998) (deciding various post-trial motions), aff'd, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000

United States v. Andreas, 23 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1998) (denying motion for judgment of acquittal), aff'd, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000

United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1998) (challenge to jury convictions), aff'd, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000

United States, v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999 WL 51806 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1999) (considering applications of Sentencing Guidelines), aff'd, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000

United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999 WL 116218 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1999) (denying motion not to apply the alternative fine provisions under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) without prejudice)

United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999 WL 299314 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1999) (granting motion to compel production of documents relevant to sentencing)

United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999 WL 515484 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1999) (deciding various motions on sentencing), aff'd, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000

United States v. Andreas, No. 99-3097 (7th Cir. June 26, 2000) (reported as 216 F.3d 645)

Brief for Appellee and Cross-Appellant United States of America (Oct. 19, 1999)

Reply Brief for Cross-Appellant United States of America (Dec. 2, 1999)

Commentary

± New York Times and Chicago Tribune articles on the Lysine case

± James B. Lieber, Rats in the Grain: The Dirty Tricks and Trials of Archer Daniels Midland, the Supermarket to the World (2000).

± Kurt Eichenwald, The Informant (2000).

± Scott D. Hammond, Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Caught in the Act: Inside an International Cartel, Presentation to the OECD Competition Committee Working Party No. 3 Public Prosecutors Program, Paris, France (October 18, 2005).

± John M. Connor, Global Cartels Redux: The Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation (1996) (May 21, 2009), final version published in The Antitrust Revolution 336 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 6th ed. 2014) .

± Nicolas de Roos, Examining Models of Collusion: the Market for Lysine (____), published at 24 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 1083 (2006).

± Lawrence J. White, Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe? (February 18, 1999).

± William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Matthew E. Raiff, Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel (September 2005), final version published in The Political Economy of Antitrust 149 (282 Contributions to Economic Analysis, Vivek Ghosal & Johan Steenak eds., 2007).

Milk cases

Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Ohio 1994)

Commentary

± Robert Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Bidding, Bid Rigging, and School Milk Prices: Ohio v. Trauth (1994), in The Antitrust Revolution 211 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 4th ed. 2004).

± Rebecca Adkins, Chelsea Block & Gracie Randall, Ohio v. Trauth: Bidding, Bid Rigging, and School Milk Prices

Sotheby’s-Christie’s

United States v. Alfred Taubman, No. 01 CR 429, 2002 WL 548733 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002), ± aff’d, 297 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2002).

Docket sheet (downloaded Jan. 1, 2010)

Indictment (May 2, 2001)

Jury instructions

DOJ Second Circuit brief (June 19, 2002)

Commentary

Alfred Taubman, Threshold Resistance (2007)

± Arthur D. Austin, A Price-Fixer’s Memoir—Exculpation and Revenge While Confronting the Antitrust Abyss: An Essay on Threshold Resistance by Alfred Taubman, Antitrust Source, October 2008

± Christopher Mason, The Art of the Steal: Inside the Sotheby's-Christie's Auction House Scandal (2004).

± Anna Rohleder, Time Line: The Rise of Christie's and Sotheby's, Forbes.com

± Anna Rohleder, Who's Who In The Sotheby's Price-Fixing Trial, Forbes.com

± Dan Ackman, Brooks Claims Taubman Initiated Price-Fixing, Forbes.com, Nov. 20, 2001

± Dan Ackman, The Taubman Trial, Forbes.com, December 13, 2001 (containing hyperlinks to all articles covering Taubman trial).

± Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby’s and Christie’s (October 2004), final version published in 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 3 (2005).

Airline Tariff Publishing

United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., Civ. A. No. 92-2854 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 21, 1992).

Complaint (Dec. 21, 1992)

Competitive Impact Statement (filed Dec. 21, 1992) in connection with United Air Lines, Inc. and USAir, Inc. consent decrees (Nov. 1, 1993)

Competitive Impact Statement (filed Mar. 17, 1994) in connection with Airline Tariff Publishing Company, Alaska Airlines, Inc., American Airlines, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., Delta Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., and Trans World Airlines, Inc. consent decrees (Aug. 10, 1994).

Petition of the United States for an Order to Show Cause Why Respondent American Airlines, Inc. Should Not Be Found in Civil Contempt (Aug. 6, 2004) (Stipulation) (Settlement Agreement and Order (09/23/2004)).

Commentary

Severin Borenstein, Rapid Price Communication and Coordination: The Airline Tariff Publishing Case (1994), in The Antitrust Revolution 223 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 4th ed. 2004).

NASDAQ market-makers

Complaint, United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, No. 96-cv-5313 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 17, 1996).

Stipulation and [Proposed] Order (July 17, 1996)

Competitive Impact Statement (July 17, 1996)

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of Plaintiffs in the In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae (Oct. 2, 1996)

Opinion (Nov. 27, 1996) (granting motion to intervene)

Opinion, United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, No. 97-6130 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 1998) (appeal by intervenors)

In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (approving class action settlement)

Commentary

± William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. Fin. 1813 (1994).

± William G. Christie, Jeffrey H. Harris, & Paul H. Schultz, Why Did NASDAQ Market Makers Stop Avoiding Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. Fin. 1841 (1994).

William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Policy Watch: Did Nasdaq Market Makers Implicitly Collude?, 9 J. Econ. Perspectives 199 (1995).

± Eugene Kandel & Leslie M. Marx, NASDAQ Market Structure and Spread Patterns (Oct. 6, 1995), final version at 45 J. Fin. Econ. 61 (1997).

± Harold Demsetz, Limit orders and the alleged Nasdaq collusion, 45 J. Fin. Econ. 91 (1997).

Arthur M. Kaplan, Antirust as a Public-Private Partnership: A Case Study of the NASDAQ Litigation, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 111 (2001).

Stamp Dealers Cartel

± John Asker, A Study of the Internal Organisation of a Bidding Cartel (April 1, 2009), final version at 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 724 (2010).

Detroit Auto Dealers

Complaint, In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, No. 9189 (F.T.C. filed Dec. 20, 1984)

Decision and Order, 108 F.T.C. 193, 237 (Dec. 3, 1986) (Chevrolet) (consent order)

Decision and Order, 108 F.T.C. 243 (Dec. 3, 1986) (Chrysler-Plymouth) (consent order)

Decision and Order, 108 F.T.C. 249 (Dec. 3, 1986) (Cadillac) (consent order)

Initial Decision, 111 F.T.C. 417, 418 (July 14, 1987) (administrative law judge decision dismissing complaint with respect to remaining respondents)

Final Decision, 111 F.T.C. 417, 475 (Feb. 22, 1989) (on appeal to full commission)

In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming in part and remanding)

FTC Order (Nov. 22, 1966) (remanding the case to the Administrative Law Judge for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Court of Appeals)

In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 119 F.T.C. 891 (F.T.C. June 20, 1995)

In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, ____ (6th Cir. 1992)

Agreement Containing Consent Order to Cease and Desist (March 14, 1997) (± news release)

Other cases examining price-fixing cartel mechanics

± Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000).

± JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999).

± Jacob Blinder & Sons, Inc. v. Gerber Prods. Co. (In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig.), 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999).

± Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993).

± Arizona v. Standard Oil Co. (In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings), 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990).

Other studies

± John Asker, A Study of the Internal Organisation of a Bidding Cartel (April 1, 2009), final version at 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 724 (2010).

± John M. Connor, Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed: Private International Cartels From 1990 to 2008 (AAI Working Paper No. 09-06, 2009).

Lars-Hendrick Röller & Frode Steen, On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian Cement Industry, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 321 (2006).

± Fiona Scott-Morton, Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929 (August 1997), final version at 6 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 679 (1997).

± Timothy F. Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Market: The 1955 Price War, 45 J. Indus. Econ. 457 (1987).

± Robert H. Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886, 14 Bell J. Econ. 301 (1983).

± Glenn Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, 25 RAND J. Econ. 37 (1994).

± Margaret C. Levenstein, Do Price Wars Facilitate Collusion? A Study of the Bromine Cartel before World War I, 33 Explorations In Econ. Hist. 107 (1996).

 

2. Early Foundations